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l)EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON DEBT, EQUITY, AND CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES
This dissertation consists of four empirical studies on firms’ financing decisions. In the
first two studies, we investigate the debt-equity choice for a large number of U.S. firms.
We find that firms prefer debt financing over equity financing in case a debt issue allows
the firm to keep its investment grade rating. When the financing requirement becomes
sufficiently large, firms are more likely to choose equity financing. We find that most firms
repurchase debt instead of equity in case they have excess funds. The last two studies of
this dissertation deal with convertible security design. Since convertible securities combine
debt and equity characteristics, the specific structure of these instruments can provide
further insight into the relevant costs and benefits of debt and equity. We find that taxes,
the costs of refinancing, and the costs of managerial discretion are important drivers of
convertible security design. We further find that the desire to manage earnings has been
responsible for recent innovations in the convertible market. Convertible arbitrage drives
the innovation of combining a convertible issue with a stock repurchase: the stock repurchase
serves to mitigate the negative price impact that results from the short sales of arbitrageurs.
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Preface 
 
In late 2004, when looking for a master’s thesis topic, I was very fortunate to get 
Miguel Rosellón appointed as my supervisor. At that time the introduction of IFRS 
provided a turbulent environment in the field of accounting, and during my internship 
at KPN I observed that managers were highly worried about the implications of these 
international accounting standards. Under the supervision of Miguel I wrote a thesis 
on the reactions of managers to the accounting changes. We showed that managers 
adjusted incentive schemes and hedging activities, even if the accounting changes did 
not have direct cash flow effects. After successfully defending my thesis, Miguel gave 
me two suggestions: 1) submit the thesis for the first CFO thesis award, and 2) apply 
for a PhD-position at the Rotterdam School of Management. The first advice won me 
3,000 euros; the second advice cost me more than three years of my life. Nonetheless, 
I consider the latter advice as one of the best suggestions ever given to me. 
The research project I applied for originated from the minds of Abe de Jong and 
Marno Verbeek, and dealt with firms’ financing decisions. This field of corporate 
finance had recently regained a lot of academic attention after a seminal paper in 1999, 
and was particularly interesting given the existence of two rival theories. Abe de Jong 
is an experienced corporate finance researcher, making him a very suitable guide for 
this project. Marno Verbeek has an econometrical background, and as he became 
more and more involved in the projects, he distinguished himself as a strong 
researcher who could answer every econometric question I could think of. I am truly 
convinced that my conversations with him substantially increased my research 
abilities, and I would like to thank Marno for his excellent guidance on both the 
scientific and personal level. 
During my PhD, I have had various faculty members as co-authors. Each one of 
them inspired me, and I am sure that all of them taught me more than I could teach 
them. Special thanks goes to Miguel Rosellón, who has also been my co-author in a 
study on the effects of IFRS on preference shares. Miguel is without a doubt one of 
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the most intelligent persons I have ever met. When I had been thinking about a 
problem for days, Miguel could most of the time provide various solutions in an 
instant. Marie Dutordoir has been my co-author on my first paper on convertible 
securities, which is Chapter 5 of this dissertation. I have benefited greatly from 
Marie’s knowledge on convertible securities, and I enjoyed working with her.  
In the third year of my PhD, I have spent time at the Owen Graduate School of 
Management at Vanderbilt University, under the supervision of Ronald Masulis. I 
would like to thank him for the invitation and his many comments on my ideas. At 
Vanderbilt, I met Craig Lewis, with whom I wrote a paper on the designs of 
convertible securities. This paper has resulted in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. Craig’s 
research ideas, working efficiency, and friendliness have greatly inspired me. I am 
sure that my cooperation with Craig will benefit me for the rest of my academic career. 
Next to working with faculty members, I have also been engaged in projects with 
fellow PhD-students. Jeroen Derwall and I have written a paper on the impact of 
corporate social responsibility on firms’ cost of capital. The paper shows that leaders 
in the fields of environmental performance, governance, and product quality have 
lower cost of capital than more sinful firms. I think of Jeroen as a promising young 
researcher, and expect him to stay a prominent spokesman on the effects of corporate 
social responsibility. I would also like to thank Tao Jiang who introduced me to the 
world of franchising: together with Abe de Jong we show that a franchising structure 
can provide tax benefits for the franchisor. Maarten Jennen and I explored whether the 
density of a firm’s location has an effect on its profitability. Surprisingly, we find that 
firms in low density areas outperform firms in large cities. Being roommates, we 
mostly wrote the paper during the evenings, and Maarten is the kind of person that 
makes it fun to work late. 
I would also like to thank my other roommates Willem Schramade, Chris 
Huurman, and Melissa Porras Prado. They always made it a pleasure to go to work. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank my fellow members at the PhD council, being 
Patricia Heijndijk, Remco Prins, and Oliver Weidenmuller. Of course, I am also 
indebted to ERIM. I would like to thank Tineke, Myra, Olga, and Eric for running a 
professional research institute that spreads such a warm feeling.   
I would not dare writing this preface without thanking some close friends. Most of 
my best friends are united in my darts team. I would like to thank Bernard, Sandor, 
Alex, Mark, Koen, and Martin for partnering up with me - or for supporting us - in the 
many matches we played. In addition, I would like to thank my fellow board members 
and friends at youth society De Gooth, with whom I spend numerous evenings of beer 
and laughter. Also, I would like to thank the members of my indoor soccer team, who 
always kept playing the ball to me even when they knew they would never get it back.  
9 
 
Let me try to express my gratitude to Abe de Jong in just this paragraph, bearing 
in mind that it can be in no way a sufficient enough thank you. When I first met Abe, I 
could not have guessed the strong impact he would have on my life. His perseverance 
in dragging me to seminars, his sharp evaluations of my achievements (“Patrick heeft 
wetenschappelijk ADHD”), his extensive guidance, and his many research ideas (on 
every topic I could think of) have made me the researcher I am. Abe makes sure that 
his PhD-students learn everything they ought to know. His door is always open to 
discuss matters, and I honestly think Abe is the best supervisor one could wish for. I 
want to thank him for his care, patience, and extreme friendliness, and hope to 
continue working with him in the future.  
My final word of gratitude goes to my parents and my fiancée. Peter, Carla, and 
Melissa are truly the most lovable people I know. This book is dedicated to them. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This thesis consists of four studies in the area of capital structure. The first two 
studies examine capital structure theories that explain firms’ financing decisions. The 
other two studies focus on recent trends in convertible security offerings. This chapter 
discusses the current status of the literature regarding capital structure theories and 
convertible security offerings, and describes how our studies relate to this literature. 
 
 
1.1 Capital structure theories 
 
 
The capital structure of a firm refers to the way in which a firm finances its 
operations. Basically, a firm can choose between straight debt, common equity, and 
hybrid securities. A general characteristic of debt is that interest has to be paid and 
that the loan has to be repaid at a given point in time. A common form of equity is a 
share, which typically is an exchange of money for a share of business ownership. 
Hybrid securities are financing instruments that combine debt and equity 
characteristics, like preferred stock and convertible bonds.  
One of the main questions in financial economics concerns the optimal financing 
decisions for firms: which type of financing should the firm obtain when its goal is to 
maximize firm value? Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrate that there would be 
arbitrage opportunities in perfect capital markets if the value of a firm depends on 
how it is financed. They also argue that if investors and firms can borrow at the same 
14
Chapter 1 
 
2 
rate, investors can neutralize any capital structure decisions the firm’s management 
may take. As a result, the financing decision is irrelevant in a perfect world. 
However, when the assumptions used by Modigliani and Miller are relaxed, some 
factors appear to be relevant when determining the optimal debt ratio. The three 
factors that are mostly cited are tax advantages, bankruptcy costs, and agency costs. 
The first factor relates to the argument that firms should use as much debt as possible 
due to the tax deductibility of interest expenses. The second factor is a disadvantage 
of debt: firms with higher leverage have a larger probability of default, which is costly. 
Even when firms do not face an immediate threat of bankruptcy, increasing leverage 
raises the chance of a firm getting into financial distress. Agency costs are another 
factor influencing the optimal debt ratio. Jensen and Meckling (1976) for example 
identify the conflicts between the shareholders’ interests and the managers’ individual 
interests and suggest that debt is a remedy against this form of agency costs: since 
debt forces the company to pay out the excessive cash flow, it decreases the free cash 
flow which is at managers’ discretion and thus in danger of being suboptimally 
invested. The static tradeoff theory argues that the tradeoff between these costs and 
benefits of debt results in an optimal debt ratio for firms.  
An alternative financing theory is the pecking order theory. This theory suggests 
that firms’ capital structure decisions can help to mitigate inefficiencies in a firm’s 
investment program that are caused by informational asymmetries. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) show that firms’ managers, when acting on behalf of the current shareholders, 
pass up good investments in case new shareholders will capture the benefits of the 
investment. Consequently, investors will reason that an investment decision without a 
security issue signals good news, while issuing securities signals bad news. The latter 
signal reduces the price investors are willing to pay for the issue. The information 
costs associated with debt and equity issues has led Myers (1984) to argue that a 
firm’s capital structure reflects past financial requirements. There is a pecking order 
of corporate financing: firms prefer internal finance over external finance. If internal 
finance is not sufficient and firms require external finance, firms start with issuing 
debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, and issue equity only 
as a last resort.  
Empirical research has found evidence for both capital structure theories. 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) analyze the debt-equity choice of U.S. firms 
for the period 1979-1997. They estimate whether the difference between the firm’s 
current leverage and its estimated target has an effect on whether the firm issues or 
repurchases debt or equity. They find that the higher the target with respect to the 
current leverage, the higher the probability that the firm issues debt. For repurchase 
decisions, it is found that the higher the target relative to the current leverage, the 
15
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higher the likelihood that the firm repurchases equity. Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
find that the typical firm closes about one-third of the gap between its actual and its 
target debt ratio each year. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) introduce an empirical test for the pecking order 
theory. According to this test, the pecking order implies that firms issue or retire an 
amount of debt equal to the funds flow deficit, which is the inadequacy of internal 
cash flows for real investments and dividend commitments. In a regression of a firm’s 
net debt issued on the financing deficit, the slope coefficient provides information on 
the proportion of a one dollar increase in deficits that is financed by debt. The pecking 
order implies that this coefficient is close to one. Using a sample of large, mature 
firms, Shyam-Sunder and Myers conclude that the pecking order model is a first-order 
descriptor of financing behavior, since they find an estimated pecking order 
coefficient of 0.75.  
Multiple papers have responded to Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ model. Chirinko 
and Singha (2000) argue that the linear specification of Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) is subject to a strong influence of large deficits. Frank and Goyal (2003) argue 
that firms with the greatest potential for asymmetric information will have the greatest 
incentive to follow the pecking order. They conclude that finding large, mature firms 
(rather than small, high-growth firms) to perform best in the Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers’ test is contrary to the pecking order theory. Lemmon and Zender (2007) argue 
that the finding of large firms to perform best for the pecking order is the result of 
debt capacity restraints, since it are precisely the small, high-growth firms that face 
the more restrictive debt constraints.  
Chapter 2 of this dissertation improves the empirical test of Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999). Our first modification relates to the fact that Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ 
model does not discriminate between the effects of financing deficits and financing 
surpluses. Our second modification results from Chirinko and Singha (2000), who 
argue that Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ empirical model is flawed for firms with large 
deficits. In case these firms follow the pecking order, the large financing needs may 
exceed the unused debt capacity and firms will finance the remainder of the financing 
needs with equity. Therefore, our model distinguishes three situations, i.e., firms with 
surpluses, firms with “normal” deficits, and firms with large deficits. We hypothesize 
that the pecking order test yields coefficients reasonably close to unity for firms with 
“normal” deficits, but expect lower coefficients for firms with larger deficits, as these 
firms are more likely to reach their debt capacity. 
We test our capital structure models by using a large panel of U.S. firms taken 
from Compustat over the period 1971-2005. We find a strong asymmetry in pecking 
order behavior. For surpluses the estimated pecking order coefficient is 0.90, while for 
16
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deficits it is only 0.15. Next, we test the pecking order model for different deficit sizes. 
In firms with normal deficits, the pecking order coefficient is around 0.74. In contrast, 
large deficit firms exhibit a coefficient of 0.09. This low coefficient can be explained 
by firms’ debt capacities: since the financing of large deficits with debt would result 
in a substantial increase of the debt ratio, firms opt for issuing equity. 
Chapter 3 builds on our finding that the debt capacity is important in firms’ 
financing decisions. The main goal in Chapter 3 is to examine whether the pecking 
order theory or the static tradeoff theory is more capable of explaining firms’ 
financing decisions. We estimate firm-year specific debt capacities, and use these 
estimates to construct a framework that allows us to identify situations in which the 
pecking order theory and the static tradeoff theory have conflicting predictions: the 
static tradeoff theory argues that a firm increases leverage until it reaches its target 
debt ratio, while the pecking order yields debt issuance until the debt capacity is 
reached. 
We again focus our analysis on the U.S., and find that the pecking order theory is 
a better predictor of firms’ financing decisions than the static tradeoff theory. That is, 
most firms that are not restricted by their debt capacity issue debt when their leverage 
is above their supposed target debt ratio. We further test whether a preference for a 
capital structure theory is firm-specific. We find persistence in firms’ preferences: a 
firm that acts according to the pecking order theory or static tradeoff theory in a given 
year is more likely to do so again in a subsequent year.  
 
 
1.2 Convertible security offerings 
 
 
For the remainder of this dissertation we shift focus from broad capital structure 
theories to specific financing instruments. In particular, we focus on hybrid securities, 
which combine characteristics of debt and equity. The specific structure of these 
instruments can provide further insight into the relevant costs and benefits of debt and 
equity. A well-known hybrid instrument is a convertible security. In its basic form, 
convertible securities are securities that are structured as a bond or preferred stock, but 
that can be converted into a pre-determined number of common shares. In this way, 
convertible security holders benefit when the share price of the firm increases. 
Tests of the static tradeoff theory and the pecking order theory generally ignore 
hybrid securities such as convertible securities. Still, convertible securities are a 
relatively popular instrument. In the U.S. for example, SDC reports that total proceeds 
of the convertible issues in 2007 exceed 100 billion dollars. 
17
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Studies on the motivations for convertible issuance represent two different 
viewpoints. According to Stein’s (1992) delayed equity rationale, companies with 
high equity-related adverse selection costs use convertibles as a substitute for equity. 
These firms subsequently force conversion of the convertible into shares by calling 
them, and thus obtain equity “through the backdoor”. Other authors argue that 
convertibles are used as an alternative for straight debt by firms with high debt-related 
financing costs (e.g., Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987), and Brennan and 
Schwartz (1988)).  
In line with these two viewpoints, Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (1999) find 
evidence that some convertible offerings are substitutes for debt, while other 
convertible offerings are substitutes for equity. Survey evidence (e.g., Graham and 
Harvey (2001)) is mostly in line with Stein’s backdoor-equity hypothesis. 
In Chapter 4 we look at a range of choices that convertible security issuers face. 
When focusing on convertible issues over the period 2000-2007, we observe that an 
important decision for convertible security issuers is to choose between convertible 
debt and convertible preferred stock. When convertible debt is chosen, the next main 
choice is whether to allow settlement in cash, or to just settle in stock. When 
convertible preferred stock is issued, the main choice is whether conversion of the 
convertible preferred stock is mandatory at a given point in time. 
We find that taxes are an important factor in explaining why some firms issue 
convertible preferred stock, and others issue convertible bonds. We also find that 
refinancing costs and managerial discretion costs are important determinants of the 
decision between convertible bonds and convertible preferred stock. Cash settlements 
have become more popular over the years: in 2000, the large majority of convertible 
bond issues were stock settlements, whereas in 2007 the large majority are cash 
settlements. We find that earnings management is a strong driver of the increase in 
popularity of cash settlements. Mandatory convertibles are generally issued by firms 
to reduce the indebtedness and to improve the credit rating. 
In Chapter 5 we focus on a specific innovation in the convertible market. In recent 
years, firms tend to add stock repurchases to their convertible offerings. We test 
whether convertible arbitrage drives the combination of a convertible issue and a 
stock repurchase: convertible arbitrageurs simultaneously buy convertibles and short 
sell the issuer’s common stock, resulting in downward pressure on the stock price. 
Our hypothesis is that convertible issuers repurchase (borrowed) stock from the 
arbitrageurs to facilitate such short-selling activity and mitigate the negative price 
pressure.  
We show that convertible arbitrage strategies indeed drive the combinations of 
convertible issues and stock repurchases. Firms that combine the convertible issue and 
18
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the stock repurchase exhibit less short-selling activity in the open market and less 
negative excess returns than uncombined convertible issues. We also show that 
convertible arbitrage explains both the size and the timing of the stock repurchases. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The impact of financing surpluses and 
large financing deficits on tests of the 
pecking order theory1 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
In explaining firms’ financing behavior, the pecking order theory has become a 
widely debated model of capital structure choice. According to the pecking order 
theory, firms have no well-defined optimal debt ratio (Myers (1984)). Instead, due to 
asymmetric information, firms adopt a hierarchical order of financing preferences: 
internal financing is preferred to external financing. If external financing is needed, 
firms first seek debt funding. Equity is only issued as a last resort.  
The seminal paper by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) introduces an empirical 
test for the pecking order theory. According to this test, the pecking order implies that 
firms issue or retire an amount of debt equal to the funds flow deficit, which is the 
inadequacy of internal cash flows for real investments and dividend commitments. In 
a simple regression of a firm’s net debt issued on the financing deficit, the slope 
coefficient provides information on the proportion financed by debt of a one dollar 
                                            
1 This chapter is based on De Jong, Verbeek and Verwijmeren (2008a). It has benefited from comments by 
Marie Dutordoir, Kose John, Marieke van der Poel, Abraham Ravid, Miguel Rosellón, and seminar 
participants at RSM Erasmus University. 
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increase in deficits and the pecking order implies that this coefficient is close to unity. 
Using a small sample of firms that survive the entire 1971-1989 period, Shyam-
Sunder and Myers conclude that the pecking order model is an excellent first-order 
descriptor of financing behavior, since they find an estimated pecking order 
coefficient of 0.75. Frank and Goyal (2003) test the pecking order model using a more 
comprehensive data set. They find substantially lower coefficients and show that 
larger firms exhibit more pecking order behavior than smaller firms. This size effect is 
corroborated by Fama and French (2002). From a pecking order perspective, this 
relation is counterintuitive as small firms have the highest potential for asymmetric 
information, which is the actual driver of the pecking order in the Myers and Majluf 
(1984) model. We refer to the size anomaly as the first pecking order puzzle. Another 
finding of Frank and Goyal is that the pecking order model has lost its explanatory 
power over the years. For the period 1971-1989 their estimated coefficient is 0.28, 
while for 1990-1998 it is as low as 0.15. Frank and Goyal’s analysis does not explain 
this trend. We consider the decreasing pecking order coefficient over time to be the 
second pecking order puzzle. 
The main goal of this chapter is to examine whether two modifications in Shyam-
Sunder and Myers’ (1999) model can solve the puzzles. Our first modification relates 
to the fact that the model does not discriminate between the effects of financing 
deficits and financing surpluses. Instead, the model is typically estimated over both 
surpluses and deficits, and imposes a common homogeneous pecking order coefficient. 
However, the implications of deficits and surpluses are different: in case of a deficit, a 
firm has to issue securities, while it repurchases securities when having a surplus. As 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) theory for the pecking order for issuance decisions differs 
from a theory on repurchase decisions in Shyam-Sunder and Myers, we allow for an 
asymmetry between the effects of surpluses and deficits.  
Our second modification results from Chirinko and Singha (2000), who argue that 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ empirical model is flawed for firms with large deficits. In 
case these firms follow the pecking order, the large financing needs may exceed the 
unused debt capacity and firms will finance the remainder of the financing needs with 
equity. Therefore, our model distinguishes three situations, i.e., firms with surpluses, 
firms with “normal” deficits, and firms with large deficits. We hypothesize that the 
pecking order test yields coefficients reasonably close to unity for firms with 
“normal” deficits, but expect lower coefficients for firms with larger deficits, as these 
firms are more likely to reach their debt capacity. 
We test our capital structure models by using a large panel of U.S. firms taken 
from Compustat over the period 1971-2005. We corroborate the results of Frank and 
Goyal (2003) as the estimated pecking order coefficient is 0.26 over the full period, 
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lower in small firms, and decreasing over time. Next, we extend the analysis by 
estimating the pecking order model for subgroups with deficits and surpluses. We find 
a strong asymmetry in pecking order behavior. For surpluses the estimated pecking 
order coefficient is 0.90, while for deficits it is only 0.15. This finding shows that the 
average estimate of 0.26 hides a substantial degree of asymmetry across financing 
surpluses and deficits.  
Next, we test the pecking order model for different deficit sizes. In firms with 
normal deficits, the pecking order coefficient is around 0.74. In contrast, large deficit 
firms exhibit a coefficient of 0.09. This low coefficient is potentially explained by 
firms’ debt capacities: firms with large deficits are restricted in issuing debt. To test 
the impact of the debt capacity, we build on previous literature and construct 
subgroups with different levels of financial constraints. We find that the pecking order 
model is a good description of the financing behavior of non-constrained firms, and 
find that the lower pecking order coefficients in certain subsamples are indeed 
consistent with firms’ restrictions in issuing debt. 
The distinction between surpluses, normal deficits, and large deficits appears to 
explain both pecking order puzzles. The size anomaly results from the fact that large 
financing deficits are much more common for relatively small firms, while financing 
surpluses are scarcer for small firms. The second puzzle – that the pecking order 
model loses explanatory power over time – is also explained by large deficits, as these 
have become more common in recent years. 
This chapter is mostly related to Lemmon and Zender (2007) and Agca and 
Mozumdar (2007). The paper by Agca and Mozumdar, in particular, also uses a 
piecewise linear specification to account for debt capacity. We corroborate their 
findings with regard to the effect of the debt capacity: the pecking order model 
performs worse for firms with smaller debt capacities. We show that the distribution 
of deficit sizes has an additional decreasing effect on the pecking order coefficient for 
firms with small debt capacities: it are the constrained firms that have the largest 
financing needs. We further add to these papers the notion that firms act very 
differently in response to financing surpluses and deficits, and provide insight into the 
changes of the financing deficit over time. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we present 
the pecking order model and its empirical implications. In Section 2.3 the data are 
described, and Section 2.4 describes the empirical results of this study. Finally, we 
present our conclusions in Section 2.5. 
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2.2 Theory 
 
This section describes some of the empirical and theoretical studies on the 
pecking order theory, and explains how this chapter relates to these studies.  
 
2.2.1 Pecking order theory 
 
Donaldson (1961) is the first to describe firms’ preferences for internal funds over 
external funds, and firms’ preferences for issuing debt over issuing equity. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) explain these preferences in a theoretical model that deals with capital 
structure decisions of firms with external financing needs. Myers and Majluf show 
that firms’ managers, when acting on behalf of the current shareholders, pass up good 
investments in case the new shareholders will capture the benefits of the investment. 
Consequently, investors will reason that an investment decision without an equity 
issue signals good news, while issuing shares signals bad news. The latter signal 
reduces the price investors are willing to pay for the equity issue, which results in a 
pecking order of corporate financing: managers will prefer debt to equity.  
A pecking order model for repurchase decisions is presented in Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999). They assume that firms’ managers differ in their degree of being 
optimistic. Managers who are less optimistic than investors do not want to repurchase 
shares, as they perceive the price as being too high. The optimistic managers, however, 
want to repurchase shares, hence forcing up stock prices if they try to do so. With the 
new stock price, there will be fewer managers who are more optimistic than the 
investors, and the stock price impact of an attempted repurchase increases. In the end, 
the repurchase price reaches such a high level that none of the managers wants to 
repurchase equity. Accordingly, all managers end up paying down debt. 
When one compares the pecking order theory for issue decisions with the pecking 
order theory for repurchase decisions, it becomes clear that both theories provide 
differing rationales. For example, the level of optimism of firms’ managers is not 
required for explaining issuance decisions, while it is an essential part of the pecking 
order theory for repurchase decisions. An empirical test of the pecking order model 
should therefore distinguish between issuance and repurchase decisions. 
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2.2.2 Testing the pecking order theory 
 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) aim to capture the pecking order theory in an 
empirical model that relates financing deficits to net debt issues2: 
 
∆Dit = α + βpo*DEFit + εit,     (1) 
 
where DEFit is the financing deficit of firm i in year t, and ∆Dit is the net debt issued 
for firm i in year t. Both variables are scaled by assets. In case firms have 
unconstrained access to debt, the pecking order theory predicts that the amount of debt 
issued equals the deficit, and hence the pecking order coefficient (βpo) equals one, and 
the intercept term α is zero. Note that the size of the financing deficit is endogenous: 
firms can – to certain limits – decide how much money to attract and invest. In reality, 
a firm’s debt capacity is limited due to financial distress costs. Therefore, Shyam-
Sunder and Myers hypothesize that βpo is close to one, but not precisely one. For a 
sample of 157 firms with continuous data over the period 1971-1989, Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers find an estimated coefficient of 0.75 and conclude that the pecking order 
model is “an excellent first-order descriptor of corporate financing behavior.” Frank 
and Goyal (2003) substantially extend the sample of firms used to test the pecking 
order model. Estimating Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ regression specification using a 
comprehensive data set with over 140,000 observations over the period 1971-1998, 
Frank and Goyal find substantially lower coefficients. Furthermore, they test whether 
small firms issue less equity than large firms, as investors of smaller firms face more 
informational asymmetry (e.g., Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn (1987); Brennan and 
Hughes (1991)), and informational asymmetry increases firms’ reluctance to issue 
equity (Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991); Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993)). 
Contrary to this hypothesis, Frank and Goyal find that large firms exhibit more 
pecking order behavior than small firms. This size anomaly is also found by Fama and 
French, who consider it a “deep wound” (Fama and French (2002), p. 30) on the 
pecking order theory.  
Frank and Goyal (2003) also find that the pecking order model loses its 
explanatory power over the years. Because the average publicly traded firm becomes 
                                            
2 Prior to this model, the pecking order was usually tested with the event study methodology. Most studies find 
an insignificant market reaction to debt issues, a significantly negative market reaction to equity issues, and a 
significantly positive market reaction to equity repurchases. For overviews of this literature, see Eckbo and 
Masulis (1995) and Ritter (2003). Another way of testing the pecking order theory is by conducting a survey. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) survey 392 CFOs and interpret the reported importance of financial flexibility and 
equity undervaluation in managers’ financing decisions as support for the pecking order theory. 
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smaller over time (Fama and French (2005)), the size and time effects can be related. 
However, Frank and Goyal conclude that the time period effect is not entirely due to 
the higher amount of small firms in the 1990s: for each of the size quartiles, the 
pecking order model coefficients are lower after 1989 than before 1989. 
 
2.2.3 Large deficits and firms’ debt capacities  
 
In a critical comment on Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ (1999) pecking order model, 
Chirinko and Singha (2000) show that the pecking order coefficient can be 
significantly smaller than one even when firms follow the financing hierarchy 
prescribed by the pecking order model. The rationale is that, if deficits are sufficiently 
large, firms might be constrained in their ability to issue debt and have to finance the 
remainder of the deficit with equity. According to Chirinko and Singha, these 
constraints are specifically high when firms have high leverage ratios. We elaborate 
on the critique of Chirinko and Singha by empirically showing the influence of large 
deficits.  
Lemmon and Zender (2007) and Agca and Mozumdar (2007) estimate Shyam-
Sunder and Myers’ (1999) regression specification for subsamples that are based on 
firms’ debt capacities. They find that the pecking order model works best for firms 
that are not constrained in their debt issuing. Although the size of the deficit is not the 
main focus of either of the papers, both papers control for the effects of larger deficits: 
Lemmon and Zender include a quadratic term of the deficit and Agca and Mozumdar 
use a piecewise linear specification. Following our discussion of the different effects 
of financing surpluses (i.e. negative deficits), a quadratic term of the financing deficit 
seems inappropriate since a negative deficit becomes positive when squared. We 
therefore differ from both papers in taking the effect of surpluses into account when 
testing the relation between the financing deficit, the debt capacity, and firms’ 
financing decisions. We examine how our findings relate to these papers in Section 
2.4.4. 
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2.3 Data 
 
In our empirical analysis, we employ a broad cross-section of U.S. firms from the 
Compustat database covering the period 1971-2005. The starting point is 1971 
because we require flow of funds data to compute the financing deficit, and these data 
are not available prior to 1971. We compute the financing deficit as the sum of the 
change in working capital, the investments, and the cash dividends, minus the internal 
cash flows. By definition, the financing deficit is equal to the sum of net debt issues 
and net equity issues. Financing deficits (surpluses) and issues (repurchases) are 
scaled by the book value of total assets. Regulated utilities (SICs 4900-4999), 
financial firms (SICs 6000-6999), and individual firm-years with missing values for 
the financing deficit/surplus, the net debt issues, and the net equity issues are excluded. 
We further exclude firm-years for which the financing deficit, the change in working 
capital, the investments, the cash dividends, the internal cash flows, the net debt issues, 
or the net equity issues exceed 400% of the firm’s total book assets. While these 
requirements make our sample comparable to Frank and Goyal (2003), we deviate 
from the criteria in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), in which firms are required to 
provide data in each year of their sample period. We will revisit this issue in Section 
2.4. Our final sample contains 22,197 firms and covers 233,909 firm-year 
observations.3  
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the fund flow and financing variables in 
our analysis, and how they are computed from Compustat items. Although we are not 
able to perfectly replicate Frank and Goyal’s (2003) sample, Table 1 closely 
corresponds to their Table 2 (p. 229). Table 1 also shows the composition of the 
financing deficit and the magnitude of these components in different years. The 
average internal cash flows and the average working capital decline over the years, 
while the average cash dividends remain relatively stable over the time period. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
3 Several cash flow statement items are recoded as zero if they were reported missing or combined with other 
data items in Compustat. The data are often coded as missing when a firm does not report a particular item or 
when it combines items. See Frank and Goyal’s Table 8 (2003, p. 242) for the specific cash flow statement 
items that are recoded.  
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Table 1: Corporate cash flows 
 
This table shows the corporate cash flows and the issuance of securities for the sample period 1971–2005. 
Financial firms and utilities are excluded. The sample additionally excludes firm-years with gaps in the 
reporting of relevant flow of funds data. The net debt issues are computed as Item 111 – Item 114, and the net 
equity issues are computed as Item 108 – Item 115. All variables are scaled by total assets. The table is a 
replication of Table 2 of Frank and Goyal (2003). 
 Average funds flow and financing as a percentage of total assets 
 1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Cash dividends a 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.010 0.014 
Investments b 0.101 0.077 0.110 0.132 0.067 0.094 0.084 0.069 
Working capital c 0.033 0.015 0.033 -0.028 -0.016 0.023 -0.015 -0.014 
Internal cash flow d 0.101 0.096 0.095 0.026 0.006 -0.006 -0.084 -0.051 
Financing deficit 
   (a + b + c – d) 
0.048 0.009 0.062 0.093 0.061 0.137 0.162 0.120 
Net debt issues                 0.017 0.003 0.012 0.018 0.006 0.026 0.018 0.029 
Net equity issues 0.030 0.006 0.050 0.075 0.055 0.111 0.144 0.091 
Net external financing 0.048 0.009 0.062 0.093 0.061 0.137 0.162 0.120 
N 2,992 5,802 5,709 6,488 6,668 9,009 8,562 5,900 
a Item 127. 
b For firms reporting format codes 1 to 3, investments equal Item 128 + Item 113 + Item 129 + Item 219 – Item 
107 – Item 109. For firms reporting format code 7, investments equal Item 128 + Item 113 + Item 129 – Item 
107 – Item 109 – Item 309 – Item 310. 
c For firms reporting format code 1, change in net working capital equals Item 236 + Item 274 + Item 301. For 
firms reporting format codes 2 and 3, change in net working capital equals –Item 236 + Item 274 - Item 301. 
For firms reporting format code 7, change in net working capital equals –Item 302 – Item 303 – Item 304 – 
Item 305 – Item 307 + Item 274 – Item 312 – Item 301. 
d For firms reporting format codes 1 to 3, internal cash flow equals Item 123 + Item 124 + Item 125 + Item 126 
+ Item 106 + Item 213 + Item 217 + Item 218. For firms reporting format code 7, internal cash flow equals 
Item 123 + Item 124 + Item 125 + Item 126 + Item 106 + Item 213 + Item 217 + Item 314. 
 
Table 2 provides detailed information on the financing deficits and surpluses over 
the sample period. Although the yearly percentage of firms with financing deficits 
varies between 44% (in 1976) and 65% (in 1997), it does not portray a strong time 
trend. The average size of the deficits varies substantially over time: it fluctuates 
around 0.10 over the first ten years of our sample period, but is around 0.26 over the 
last ten years. This trend is caused by the growing magnitude of the deficits at the 75th 
percentile. In the seventies, about 25% of the deficits is larger than 0.12, while in the 
late nineties this quartile has increased to 0.40. The average size of the surpluses 
hardly fluctuates over time. The median is 0.02 or 0.03. Furthermore, the average 
surplus size is lower than the average deficit size: the overall mean surplus is 0.06 and 
the overall mean deficit is 0.21. This difference is again caused by the levels of the 
largest deficits, as large surpluses are virtually absent.4  
 
                                            
4 We have tested whether winsorizing the size of the deficit at the 95% level will have a strong effect on our 
results. We find that both the asymmetry between the effects of deficits and surpluses and the asymmetry 
between the effects of different deficit sizes (measured in quartiles) remain present when we winsorize the 
financing deficit. 
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Table 2: Deficits and surpluses, 1971 to 2005 
 
This table shows the distribution of financing deficits and financing surpluses over time. A firm has a deficit if 
the sum of the firm’s investments, cash dividends, and increase in working capital exceeds the firm’s internal 
cash flows. A firm has a surplus if its internal cash flows in a year exceed the sum of the firm’s investments, 
cash dividends, and increase in working capital. When a firm has a surplus it repurchases securities, while the 
firm has to issue securities when it faces a deficit. Next to means and medians, we also provide information on 
the 25th and 75th percentile, to portrait the distribution of the deficits and surpluses more accurately. Deficits 
and surpluses are scaled by assets. Under “%” we report the percentage of firms having a deficit or a surplus in 
that particular year. These percentages do not add up to 100% as some firm-years have a financing deficit of 
exactly zero.  
  Deficits  Surpluses 
Year N % Mean 25th 
perc. 
Median 75th 
perc. 
 % Mean 25th 
perc. 
Median 75th 
perc. 
1971  2,992 0.55 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.14  0.40 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 
1972   3,200 0.57 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.14  0.39 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 
1973 3,970 0.56 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.11  0.40 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 
1974 5,638 0.48 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.11  0.45 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 
1975 5,802 0.44 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.10  0.49 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.06 
1976 5,871 0.44 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.11  0.49 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 
1977 5,912 0.49 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.11  0.44 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 
1978 5,779 0.51 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.12  0.42 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 
1979 5,618 0.52 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.12  0.42 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 
1980 5,709 0.55 0.15 0.02 0.07 0.17  0.40 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05 
1981 5,709 0.56 0.18 0.02 0.07 0.21  0.38 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 
1982 5,948 0.53 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.17  0.40 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.06 
1983 6,136 0.58 0.23 0.03 0.10 0.31  0.37 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.06 
1984 6,168 0.56 0.18 0.02 0.08 0.21  0.39 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.06 
1985 6,488 0.57 0.21 0.02 0.08 0.26  0.38 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.06 
1986 6,657 0.58 0.25 0.03 0.11 0.33  0.37 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.07 
1987 6,782 0.56 0.25 0.03 0.11 0.33  0.39 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.07 
1988 6,747 0.50 0.18 0.02 0.08 0.21  0.43 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.07 
1989 6,612 0.51 0.20 0.02 0.08 0.23  0.42 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 
1990 6,668 0.48 0.18 0.02 0.07 0.20  0.44 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 
1991 6,867 0.50 0.20 0.02 0.07 0.22  0.43 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 
1992 7,102 0.53 0.22 0.02 0.08 0.27  0.41 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 
1993 7,630 0.57 0.23 0.02 0.10 0.30  0.37 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 
1994 8,184 0.59 0.22 0.02 0.09 0.27  0.35 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.06 
1995 9,009 0.61 0.25 0.03 0.10 0.32  0.33 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.06 
1996 9,179 0.63 0.28 0.03 0.13 0.39  0.31 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.06 
1997 8,930 0.65 0.25 0.03 0.11 0.33  0.31 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 
1998 9,164 0.64 0.28 0.03 0.12 0.35  0.31 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.07 
1999 9,078 0.62 0.31 0.03 0.12 0.43  0.33 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.07 
2000 8,562 0.61 0.30 0.03 0.10 0.41  0.34 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.07 
2001 7,945 0.56 0.21 0.02 0.07 0.21  0.37 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.07 
2002 7,541 0.51 0.21 0.01 0.06 0.20  0.42 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.07 
2003 7,369 0.55 0.23 0.02 0.07 0.26  0.38 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.07 
2004 7,043 0.60 0.26 0.02 0.07 0.32  0.34 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.07 
2005 5,900 0.60 0.24 0.02 0.07 0.29  0.36 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.07 
Avg 6,683 0.56 0.21 0.02 0.08 0.23  0.38 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 
SD 1,536 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.09  0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
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2.4 Empirical tests 
 
In this section we test the pecking order theory for groups with financing 
surpluses, non-large deficits, and large deficits. We also show the impact of these 
segregations on the pecking order puzzles. 
 
2.4.1 The pecking order puzzles 
 
We first replicate Frank and Goyal’s (2003) key findings that illustrate the 
pecking order puzzles. Table 3 shows a replication of Frank and Goyal’s Table 6 
using our sample of Compustat firms, and provides updated results for the second 
subperiod starting in 1990. In this table, we present pooled OLS estimates of the 
pecking order coefficients for different time periods and size quartiles. 
For the entire sample period 1971-2005, the estimated pecking order coefficient is 
0.255, which is comparable to the estimates reported in Frank and Goyal. The 
interpretation of this coefficient is that an increase of the deficit of one dollar will on 
average be financed with 25.5 cents of debt. Although this pecking order coefficient is 
significantly different from zero, it is actually evidence against the pecking order 
model. Apparently, on average 74.5 cents of a one dollar increase in deficits is met by 
an equity issue. 
The additional results in Table 3 highlight the two pecking order puzzles. Before 
1989, the estimated pecking order coefficient for the quartile containing the smallest 
firms is 0.223, while for the largest firms it is considerably higher, viz. 0.763. After 
1989, the pecking order coefficient of the largest firms remains relatively high with an 
estimate of 0.667, against 0.207 for the smallest firms. As the differences in the 
average pecking order coefficients before and after 1989 are possibly caused by only a 
few years, Figure 1 shows the evolution over the years of the estimated pecking order 
coefficients, using the entire sample of firms. 
It can be seen that the pecking order model describes most of firms’ financing 
behavior in the seventies, but is a poor descriptor of firms’ financing behavior in the 
eighties and nineties. Although the pecking order coefficient does not decline linearly, 
Figure 1 shows a trend of a decreasing impact of the deficit on firms’ debt issues over 
time.  
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Figure 1: The pecking order coefficients, 1971 to 2005  
 
This figure shows the pecking order coefficients (βpo) over the years. We determine the pecking order 
coefficient by estimating the regression specification ∆Dit = α + βpo*DEFit + εit on a yearly basis, where ∆Dit is 
the net debt issued by firm i in year t and DEFit is the financing deficit of firm i in year t. 
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2.4.2 Deficits and surpluses 
 
To investigate the differences in pecking order behavior for firm-years with 
financing deficits and firm-years with financing surpluses, we estimate a regression 
specification that allows for an asymmetry between positive and negative deficits. The 
following model allows for such an asymmetry 
   
∆Dit = α + β1*dit + βpo*DEFit + βsur*dit*DEFit + εit,    (2) 
 
where dit is a dummy variable that equals one if DEFit < 0, and zero otherwise. The 
term β1*dit allows for different intercepts for the samples of deficits and surpluses. 
 
 
 
31
The impact of financing surpluses and large financing deficits on tests of the pecking order theory 
 
19
Table 4: Pecking order tests for financing deficits and surpluses 
 
The sample period is 1971–2005. We exclude financial firms, utilities, and firm-years with gaps in the 
reporting of relevant flow of funds data. This table determines the significance of a dummy for financing 
surpluses, and tests the model ∆Dit = α + β1*dit + βpo*DEFit + βsur*dit*DEFit + εit, where ∆Dit is the amount of 
net debt issued, DEFit is the financing deficit, and dit is a dummy variable that equals one if DEFit < 0, and is 
zero otherwise. All variables are scaled by total assets. White standard errors appear in parentheses. * indicates 
significance at the 1% level.  
 Overall  1971-1989 1990-2005 
α 0.029*  
(0.001) 
 0.035*  
(0.001) 
0.023* 
 (0.001) 
β1 -0.027*  
(0.001) 
 -0.034*  
(0.001) 
-0.021*  
(0.001) 
βpo 0.155*  
(0.005) 
 0.169*  
(0.008) 
0.153*  
(0.006) 
βsur 0.746*  
(0.013) 
 0.765*  
(0.018) 
0.714*  
(0.018) 
N 233,909  107,738 126,171 
R² 0.390  0.495 0.324 
 
Table 4 shows our estimation results for Eq. (2). The pecking order coefficient 
(βpo) of 0.155 implies that firms with deficits issue on average 15.5 cents of debt for 
each additional dollar of the financing deficit. Accordingly, most of the deficits are 
covered with equity issues. The coefficient estimates are similar in the pre-1989 and 
post-1989 periods. The coefficient βsur represents the difference in the pecking order 
coefficients for deficits and surpluses, and is significantly different from zero at the 
1% level. For firms with financing surpluses the estimated pecking order coefficient is 
0.746 higher than for firms with deficits, and again the effect is similar in the two 
subperiods. These results imply that the pecking order coefficient is 0.901 (βpo+ βsur) 
for surpluses. That is, on average 90 cents of a dollar increase of the financing surplus 
are used to repurchase debt. Overall, firms seem to have a strong preference for 
buying back debt when there is a surplus, but do not seem to follow the pecking order 
when they have a deficit. Hence, we conclude that a correct empirical pecking order 
specification requires a differentiation between financing deficits and financing 
surpluses.  
The financing deficit is calculated by subtracting the internal cash flows of a firm 
in a particular year from the sum of the cash dividends, net investments, and changes 
in working capital in that year. We decompose the deficits and surpluses in Table 5 to 
investigate how the components differ for firm-years with deficits and firm-years with 
surpluses. Table 5 also shows means and medians of several other firm characteristics 
for firm-years with deficits and those with surpluses. 
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Table 5: Characteristics for financing deficits and surpluses 
 
The sample period is 1971–2005. We exclude financial firms, utilities, and firm-years with gaps in the 
reporting of relevant flow of funds data. This table determines the differences between firm-years with 
financing deficits and firm-years with financing surpluses. Assets are determined by Compustat Item 6 and are 
reported in millions of dollars. The debt ratio is computed by dividing Item 9 by Item 6. The market-to-book 
ratio is (Item 24 * Item 25 – Item 60 + Item 6) / Item 6 and EBIT is Item 18 + Item 15 + Item 16. The issue 
size is equal to the net amount of equity issued/repurchased plus the net amount of debt issued/repurchased. 
Rated debt is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has rated debt outstanding, as reported with 
Compustat Item 280, and zero otherwise. The variables change in working capital, investments, cash 
dividends, internal cash flows, EBIT and issue size are scaled by total assets. We estimate t-tests with equal 
variances not assumed to test for equality of means. * indicates significance at the 1% level.  
 Deficit  Surplus  Differences of means 
 (t-stat.) 
 Mean Median  Mean Median   
Change in working capital 0.05 0.04  -0.05 -0.01  0.10*  
(73.25) 
Investments 0.14 0.10  0.04 0.04  0.10*  
(128.21) 
Cash dividends 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.00*  
(-9.43) 
Internal cash flows -0.03 0.07  0.07 0.09  -0.10*  
(-79.76) 
Assets 2013 68  1653 71  360*  
(5.30) 
Debt ratio 0.21 0.17  0.19 0.14  0.02*  
(24.35) 
Market-to-book ratio 2.30 1.40  1.50 1.14  0.80*  
(83.37) 
EBIT -0.06 0.07  0.05 0.09  0.11*  
(-76.21) 
Issue / repurchase size 0.21 0.08  0.06 0.03  0.15*  
(256.38) 
Rated debt 0.17 0.00  0.18 0.00  0.01 
 (-2.14) 
N 130,314   89,460    
 
The results in Table 5 illustrate that – even though the average firm with deficits 
has lower cash flows – the key determinant for firms to have a deficit is that they 
invest a large proportion of their capital. Cash dividends do not strongly depend on 
whether a firm has a positive or a negative deficit. Apparently, firms do not use 
dividend cuts to finance capital expenditures. Table 5 also shows that median asset 
sizes do not differ much for firms-years with financing deficits (median of 68 million 
dollars) and firm-years with financing surpluses (median of 71 million dollars). The 
average issue size of 0.21, however, is significantly different from the average 
repurchase size of 0.06. This issue size is likely to have an effect on firms’ financing 
behavior, particularly in case of a deficit, due to firms’ debt capacities (Chirinko and 
Singha (2000)). We investigate the effect of having a large deficit on the pecking 
order coefficient in Table 6. 
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Table 6 presents the pooled OLS estimates of the pecking order model over the 
full sample period 1971-2005, across different subsamples by deficit and surplus size 
(excluding firm-years with DEF = 0). We separate firm-years with deficits and 
surpluses and within these two sets we distinguish between quartiles. The effects of 
the repurchase sizes show that the estimated pecking order coefficient is 0.789 for the 
smallest repurchases, 0.881 and 0.815 for repurchases that are around the median size, 
and 0.923 for the largest repurchase sizes. Apparently, for each quartile of the surplus 
distribution the pecking order model is a good and similar descriptor of firms’ 
financing behavior. For deficits, we observe a very different pattern. Although the 
pecking order model appears to provide a reasonable description for smaller issues 
(pecking order coefficients of 0.601 and 0.741), it is only a weak explanation for 
somewhat larger issues (coefficient of 0.429). The most striking result, however, is 
found for the largest deficits. For these largest deficits the estimated pecking order 
coefficient is only 0.089. This result implies that when firms face large deficits, they 
issue on average far more equity than debt. 
 
2.4.3 Large financing deficits 
 
Table 6 makes a somewhat ad hoc distinction between smaller and larger deficits 
on the basis of the quartiles of the distribution. As a result, a “large deficit” in these 
tables is empirically defined as being larger than 0.237. To investigate the impact of 
this cut off point on the resulting estimates for the pecking order coefficient, we 
extend the pecking order model in Eq. (1) by allowing a different intercept and slope 
coefficient for larger deficits, where the threshold between “large” and “non-large” is 
varied over all possible values. That is, we estimate  
 
∆Dit = α + β1*bit + βpo*DEFit + βlargedef*bit*DEFit + εit,   (3) 
 
with bit = I(DEFit > x), where I(.) is an indicator function (equal to 1 if the condition in 
parentheses is satisfied, and zero otherwise), and x is a threshold value for the 
financing deficit that is chosen a priori. Because x is unknown, we vary x between 
0.0001 and 2, and investigate the impact on the resulting pecking order coefficients. 
This procedure is similar to allowing a structural break in the coefficients of a linear 
model, where the breakpoint is unknown (see Stock and Watson (2003), Chapter 12). 
For each value of x, the specification in Eq. (3) provides two pecking order 
coefficients: one coefficient for observations below a certain deficit level (βpo), and 
one coefficient for observations above a certain deficit level (βpo + βlargedef). In our 
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Figure 2: The pecking order coefficient for varying threshold levels of large deficits and surpluses 
 
The solid line in Panel A represents the pecking order coefficient for observations with a financing deficit 
between zero and the corresponding value at the x-axis. This pecking order coefficient corresponds to βpo in 
the regression specification ∆Dit = α + β1*bit + βpo*DEFit + βlargedef*bit*DEFit + εit, where ∆Dit is the net debt 
issued by firm i in year t, DEFit is the financing deficit of firm i in year t, and bit is one if DEFit is larger than a 
certain deficit level, and zero otherwise. The dotted line represents βpo + βlargedef, which is the pecking order 
coefficient for observations above the financing deficit on the x-axis. The solid line in Panel B represents the 
pecking order coefficient for observations with a financing surplus between zero and the corresponding value 
at the x-axis. This pecking order coefficient corresponds to βpo in the regression specification ∆Dit = α + β1*bit 
+ βpo*SURit + βlargesur*bit*SURit + εit, where ∆Dit is the net debt repurchased, SURit is the financing surplus (-
DEFit), and bit is one if SURit is larger than a certain surplus level, and zero otherwise. The dotted line 
represents βpo + βlargesur, which is the pecking order coefficient for observations above the surplus level on the 
x-axis. Financing deficits, financing surpluses, and net debt issues are scaled by total assets. 
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estimation we exclude firm-years with financing surpluses. The results of this exercise 
are summarized in Panel A of Figure 2. 
Any specific financing deficit level in Figure 2 represents a threshold level. The 
solid line gives the coefficient for deficits below this threshold and the dotted line is 
the coefficient for deficits above the threshold. In the below-threshold sample, we find 
that as more observations with large deficits are included in the estimation of βpo, this 
pecking order coefficient decreases.5 The maximum estimate for βpo is 0.734, which 
corresponds to a financing deficit of 0.059. Hence, if we define a deficit to be large if 
it exceeds 5.9% of total assets, the estimated pecking order coefficient of the 
observations with deficits below 0.059 is maximized.6 Adding firm-years with higher 
deficits would decrease this pecking order coefficient.  
Panel B of Figure 2 shows the results of a similar regression specification for 
financing surpluses: 
 
∆Dit = α + β1*bit + βpo*SURit + βlargesur*bit*SURit + εit,   (4) 
 
where SURit is the financing surplus of firm i in year t, and bit is one if SURit is larger 
than a certain surplus level, and zero otherwise. The results confirm the findings of 
Table 6, as we do not find evidence that the magnitude of the financing surplus has a 
strong effect on the pecking order coefficients.  
 
2.4.4 Firms’ debt capacities  
 
Although the size of the deficit is important in establishing whether a firm is able 
to issue debt, not all firms are similarly constrained in their debt issuing, even with 
equal financing needs. For example, Lemmon and Zender (2007) argue that firms with 
rated debt outstanding are less restricted in issuing debt than firms with no rated debt 
outstanding. Agca and Mozumdar (2007) argue that a firm’s total sales, tangibility, 
profitability, and market-to-book ratio are strong predictors of its debt capacity: total 
sales, tangibility, and profitability have a positive relation with firms’ ability to 
borrow, whereas market-to-book ratios are negatively related with firms’ debt 
capacities.  
                                            
5 For very small deficits, the pecking order coefficient is highly volatile. This volatility is caused by the 
observations for which the deficit is practically zero, but where a firm still repurchases an amount of debt.   
6 This pattern is stable over time. We compute the correlation coefficients for seven time intervals of five years 
for deficit values between 0.01 and 1, and find an average correlation coefficient of 0.96.  
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We will test how our findings on large deficits relate to proxies of firms’ debt 
capacities. For example, do firms with small debt capacities already issue equity for 
relatively small deficits? We use firms’ size, tangibility, profitability, market-to-book 
ratios, and their rated debt outstanding to determine firms’ ability to borrow. We test 
an extended regression model of the pecking order theory, which allows for 
differential coefficients for firm-years with surpluses, small deficits (deficits below 
0.059), medium deficits (in which firms’ debt capacities do limit the firm to some 
extent) and deficits that have a high probability of posing constraints on firms’ use of 
debt (deficits above 0.237): 
 
∆Dit = α + β1*dit + β2*bit + β3*cit + β4*DEFit + β5* dit*DEFit + β6*bit*DEFit + 
β7*cit*DEFit + εit,               (5) 
 
where, dit is a dummy variable that equals one if DEFit < 0, and zero otherwise, bit is a 
dummy variable that equals one if DEFit ≥ 0.059, and zero otherwise, and cit is a 
dummy variable that equals one if DEFit ≥ 0.237, and zero otherwise. This regression 
specification allows the distinction of four effects: an effect of surpluses (β4 + β5), an 
effect of deficits for which firms are not restricted by their debt capacities (β4), an 
effect of deficits in which firms’ debt capacities do limit the firm to some extent (β4 + 
β6), and an effect of deficits that have a high probability of posing constraints on 
firms’ use of debt (β4 + β6 + β7). Model 1 of Table 7 shows the estimation result for our 
total sample. As expected, the pecking order coefficient increases for firms with 
surpluses (β5), and decreases for firms with high levels of deficits (β6 and β7). 
To examine how our findings on the effects of surpluses and large deficits relate 
to predictors of firms’ debt capacities, we construct various subsamples. We first 
divide our sample in firm-years in which a firm has rated debt outstanding, and firm-
years in which a firm has no rated debt outstanding, in line with arguments of 
Lemmon and Zender (2007). Models 2 and 3 of Table 7 show that firms with rated 
debt outstanding are more likely to cover financing deficits with debt: the pecking 
order coefficient for small deficits is 0.802 for firms with rated debt outstanding, and 
0.649 for firms with no rated debt outstanding. The coefficient of 0.649 indicates that 
even firms that are restricted in their debt issuing show a tendency to issue debt for 
small deficits. These findings support the pecking order theory. For both subsamples, 
the pecking order coefficients decrease for larger deficits. For deficits above 23.7% of 
total assets, the pecking order coefficient is 0.297 for firms with rated debt 
outstanding, and 0.093 for firms with no rated debt outstanding. These results confirm 
the arguments of Lemmon and Zender, i.e. non-rated firms have lower pecking order 
coefficients for deficits. Our results for the size of the deficit are present in both
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rating-based subsamples. In other words, the pecking order coefficient decreases when 
debt is not rated and when deficits are larger.  
Models 4 and 5 of Table 7 show the results of our estimation when we construct 
subsamples based on firms’ total sales, tangibility, profitability, and market-to-book 
ratios. The least-constrained-sample has above-median sales (>59.1 million dollars), 
above-median tangibility (>25.4% of total assets), above-median profitability (>7.5% 
of total assets) and below-median market-to-book ratios (<1.265). The sample with 
constrained firm characteristics has below-median size, below-median tangibility, 
below-median profitability and above-median market-to-book ratios. For the least-
constrained-sample the pecking order model predicts firms’ financing choices well: 
the pecking order coefficients are 0.814 for small deficits, 0.806 for median deficits, 
and 0.672 for large deficits. In line with Agca and Mozumdar (2007), we find that 
most firms in our constrained sample are not able to cover the deficits with debt: for 
small deficits, the pecking order coefficient is only 0.149. The pecking order 
coefficient for large deficits is even significantly lower for these constrained firms. In 
Models 6 and 7 we combine our subsamples. That is, the least-constrained 
observations have above-median sales, above-median tangibility, above-median 
profitability, below-median market-to-book ratios, and rated debt outstanding, while 
the most-constrained-sample has below-median size, below-median tangibility, 
below-median profitability, above-median market-to-book ratios, and no rated debt 
outstanding. Interestingly, the pecking order coefficient for the non-constrained 
sample is 0.703, which is somewhat smaller than the pecking order coefficients found 
in Models 2 and 4, and also smaller than the pecking order coefficient for medium 
deficits (0.752) in the same subsample.7 Still, the patterns that we find are similar to 
the patterns in our estimation of Models 4 and 5.  
For surpluses, the coefficients are relatively high in all subsamples. Firms that are 
constrained are more likely to repurchase debt when having a surplus (coefficients of 
0.906, 0.918, and 0.918) than firms that are not constrained (coefficients of 0.754, 
0.844, and 0.754), which is in line with the constrained firms reducing debt to relax 
the constraints. 
Table 7 also reports the proportional occurrences of surpluses, small deficits, 
medium deficits, and large deficits for our subsamples. It can be seen that constrained 
                                            
7 Apparently, the threshold value for large deficits exceeds the 5.9% of total assets for our sample of non-
constrained firms with rated debt outstanding. When estimating the threshold level for this subsample with a 
similar procedure as in Section 4.3, we find that the threshold level is 33.4% of total assets. The pecking order 
coefficient that corresponds to deficits below 0.334 is 0.784 for non-constrained firms with rated debt 
outstanding.  
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firms are more often confronted with large deficits. Model 7 shows that 45% of the 
cases in our mostly constrained sample face financing needs above 23.7% of total 
assets. For non-constrained firms (Model 6), this percentage is only 1%. Hence, we 
conclude that the relatively low pecking order coefficient for constrained firms is 
caused by their limited ability to borrow, plus the relatively large financing 
requirements of these firms. 
 
2.4.5 Equity issuers 
 
Another test on the debt capacity is to specifically look at firms that issue equity, 
which is comparable to Leary and Roberts (2007). Leary and Roberts compare firms 
violating the pecking order theory with non-restricted borrowers in the private debt 
market, to examine whether the debt capacity causes the violation. They find a 
substantial portion of the violators to be facing debt capacity constraints. However, 
the majority of firms issuing equity do not seem to be significantly different in terms 
of firm characteristics from firms tapping the private debt market. 
We therefore specifically look at firms with large deficits, to see whether the debt 
capacity can explain why some firms issue debt, while others opt for equity. Our 
sample consists of those observations in which the deficit exceeds 0.237. We count 
observations in which more than 75% of the large deficit is covered by debt as a debt 
issue, and observations in which less than 25% of the large deficit is covered by debt 
as an equity issue.  
With our subsamples that are based on firms’ total sales, tangibility, profitability, 
market-to-book ratios, and rated debt outstanding, we find that of the non-constrained 
firms facing a large deficit, 79.8% chooses to issue debt. For the constrained firms, 
this percentage is 15.1%. Hence, the debt capacity again seems to have a strong 
impact on firms’ financing decisions. 
 
2.4.6 Explaining the time and size effect 
 
In this section we will examine whether the deviant results for large deficits on 
firms’ financing behavior potentially explain the size and time puzzles. We investigate 
the distributions of deficit sizes for subsamples of firm sizes in Panel A of Figure 3. 
Panel B shows the distribution of the deficit sizes for subsamples of periods. We 
calculate the cumulative percentages of observations for financing deficits between 
zero and two. The lines in Figure 3 show the percentages of observations that are 
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Figure 3: Distribution of deficit sizes for different firm sizes and periods, 1971 to 2005 
 
The lines represent the percentages of observations with deficits between zero and the corresponding value on 
the x-axis. Panel A shows the lines for different size quartiles. The dotted line represents firm-years in the first 
size quartile, the dashed and dotted line (third line from above) represents firm-years in the second size 
quartile, the dashed line represents firm-years in the third size quartile, and the solid line represents firms-years 
in the fourth size quartile. Panel B shows the lines for different time periods. The dotted line in Panel B 
represents firm-years for the period 1971-1980, the dashed and dotted line (second line from above) represents 
firm-years for the period 1981-1990, the dashed line represents firm-years for the period 1991-2000, and the 
solid line represents firms-years for the period 2001-2005. The financing deficits are scaled by total assets.  
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below the deficit levels on the x-axis. The closer the line is to the x-axis, the 
higher the proportion of relatively high deficits in a subsample. 
Panel A of Figure 3 shows that, given that a large firm has a deficit, this deficit 
will be above 0.2 in about 10% of the cases, whereas small firms face deficits above 
0.2 in about 50% of the cases. The results indicate that large firms (the solid line) face 
the lowest number of large deficits, followed by medium large firms and medium 
small firms. The smallest firms face most of the large deficits. To examine what 
causes the relation between firm size and deficit size, we describe in Table 8 the 
means and standard deviations of the components of the financing deficits for each 
size quartile.  
  
Table 8: Firm size effects on the mean and volatility of the financing deficits 
 
The sample period is 1971–2005. We delete financial firms, utilities, and firm-years with gaps in the reporting 
of relevant flow of funds data. This table determines the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of firms’ 
deficits, cash dividends, investments, change in working capital, and internal cash flows. Firms are yearly 
sorted into quartiles based on total assets. The variable deficits includes negative deficits (i.e., financing 
surpluses). All variables are scaled by total assets.  
 Overall Smallest Medium small Medium large Largest 
Averages (st.dev.)      
Deficits 0.094 0.207 0.087 0.054 0.031 
 (0.298) (0.485) (0.251) (0.174) (0.113) 
Cash dividends 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.019 
 (0.071) (0.115) (0.064) (0.044) (0.033) 
Investments 0.093 0.073 0.092 0.106 0.100 
 (0.195) (0.280) (0.189) (0.155) (0.119) 
Working capital -0.004 -0.064 0.035 0.032 0.009 
 (0.350) (0.593) (0.293) (0.194) (0.116) 
Internal cash flow 0.009 -0.190 0.041 0.088 0.093 
 (0.343) (0.598) (0.211) (0.120) (0.084) 
      
Percentages      
Surpluses 38% 32% 40% 41% 41% 
Financing deficits above 0.059 31% 39% 33% 30% 24% 
Financing deficits above 0.237 14% 26% 16% 10% 4% 
 
The group of small firms has more volatile internal cash flows: the standard 
deviation of small firms’ internal cash flows is 0.598 against 0.084 for large firms. 
The volatilities of the other components of the deficit are also higher for small firms. 
Hence, small firms have more volatile deficits, which means that small firms are more 
often confronted with considerably large deficits. As these large deficits are almost 
exclusively covered with equity issues, small firms do not appear to act according to 
the pecking order model, despite the findings of Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn (1987) 
and Brennan and Hughes (1991) that small firms have a larger likelihood of high 
informational asymmetry. 
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Our analysis on financing surpluses and large financing deficits also allows us to 
examine why net debt issues decreasingly cover the financing deficits over time. 
Panel B of Figure 3 shows that firms face the lowest number of large deficits in the 
seventies (the dotted line), followed by the firms in the eighties. In the nineties, the 
distribution of firms’ deficits is mostly skewed towards large deficits, even more than 
in the period 2001-2005. Hence, the pecking order coefficient is expected to be higher 
in the period 2001-2005 than in the period 1991-2000. Furthermore, the coefficients 
should be at their highest level in the seventies. To illustrate this, Figure 4 shows the 
pecking order coefficients based on estimating Eq. (1) by OLS for each year 
separately, together with the percentages of firms with financing surpluses and large 
financing deficits (above 0.237).  
 
Figure 4: Financing surpluses, large financing deficits, and the pecking order coefficients, 1971 to 2005  
 
The solid line represents the pecking order coefficients (βpo), which can be determined by estimating the 
pecking order specification ∆Dit = α + βpo*DEFit + εit on a yearly basis, where ∆Dit is the net debt issued by 
firm i in year t and DEFit is the financing deficit of firm i in year t. Values of the pecking order coefficient can 
be found on the left-hand axis. The dotted line represents the percentage of firms with a financing surplus in a 
given year. The dashed line represents the percentage of firms with a financing deficit that is larger than 23.7% 
of the total assets in a given year. Values of these variables are on the right-hand axis. 
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Indeed, the estimated pecking order coefficients are higher in the period 2001-
2005 than in the period 1991-2000. In general, a rise in the percentage of financing 
surpluses increases the pecking order coefficient; see for example the years 1975 and 
2005. The percentage of firms with large deficits is highly correlated with the change 
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of the pecking order coefficient. For instance, the downfall of the pecking order 
coefficient in 1983 and the rises in 1982 and 2001 relate to an increase of the 
percentage of firms with large deficits in 1983, and a decrease in 1982 and 2001. 
Overall, the time effect can largely be explained by our analysis of financing surpluses 
and large financing deficits. 
The asymmetry between surpluses, normal deficits, and large deficits potentially 
explains the findings of prior studies. For example, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
find that the pecking order coefficient is 0.75. Apart from the fact that their sample 
period ends in 1989, Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ sample differs from other papers on 
the pecking order specification in only including firms that have continuous data on 
flow of funds for the whole sample period. This requirement decreases their sample to 
157 firms. In following their data selection procedure, we obtain a sample of 690 
firms, for which we find a pecking order coefficient of 0.77. While Frank and Goyal 
(2003) already highlight the severe sample selection bias in the sample of Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, an inspection of the resulting sample reveals that large financing 
deficits occur much more often when gaps in the data are permitted. This is due to the 
fact that firms with large financing deficits are less likely to survive the whole sample 
period. For example, when examining the frequency of financing deficits above 0.237, 
we find that these deficits only occur in 3% of Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ firm-years, 
compared to 14% in our original sample. Also, the percentage of firms with large 
deficits is low as their sample is biased towards relatively large firms because these 
firms have more data available. The lack of large financing deficits substantially 
increases Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ pecking order coefficient. Additionally, the 
pecking order coefficient is enhanced by the relatively large percentage of firm-years 
with financing surpluses (47%) in their sample. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Frank and Goyal (2003) test the pecking order theory of corporate leverage with a 
model developed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and conclude that net equity 
issues track the financing deficit more closely than net debt issues do. They find two 
puzzling results: the net debt issues decreasingly explain the deficits over time and 
especially small firms do not behave according to the pecking order theory. Especially 
the latter result is counterintuitive, as the pecking order relies on the existence of 
informational asymmetry, and this asymmetry is higher for investors of small 
companies. We explain the relations between size, time, and pecking order behavior 
by separating financing deficits from financing surpluses and by taking issue sizes 
into account. We show that the debt issues provide an excellent fit for financing 
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surpluses, a reasonable fit for small and medium financing deficits, and an extremely 
poor fit for large financing deficits. As small firms have more large deficits and fewer 
surpluses, they are found to issue relatively more equity than large firms do. The 
pecking order coefficient decreases over time because of an increasing number of 
firms with large deficits in the Compustat dataset.  
Our findings are consistent with the predictions of a pecking order model that 
considers firms’ debt capacities: since large financing needs have the potential of 
exceeding the unused debt capacity of firms, these firms are restricted in the issuing of 
debt. In case of a surplus, firms’ debt capacities do not pose any restrictions on the 
repurchase of debt. For firms that are expected to be least constrained in issuing debt, 
we find the pecking order coefficients to be substantially higher than the coefficients 
of the overall sample, as reported in Frank and Goyal (2003).  
The differences in pecking order coefficients between financing surpluses, normal 
deficits, and large deficits have implications for other empirical tests in the capital 
structure literature that apply the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) technique. 
Examples are Litov (2006), who examines the debt-equity choice for firms in different 
quintiles of managerial entrenchment, and Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2008), who 
examine the debt-equity choice for firms into deciles that are based on the market’s 
assessment of their adverse selection risk. As managerial entrenchment and the risk of 
adverse selection relate to firms’ sizes and risk-taking, the distributions of financing 
surpluses and large deficits are likely to differ among these papers’ quintiles and 
deciles. For instance, firms with more managerial entrenchment are more likely to be 
large, which results in a lower frequency of large deficits. Hence, including the effects 
of surpluses and large deficits in their tests will help in interpreting their results, or 
might provide an alternative explanation for their results altogether. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Debt capacity and firms’ financing 
decisions8 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
The previous chapter focused on one widely debated capital structure theory: the 
pecking order theory. This theory argues that, due to asymmetric information, firms 
adopt a hierarchical order of financing preferences so that internal financing is 
preferred over external financing. If external financing is needed, firms first seek debt 
funding. Equity is only issued as a last resort, when debt financing will be extremely 
costly. In the words of Myers (1984, p. 585): “you will refuse to buy equity unless the 
firm has already exhausted its "debt capacity" - that is, unless the firm has issued so 
much debt already that it would face substantial additional costs in issuing more.”  
However, there is another influential capital structure theory: the static tradeoff 
theory. This theory implies that firms have a target debt ratio and try to move towards 
this target.9 In this chapter we will compare these main capital structure theories. 
Following the analysis in the previous chapter, we incorporate firms’ debt capacities 
in our analysis. We build upon the notion that credit ratings relate to firms’ debt 
capacities (Lemmon and Zender (2007)), and aim to estimate a firm-year specific debt 
                                            
8  This chapter is based on De Jong, Verbeek, and Verwijmeren (2008b). It has benefited from helpful 
comments by James Ang, Ronald Masulis, participants at the EFMA Conference 2008 in Athens, and seminar 
participants at RSM Erasmus University. 
9 Myers (1984) focuses on the tradeoff between tax benefits and bankruptcy costs when describing the static 
tradeoff theory. Several other papers incorporate more factors into the static tradeoff theory, like non-debt tax 
shields and agency costs (see, e.g., Flannery and Rangan (2006)). 
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capacity. To do so, we base our estimates on statements by Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999), who describe the pecking order theory as follows (p. 225): “If costs of 
financial distress are ignored, the firm will finance real investment by issuing the 
safest security it can. Here safe means not affected by revelation of managers’ inside 
information. In practice, this means that firms which can issue investment-grade debt 
will do so rather than issue equity.” We construct a model explaining a firm’s credit 
rating and use this to derive an estimate of the marginal debt ratio that would make a 
firm lose its investment grade rating and hence substantially increase its costs of 
issuing debt.10 We interpret this debt ratio as an estimate for a firm’s debt capacity. 
We find that the average value of a firm’s debt capacity is about 60% of the firm’s 
total assets.  
The main contribution of this chapter results from our utilization of the estimated 
debt capacities. We use firms’ debt capacities to test the static tradeoff theory against 
the pecking order theory: although previous studies have examined these capital 
structure theories, there is no consensus on the superiority of one of the theories.11 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and De Jong and Verwijmeren (2007) argue that to 
establish the underlying theory for firms’ financing decisions it is essential to 
incorporate the inferences of the pecking order theory when addressing the relevance 
of the static tradeoff theory, and vice versa. In this chapter we use firms’ debt 
capacities to do exactly this.  
We construct a framework that allows us to identify situations in which the 
pecking order theory and the static tradeoff theory have conflicting predictions. For 
example, if a firm issues a security and its debt ratio is currently below its target debt 
ratio, both theories will predict the firm to issue debt: the static tradeoff theory implies 
that a firm moves towards its target, while in a pecking order world a firm will always 
cover its external financing needs with debt as long as it is not constrained by its debt 
capacity. Also, when a firm wants to repurchase securities and has a debt ratio above 
its target, both theories predict that the firm buys back debt.12 Figure 5 provides a 
graphical overview of the predictions of the two theories and indicates whether the 
pecking order theory and the static tradeoff theory predict a debt or equity issue 
(repurchase) for different ranges of the debt ratio. 
                                            
10 The higher costs for non-investment grade rated firms are mainly the result of the higher probability of 
default. Standard and Poor’s (2006) report that the average 10-year default rate is 2.81% for firms with 
investment grade ratings, and 27.31% for non-investment grade ratings. 
11 Among others, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Lemmon and Zender (2007), and Agca and Mozumdar 
(2007) find evidence in favor of the pecking order theory, while Frank and Goyal (2003), Fama and French 
(2005), and Leary and Roberts (2007) find evidence against the pecking order theory. Evidence in favor of the 
static tradeoff theory is also mixed. See Frank and Goyal (2007) for an overview. 
12 For a description of the pecking order theory regarding repurchase decisions, see Chapter 2 or Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999, p. 225). 
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Figure 5: The predictions of the pecking order theory and the static tradeoff theory for different debt 
ratios. 
 
This figure shows whether the pecking order theory and the static tradeoff theory predict a debt or equity 
issue/repurchase for different positions of the debt ratio. “ST” corresponds to the static tradeoff theory, and 
“PO” corresponds to the pecking order theory. 
 
The most interesting parts of the debt ratio spectrum are the regions in which the 
theories have conflicting predictions. This is the case in two regions. For issuing 
decisions, the theories disagree when the current debt ratio is above the target ratio but 
below the debt capacity. In this case, the static tradeoff theory predicts a decrease of 
leverage, whereas the pecking order theory predicts that a firm would still increase 
leverage. For repurchase decisions the theories disagree when the firm’s current debt 
ratio is below the target debt ratio. The pecking order model predicts that the firm 
repurchases debt and therefore decreases leverage, whereas the static tradeoff model 
predicts a move towards the target and therefore an increase of leverage. By 
identifying the observations in these two regions, we are able to test which of the two 
theories provides the most accurate predictions. 
We test our framework with the regression specification of Hovakimian, Opler, 
and Titman (2001), in which a firm’s decision to either issue (or repurchase) debt or 
equity is regressed on the difference between a firm’s debt ratio and its supposed 
target, to explain firms’ debt-equity choices. However, we extend the specification 
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with the deviations between firms’ leverage and their estimated debt capacity. For the 
situations in which the pecking order theory and the static tradeoff theory have 
conflicting predictions regarding the issue decision, we find the deviation from the 
debt capacity to be a better descriptor of firms’ debt-equity choices than firms’ 
deviations from their targets. In fact, the estimated target has a statistically 
insignificant impact on the debt-equity choice after controlling for the debt capacity. 
This latter finding is strong evidence against the static tradeoff theory. For repurchase 
decisions, both the deviation from the estimated target and the estimated debt capacity 
are statistically significant. 
Next, we use our framework to identify firms that behave in accordance with the 
pecking order theory in a given year, and firms that act according to the static tradeoff 
theory. Corroborating our earlier results, we find that most observations are in line 
with the pecking order theory. By exploiting these classifications, we examine 
whether a firm’s preference for a capital structure theory is situation-specific, as 
argued by Myers (2001), or whether the preferences are firm-specific. This latter 
notion is suggested by survey evidence of, for example, Graham and Harvey (2001). 
A situation-specific preference would imply, for example, that firms in a specific year 
with high informational asymmetry correspond to a preference for the pecking order 
theory. Firm-specific preferences imply that firms have certain preferences, 
irrespective of their situation and the conditions of the market.  
We test whether a preference for a capital structure theory is situation-specific by 
examining the effects of firm characteristics on firms’ preferences for a specific 
theory, and by examining whether these preferences are time-specific. We find that 
profitability is the only explanatory variable that robustly explains the choice for a 
capital structure theory. The more profitable a firm is, the higher the probability that it 
will act according to the pecking order theory. An examination of the preferences for 
a capital structure theory over time shows that these preferences are relatively stable 
over the years. These findings imply that time-varying variables do not have a strong 
impact on the question whether a firm operates on the basis of one theory or the other. 
On the other hand, we do find strong persistence in a firm’s preferences: a firm that 
acts according to the pecking order theory or static tradeoff theory in a given year, is 
more likely to do so again in a subsequent year. Apparently, firms are persistent in 
financing according to a particular capital structure theory. 
This chapter contributes to the literature in various ways. First, we contribute to 
the ongoing battle between the pecking order theory and the static tradeoff theory. 
Fama and French (2002) find mixed evidence when examining the conflicting indirect 
predictions of both theories with regard to the influence of dividends and profitability 
on leverage. We choose to solely focus on the direct predictions of a capital structure 
51
Debt capacity and firms’ financing decisions 
 
39
theory on financing decisions. We shed new light on findings by Hovakimian, Opler, 
and Titman (2001), and show that the pecking order theory is a better predictor of 
firms’ financing decisions than the static tradeoff theory. Second, we quantify a firm’s 
debt capacity, which enables a test of the conflicting direct predictions of the pecking 
order theory and the static tradeoff theory. Although the concept of the debt capacity 
has been used throughout the pecking order literature, we do not know of attempts to 
construct an advanced empirical measure of this concept in terms of a debt ratio. Most 
related is Turnbull (1979), who models the maximum level of debt that lenders should 
be willing to provide. 
 
3.2 Data 
 
3.2.1 Sample selection 
 
In our empirical analysis, we employ a broad cross-section of U.S. firms from the 
Compustat and CRSP databases covering the period 1985-2005. The starting point is 
1985 because we require credit rating data (Compustat item 280), and these data are 
not available prior to 1985. Regulated utilities (SICs 4900-4999) and financial firms 
(SICs 6000-6999) are excluded. We delete firm-years with missing information for 
our variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Our final 
sample contains 2,259 firms and 13,338 firm-year observations.13 
 
3.2.2 The financing deficit 
 
The financing deficit is introduced by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) to test the 
pecking order model. The financing deficit represents the inadequacy of internal cash 
flows for real investments and dividend commitments, and is calculated as the sum of 
the change in working capital, the investments, and the cash dividends, minus the 
internal cash flows. In Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ definition, the financing deficit is 
equal to the sum of net long-term debt issues and net equity issues. For details about 
the computation of the deficit, see Chapter 2 or Frank and Goyal (2003).  
We define leverage as total debt divided by total assets, since trade credit (which 
is short-term financing) can provide financing when a firm would otherwise be 
                                            
13 This sample is smaller than our sample in Chapter 2 because we require firms to have credit rating data 
available. 
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constrained (Petersen and Rajan (1997)). We therefore adjust the deficit so that it 
represents the need for total (short-term and long-term) financing. We adjust the 
computation of the deficit by not including changes in current debt (item 301) and 
changes in accounts payable (item 304; if format code 7). Consequently, our deficit 
measure represents the need for total financing. The variable is scaled by assets at the 
beginning of the book-year. We employ the financing deficit in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2.3 Informational asymmetry 
 
An important aspect of the pecking order theory is informational asymmetry. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that managers, when acting on behalf of the current 
shareholders, pass up good investments in case the new shareholders will capture the 
benefits of the investment. Consequently, with informational asymmetry, investors 
will reason that an investment decision without an equity issue signals good news, 
while issuing shares signals bad news. This signal causes the stock price to drop. An 
interesting discussion is whether the level of informational asymmetry matters. 
Basically, the theoretical underlying of the pecking order theory in Myers and Majluf 
(1984) does not imply that only firms with high informational asymmetry have the 
financing hierarchy of first internal funds, then external debt, and then external equity. 
Instead, their model implies that any firm with informational asymmetry would have 
this financing hierarchy. Still, it could be argued that higher informational asymmetry 
leads to a larger decrease of the stock price due to an equity issue, as the uncertainty 
about the true value of the investment opportunity is higher. We therefore treat this 
issue as an empirical question. 
Our proxy of informational asymmetry measures the firm-specific return variation, 
ψ, as constructed in Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003). This measure is 
based on the assumption that greater firm-specific variation in stock prices reflects 
more information getting into the stock price, i.e. less informational asymmetry. The 
firm-specific stock return variation follows from the regression  
 
Firm returnt = β0 + β1*market returnt + β2*industry returnt + εt,  
 
which is estimated for each firm using monthly returns within the previous calendar 
year. Industry returns are measured at the level of 2-digit SIC-codes. The market 
return and the industry return are value-weighted averages excluding the firm for 
which the regression is estimated. The variance of ε is scaled by the total variance of 
the dependent variable in the regression. This is equal to dividing the residual sum of 
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squares by the total sum of squares, or 1 – R2. The resulting ψ is a measure for the 
firm-specific return variability in a given year relative to the total variability. High ψ 
corresponds to low informational asymmetry. Various papers have used this measure. 
Dittmar and Thakor (2007), for example, show that firms with a high ψ are more 
likely to issue equity. 
 
3.2.4 Summary statistics 
 
In our framework we use a firm’s credit rating to eventually determine the debt 
capacity. The credit ratings are from Standard and Poor’s and provide information on 
a firm’s creditworthiness. Long-term credit ratings have a scale from AAA to D: a 
rating of AAA implies that a firm is reliable, stable, and of high quality, while a rating 
of D qualifies the firm as being expected to default on most or all obligations. The 
ratings AAA, AA, A, and BBB are called investment grade ratings. As of BB, ratings 
are called non-investment grade or speculative grade ratings.  
Table 9 shows firm characteristics for our total sample, for our sample of firms 
with investment grade ratings, and for our sample of firms with speculative grade 
ratings. 
The average firm in our sample has assets worth of 6,133 million dollars. Firms 
with investment grade ratings are on average larger than firms with non-investment 
grade ratings. The leverage of speculative grade firms is higher: on average these 
firms have a debt-assets ratio of 0.434, while investment grade firms have an average 
debt ratio of 0.267. The firms with investment grade ratings have been rated by 
Standard and Poor’s for seven years (median), while firms with non-investment grade 
ratings have been rated for just four years (median). 
 
3.3 Target leverage and debt capacity 
 
3.3.1 Target leverage 
 
The target debt ratio in the static tradeoff theory is the result of various factors. 
The tax shield of debt (Modigliani and Miller (1963)) provides an incentive for firms 
to have higher debt ratios, just as the monitoring and disciplining role of debt holders 
in case of agency problems (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Jensen (1986)). On the 
other hand, financial distress costs decrease firms’ optimal debt ratio.  
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Table 9: Summary statistics 
 
We exclude financial firms, utilities, and firm-years with gaps in the reporting of relevant data. The sample 
period is 1985-2005. Assets are determined by Compustat Item 6 and are reported in millions of dollars. Sales 
is Item 12 and is also in millions of dollars. Tangibility is Item 8. Book leverage is computed by dividing the 
sum of Item 9 and Item 34 by Item 6, and market leverage is (Item 9 + Item 34) / (Item 34 + Item 9 + Item 24 
* Item 25). EBIT is Item 18 + Item 15 + Item 16 and EBITDA is Item 13. The market-to-book ratio is 
calculated as (Item 24 * Item 25 – Item 60 + Item 6) / Item 6. Age is the number of years since the firm was 
first rated by Standard and Poor’s, and has a maximum value of ten. Dividends correspond to the sum of Item 
19 and Item 21, and retained earnings to Item 36. Working capital is Item 4 minus Item 5. Rating is Item 280. 
The financing deficit is computed as in Frank and Goyal (2003), with the addition of Item 301 and possibly 
Item 304 (if the format code is 7). Informational asymmetry is measured by Psi, as in Durnev, Morck, Yeung, 
and Zarowin (2003). Industry book leverage is the median book leverage per industry and per year, based on 
the Fama-French 30-industry classification. The two-year stock return is computed by dividing the stock price 
in a given year (Item 24) by the stock price two years before. Tangibility, EBIT, EBITDA, dividends, retained 
earnings, working capital, and the financing deficit are scaled by total assets. We report the means, and the 
medians are between parentheses. 
 All firm-years  Firm-years with an 
investment grade 
rating 
 Firm-years with a 
speculative grade 
rating 
 N Mean 
(median) 
 N Mean 
(median) 
 N Mean 
(median) 
Total assets 13,338 6,133 
(1,804) 
 7,284 9,748 
(3,626) 
 6,054 1,783  
(744) 
Sales 13,338 5,621 
(1,721) 
 7,284 8,939 
(3,705) 
 6,054 1,630  
(641) 
Tangibility 13,338 0.391 
(0.350) 
 7,284 0.407 
(0.365) 
 6,054 0.373  
(0.330) 
Book leverage 13,338 0.343 
(0.320) 
 7,284 0.267 
(0.262) 
 6,054 0.434  
(0.428) 
Market leverage 13,338 0.351 
(0.306) 
 7,284 0.245 
(0.223) 
 6,054 0.478  
(0.470) 
EBIT 13,338 0.079 
(0.086) 
 7,284 0.104 
(0.102) 
 6,054 0.049  
(0.065) 
EBITDA 13,338 0.133 
(0.131) 
 7,284 0.156 
(0.151) 
 6,054 0.105  
(0.106) 
Market-to-book ratio 13,338 1.612 
(1.341) 
 7,284 1.789 
(1.479) 
 6,054 1.400  
(1.195) 
Age 13,338 5.719 
(5.000) 
 7,284 6.426 
(7.000) 
 6,054 4.869  
(4.000) 
Dividends 13,285 0.014 
(0.008) 
 7,253 0.021 
(0.016) 
 6,032 0.006  
(0.000) 
Retained earnings 13,338 0.163 
(0.172) 
 7,284 0.289 
(0.283) 
 6,054 0.010  
(0.045) 
Working capital 13,338 0.148 
(0.124) 
 7,284 0.129 
(0.108) 
 6,054 0.170  
(0.148) 
Credit rating 13,338 3.706 
(4.000) 
 7,284 4.719 
(5.000) 
 6,054 2.486  
(3.000) 
Financing deficit 12,454 0.030 
(0.000) 
 6,887 0.014  
(-0.002) 
 5,567 0.049  
(0.003) 
Informational asymmetry 6,846 0.578 
(0.611) 
 4,693 0.581 
(0.614) 
 2,153 0.572  
(0.608) 
Industry book leverage 13,017 0.458 
(0.458) 
 7,136 0.457 
(0.458) 
 5,881 0.460  
(0.458) 
Two-year stock return 12,469 0.115 
(0.013) 
 7,098 0.100 
(0.043) 
 5,371 0.135  
(-0.044) 
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Other factors that give incentives to lower debt ratios are the debt overhang 
problem (Myers (1977)), the cost of personal taxes (Miller (1977)), and non-debt tax 
shields (DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)). According to the target adjustment theory 
firms are attempting to move to their target debt ratio, and adjust their financing 
decisions towards this goal. 
In modeling the target, we allow for a current deviation from the target and allow 
for different targets across firms: 
 
   ,'* 1, βitti xdr =+            (6) 
 
where * 1, +tidr  is firm i’s desired debt ratio at t+1; xit is a vector of firm characteristics 
related to the costs and benefits of operating with various leverage ratios. The 
coefficient vector β is estimated using a regression explaining the debt ratio in year 
t+1 from the firm characteristics in year t.  
We select firm characteristics for estimating firms’ debt ratios based on Rajan and 
Zingales (1995). These characteristics are size, tangibility, profitability, and the 
market-to-book ratio. We also include the median industry leverage as an explanatory 
variable for a firm’s target debt ratio. For firms’ target ratios, we use book ratios.14 We 
exclude the targets of firms that have speculative ratings, as these firms’ debt ratios 
are most likely not the desired ratios of these firms (Kisgen (2006)). Also, these firms 
are likely to face more difficulties in adjusting their debt ratios than firms with 
investment grade ratings. Following recommendations of Petersen (2007), we employ 
panel-robust standard errors throughout the chapter.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
14 This is in accordance with for example Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). Still, the target ratio has also been 
quantified in terms of market leverage. Generally, when authors analyze both market and book leverage, the 
results are comparable (Flannery and Rangan (2006)). We will redo our analysis with market leverage in 
Section 3.4.2. 
15 We do not use fixed effects since we expect firms that follow the pecking order theory to deviate from their 
supposed target for longer periods of time. The inclusion of fixed firm effects imposes that firms are on 
average on their target during the period used for estimating the model, which would not allow firms to be 
constantly below or above their supposed target. 
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Table 10: Target leverage 
 
We exclude financial firms, utilities, and firm-years with gaps in the reporting of relevant data. The sample 
period is 1985-2005. This table shows the estimated targets for the firms in our sample with an investment 
grade rating. We estimate the following regression specification: ,'* 1, βitti xdr =+ where * 1, +tidr  is firm i’s 
desired debt ratio at t+1; x’it is a vector of firm characteristics related to the costs and benefits of operating 
with various leverage ratios, and β is a coefficient vector. T-statistics appear in parentheses and are computed 
using panel-robust standard errors. *, ** indicate significance at the 5%, and 1% confidence level, 
respectively. 
 Target debt ratio 
Constant 0.106**  
(2.60) 
Log(sales) 0.008**  
(2.74) 
Tangibility 0.100**  
(5.84) 
EBITDA -0.068  
(-1.06) 
Market-to-book 
ratio 
-0.016**  
(-5.12) 
Industry median 0.460**  
(5.72) 
Year dummies Yes 
N 7,136 
R2 0.133 
 
The results in Table 10 indicate that size and tangibility increase the target 
leverage of firms. The relation between size and leverage is usually explained by 
bankruptcy considerations: larger firms are generally more diversified and therefore 
less prone to bankruptcy. Also, the direct bankruptcy costs will generally be a smaller 
portion of the firm’s assets. Firms are generally believed to use their tangible assets as 
collateral, which decreases the costs of debt. Indeed we find firms with higher 
tangibility to have higher debt targets. We further observe that the market-to-book 
ratio and profitability have a negative effect on a firm’s target, which is also in line 
with the current literature (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995)). 
Up front, we do not know whether a firm has a target debt ratio. Still, we estimate 
firms’ targets on all investment grade firms, which means that we will also 
incorporate the firms that do not have a target. In a robustness check, we consider an 
alternative measure for a firm’s target debt ratio, by taking the average debt ratio of a 
given firm over the preceding years (see, for example, Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999)). In this way, the target debt ratio of a firm that actually has a target is not 
contaminated by the effects of firms without targets. 
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3.3.2 Debt capacity 
 
The proxy for the debt capacity should represent the debt ratio for which firms are 
restricted in issuing debt. This restriction relates to a firm’s constraint in issuing debt 
against “normal” costs. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) interpret the pecking order 
theory as follows (p. 225): “If costs of financial distress are ignored, the firm will 
finance real investment by issuing the safest security it can. Here safe means not 
affected by revelation of managers’ inside information. In practice, this means that 
firms which can issue investment-grade debt will do so rather than issue equity.” We 
follow Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ (1999) interpretation of the pecking order model 
and link the debt capacity to investment grade ratings. A firm is constrained in its debt 
issuing if it cannot issue investment grade debt. The reason why speculative debt is 
costly is that issuing speculative debt substantially increases the chance of bankruptcy. 
As a result, it requires higher interest payments (Almeida and Philippon (2007)).16 
Grinblatt and Titman (2002) argue that the cost for speculative debt is also increased 
as many bond portfolio managers are restricted from owning speculative grade bonds.  
The relationship between debt ratings and debt ratios is empirically shown by, for 
example, Huang and Huang (2003), Molina (2005), and Almeida and Philippon 
(2007). Table 11 confirms that leverage and credit ratings are strongly related in our 
sample.17 The table also shows the 10-year historical cumulative default rates for U.S. 
firms with a specific rating in the period 1981-2005, based on a report of Standard and 
Poor’s (2006).  
On average, firms with the highest rating (AAA) have the lowest debt ratios 
(mean of 0.177). It can be seen that the lower the credit rating, the higher the leverage. 
The table also shows how we recode the ratings AAA-D into numerical ratings, based 
on Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006). Table 11 further shows that over 
the period 1981-2005 the historical 10-year cumulative probability of default is 5.73% 
for firms having a rating BBB in the U.S. (investment grade rating), whereas this 
default probability rises to 17.87% for firms with rating BB (speculative grade rating).  
 
 
                                            
16 Sometimes firms issue junk bonds (bonds with a rating lower than BB), and hence opt for high interest rates. 
Gilson and Warner (1997) find that this is mainly to gain financial flexibility, as junk bonds do usually not 
have the restrictive covenants that normal debt has. 
17 This relation is likely to work in two ways. Firms’ leverage obviously influences probability of defaults and 
hence credit ratings. However, firms’ credit ratings are also believed to influence firms’ leverage (see, e.g. 
Kisgen (2006)), especially because anecdotal evidence suggests that firms contact rating agencies before 
making large financing decisions. Still, the effect of leverage on credit ratings is likely to be much stronger 
than the effect of credit ratings on firms’ leverage.   
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Table 11: Credit ratings and leverage 
 
We exclude financial firms, utilities, and firm-years with gaps in the reporting of relevant data. The sample 
period is 1985-2005. This table shows the book leverage for firms with various long-term credit ratings. We 
report means, medians, and standard deviations. The table also shows the numerical classifications of credit 
ratings as in Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006). The default rate is the cumulative average 10-year 
default rate of U.S. firms in the period 1981-2005, as reported by Standard and Poor’s (2006). 
Credit rating  N Numerical Investment 
or 
speculative 
10-year 
default 
rate 
 Book leverage 
        Mean Median St. dev. 
AAA  234  7  Investment 0.35%  0.177 0.167 0.082 
AA  864  6  Investment 0.77%  0.205 0.200 0.109 
A  2,807  5  Investment 2.06%  0.254 0.251 0.110 
BBB  3,379  4  Investment 5.73%  0.300 0.297 0.128 
BB  3,238  3  Speculative 17.87%  0.393 0.385 0.161 
B  2,523  2  Speculative 32.65%  0.482 0.490 0.188 
CCC & D  293  1  Speculative 55.65%  0.473 0.504 0.238 
 
We use firms’ credit ratings to determine the debt capacity for a firm in a given 
year. First, we determine in what way the credit rating depends on various firm 
characteristics. The set of characteristics is based on Altman and Rijken (2004) and 
originates from the Z-score model (Altman (1968)). These variables are working 
capital, retained earnings, profitability, size, and age. Age is the number of years since 
a firm was first rated by Standard and Poor’s (with a maximum of ten). We model a 
firm’s credit rating ity  using an ordered response model, where *ity  is the underlying 
latent variable:  
 
    *ity = ,2'1 ititit xdr εαα ++      (7) 
 
where xit is a set of characteristics of firm i in year t, and drit is the debt ratio of firm i 
in year t (not included in xit). We define a firm’s debt ratio as total debt over the book 
value of assets. Short-term debt is included as, for example, trade credit can provide 
financing when a firm would otherwise be constrained (see Petersen and Rajan 
(1997)). We observe ity  on a 7-point scale and we specify our model as an ordered 
logit model. In this model, γ  refers to the boundaries between the different credit 
ratings. 18  We observe ity  = 1 if ,1* γ≤ity  ity  = 2 if ,2*1 γγ ≤< ity …, and ity  = 7 if 
.6
* γ>ity  An investment grade rating corresponds to ity  ≥ 4. From Table 9 we know 
that 7,284 of the 13,338 firms in our sample have an investment grade rating. For a 
given set of characteristics xit, the probability of getting an investment grade rating is 
given by 
                                            
18 The imposed normalization constraint implies that Eq. (2) has no intercept term. 
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where F denotes the logistic distribution function.  
We define the debt capacity of a firm as the marginal value of the debt ratio, given 
its other firm characteristics, that increases the probability of obtaining a speculative 
grade to 0.50. In other words, we vary the debt ratio and take the value of this debt 
ratio for which we expect a specific firm in a specific year to have a fifty percent 
chance of getting a speculative grade, given the firm’s other characteristics.  
As we vary the debt ratio to find the level for which a firm is expected to lose its 
investment grade rating, we need the control variables to be constant for changes of 
the debt ratios. However, a change in short-term debt will, per definition, have an 
impact on the working capital. Also, a change in leverage will increase a firm’s 
interest payments and therefore its retained earnings. Therefore, in estimating the debt 
capacity, we take the orthogonal variables for a firm’s working capital and the 
retained earnings.19 Table 12 shows the estimation results of the ordered logit model. 
It can be seen that an increase of a firm’s size, profitability, or retained earnings 
on average has a positive effect on Standard and Poor’s credit rating. Leverage has a 
negative effect. The sign of working capital is somewhat unexpected: firms with 
higher working capital have on average lower ratings. This is also found by Altman 
and Rijken (2004). The pseudo R2 is 0.313, and our model gives the correct prediction 
of investment grade ratings or speculative grade ratings in 85% of the cases (not 
reported). 
As mentioned, we define the debt capacity ( citdr ) of a firm as the value of the debt 
ratio, given the other firm characteristics, that increases the probability of obtaining a 
speculative grade to 0.5. For our model, this means that we look for drit that – given xit 
– changes the expected value of *ity  to 3γ . Solving 32'1 γαα =+ itit xdr  for the debt ratio it 
follows that 
 
   ./))(( 12'3 ααγ itcit xdr −=      (9) 
 
                                            
19 We define the orthogonal variables as the residuals of a regression of the debt ratio on a specific variable. 
Hence, the orthogonal variables are uncorrelated to the debt ratio. In robustness tests we have estimated the 
model with all five variables as orthogonal. Also, we have estimated specifications in which we use firms’ 
dividends as proxy for retained earnings, and firms’ current assets as a proxy for the working capital. Our 
results prove to be robust for these alterations. 
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Table 12: Credit ratings 
 
We exclude financial firms, utilities, and firm-years with gaps in the reporting of relevant data. The sample 
period is 1985-2005. This table shows the estimation of an ordered logit model. We estimate *ity = 
,2
'
1 ititit xdr εαα ++ in which *ity  is the underlying latent variable of the credit rating, xit is a set of 
characteristics of firm i in year t, and drit is the debt ratio of firm i in year t (not included in xit). We also report 
the boundaries that correspond to an ordered logit model. T-statistics appear in parentheses and are computed 
using panel-robust standard errors. *, ** indicate significance at the 5%, and 1% confidence level, 
respectively. 
 Credit rating 
Log(sales) 0.918** 
(24.12) 
Book leverage -6.590** 
(-22.13) 
EBIT 2.674** 
(6.26) 
Retained earnings 4.559**  
(19.70) 
Working capital -1.853** 
(-6.80) 
Age dummies Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
N 13,244 
Pseudo R2 0.313 
  
Boundaries  
γ1 -2.529 
γ2 1.557 
γ3 3.925 
γ4 6.063 
γ5 8.524 
γ6 10.641 
 
This measure for a firm’s debt capacity ignores information on unobserved firm 
characteristics that can be inferred from the currently observed credit rating. We can 
exploit this information by noting that the expected value of itε  in (2), given the credit 
rating ity  and other characteristics, is nonzero. Our preferred measure for a firm’s debt 
capacity takes this into account. Accordingly, we define the debt capacity to that value 
for drit, given xit and given the current rating yit that increases the probability of a 
speculative grade to 0.5. It follows that the debt capacity can be derived from 
 
    .},,{ 32'1 γεαα =++ itititititit drxyExdr    (10) 
 
The term },,{ itititit drxyE ε in this expression is nonzero and corresponds to the 
generalized residual of the ordered response model in Eq. (7), as proposed by 
Gourieroux, Monfort, Renault, and Trognon (1987). The generalized residual 
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(denoted itλ ) is positive for firms that have an unexpectedly high credit rating: these 
firms have unobservable firm characteristics that make their rating higher than 
expected. The debt capacity can be estimated as 
 
./))(( 12
'
3 αλαγ ititcit xdr +−=     (11) 
      
Assuming 01 <α , the debt capacity in Eq. (11) will be higher than the debt 
capacity in Eq. (9) for firms that currently have an unexpected good credit rating, and 
lower for firms that currently have an unexpected poor credit rating.  
Using Eq. (11) and the estimated underlying ordered logit model from Eq. (7) we 
find the average debt capacity of firms to be 60.3% of total assets. The median is 
59.2%, and the standard deviation is 21.2%. Some firms have estimates of debt 
capacities that are above one or below zero. This means that our model estimates 
these firms to have a probability smaller than 0.5 of ever getting an investment grade 
rating (in case of a debt capacity below zero) or a speculative rating (in case of a debt 
capacity above one), regardless of the change in debt ratio. There are 208 observations 
(3% of the sample) with values above one and 77 observations (1%) of values below 
zero. For subsequent analyses, we set these values to one and zero, respectively. 
 
3.4 Testing the influence of a firm’s target ratio and debt 
capacity on its debt-equity choice 
 
In this section we relate the estimated target and debt capacity to the debt-equity 
choice. Section 3.4.1 extends the debt-equity choice model of Hovakimian, Opler and 
Titman (2001), Section 3.4.2 provides robustness tests, and Section 3.4.3 discusses 
non-rated firms. 
 
3.4.1 Extending the Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) test 
 
Our test is based on Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), who analyze the 
debt-equity choice of U.S. firms for the period 1979-1997. They define a firm as 
being a debt issuer in a year when the net amount of debt issued in that year exceeds 
5% of total assets. Likewise, an equity issue indicates that the net amount of equity 
issued exceeds 5% of total assets. Using a binary logit model, they estimate whether 
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the difference between the firm’s current leverage and its estimated target has an 
effect on whether the firm issues (repurchases) debt or equity. They find that the 
higher the target with respect to the current leverage, the higher the probability that 
the firm issues debt. For repurchase decisions, it is found that the higher the target 
relative to the current leverage, the higher the likelihood that the firm repurchases 
equity.  
Although these findings seem to provide evidence for the static tradeoff theory, 
we argue that the pecking order theory potentially interfered with the results. For 
instance, when a firm’s current debt ratio is substantially below its target debt ratio, it 
is likely that the firm also substantially deviates from its debt capacity, and the choice 
for debt can just as well be explained by the pecking order theory. As was shown in 
Figure 5, the most interesting region for empirical tests on the capital structure 
theories for issue decisions is the one in which a firm’s leverage is above the target, 
but below the debt capacity. In this case, the static tradeoff theory predicts a strong 
influence of the target debt ratio, while the pecking order model predicts a strong 
influence of the debt capacity and an insignificant impact of the target debt ratio. We 
therefore extend the test of Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) by incorporating 
the estimated debt capacity in the regression specification. We limit our sample to the 
firms that issue or repurchase amounts of either debt or equity that exceed 5% of total 
assets.20 We look at the debt-equity choice in year t+1, to ensure that the debt-equity 
choice does not have an effect on our determination of the debt capacity in Eq. (11). 
Summary statistics of this subsample are presented in Table 13. 
Firms that issue debt have average total assets of 6,566 million dollars, which is 
larger than the equity issuers (5,880 million), but smaller than the average firm that 
repurchases debt (6,888 million) or equity (8,409 million). Firms that issue equity or 
repurchase debt, and herewith decrease leverage, have higher current leverage than 
firms that issue debt or repurchase equity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
20 As a result, we follow Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) in excluding dual issues. In our sample, 423 
observations show an issue of both debt and equity within one year that are larger than 5% of total assets. For a 
discussion of dual issues and their relation to capital structure theories, see Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and 
Tehranian (2004). 
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Table 13: Summary statistics for the debt-equity choice 
 
We exclude financial firms, utilities, and firm-years with gaps in the reporting of relevant data. The sample 
period is 1985-2005. This table shows mean values of key characteristics. Firms are defined as issuing 
(repurchasing) a security when the net amount issued (repurchased) divided by the book value of assets at the 
beginning of the fiscal year exceeds 5%. Cases where firms issued (repurchased) both debt and equity in a 
fiscal year are omitted. Assets are determined by Compustat Item 6 and are reported in millions of dollars. 
Book leverage is computed by dividing the sum of Item 9 and Item 34 by Item 6. Target leverage is estimated 
on the basis of firm characteristics. The debt capacity is calculated with Eq. (6). ROA is the three year average 
of Item 13 divided by Item 6. NOLC is the net operating loss carryforward (Item 52), divided by Item 6. The 
two-year stock return is computed by dividing the stock price in a given year (Item 24) by the stock price two 
years before. The market-to-book ratio is calculated as (Item 24 * Item 25 – Item 60 + Item 6) / Item 6. The 
MTB-dummy is one when the market-to-book ratio exceeds one, and is zero otherwise. The dilution dummy 
examines whether an equity issue could dilute earnings. It is set to zero, except when one minus the assumed 
tax rate times the yield on Moody’s Baa rated debt is less than the firm’s after-tax earnings-price ratio. In 
accordance with Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), the tax rate is assumed to be 50% before 1987 and 
34% afterward. The after-tax earnings price ratio is calculated as Item 18 / (Item 24 * Item 25). The fraction of 
debt that is due in three years is computed as (Item 44 + Item 91 + Item 92) / (Item 9 + Item 34).  
 Debt issue Equity issue Debt repurchase Equity repurchase 
Total assets 6,566 5,880 6,888 8,409 
Book leverage 0.272 0.341 0.346 0.215 
Target – leverage 0.005 -0.065 -0.072 0.029 
Capacity – leverage 0.315 0.177 0.198 0.452 
Three-year mean ROA 0.163 0.137 0.145 0.203 
NOLC 0.011 0.019 0.015 0.010 
Two-year stock return 0.120 0.105 0.100 0.185 
Market-to-book ratio 1.871 1.720 1.597 2.716 
MTB-dummy 0.953 0.929 0.912 0.985 
Dilution dummy 0.523 0.231 0.377 0.485 
Fraction of debt due in 3 years 0.177 0.167 0.229 0.193 
Observations 1,219 182 567 720 
 
Table 13 also includes summary statistics for the control variables used in 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001). The variable “NOLC” represents the net 
operating loss carryforward. NOLC, ROA, the stock return, and the market-to-book 
ratio might proxy for the extent to which firms are over- or underlevered. The dilution 
dummy equals one when an equity issue could dilute earnings, which makes an equity 
issue less favorable. The percentage of debt that is due in three years is related to the 
wealth transfer from equity holders to debtholders in case new equity is issued.  
The estimation results for the extended Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman regression 
are given in Table 14.  
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Table 14: The impact of the debt capacity on debt-equity choices 
 
We exclude financial firms, utilities, and firm-years with gaps in the reporting of relevant data. The sample 
period is 1985-2005. This table shows the impact of target leverage and the debt capacity on the debt-equity 
choice for firms with an investment grade rating. We estimate a binary logit model. Firms are defined as 
issuing (repurchasing) a security when the net amount issued (repurchased) divided by the book value of assets 
at the beginning of the fiscal year exceeds 5%. Cases where firms issued (repurchased) both debt and equity in 
a fiscal year are omitted. Target leverage is estimated based on firm characteristics. The control variables are 
taken at the beginning of the fiscal year. T-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on panel-robust 
standard errors. *, ** indicate significance at the 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. 
 Debt vs. Equity issue  Debt reduction vs. Equity repurchase 
 All When  
target > 
book 
leverage 
When 
target < 
book 
leverage 
 All When  
target > 
book 
leverage 
When  
target < 
book 
leverage 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Target – leverage 3.205** 
(4.13) 
16.455** 
(5.11) 
1.089 
(0.82) 
 -7.928** 
 (-8.30) 
-13.371**  
(-5.30) 
-3.499* 
 (-2.25) 
Capacity – leverage 2.002** 
(4.12) 
1.777* 
(1.96) 
2.190** 
(3.63) 
 -2.217** 
 (-4.17) 
-1.504* 
 (-2.05) 
-2.987** 
 (-3.84) 
Three year mean 
ROA 
4.282 
(1.68) 
6.183 
(1.84) 
1.467 
(0.38) 
 -6.336** 
 (-3.25) 
-7.470* 
 (-2.52) 
-4.703 
 (-1.87) 
NOLC 0.615 
(0.25) 
-3.240  
(-0.85) 
1.507 
(0.83) 
 0.775  
(0.42) 
3.274  
(1.17) 
-2.525 
 (-1.10) 
Two-year stock 
return 
-0.068 
 (-0.35) 
0.150 
(0.52) 
-0.204  
(-0.91) 
 0.145  
(0.14) 
-0.137  
(-0.51) 
-0.004  
(-0.02) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.005  
(-0.03) 
-0.174 
 (-1.24) 
0.386 
(1.85) 
 -0.932**  
(-4.68) 
-0.766*  
(-2.45) 
-0.966**  
(-3.26) 
Dummy for MTB > 1 -0.113 
 (-0.30) 
-0.141  
(-0.23) 
-0.169  
(-0.31) 
 -0.414  
(-1.05) 
-0.666 
 (-1.30) 
-0.469 
 (-0.58) 
Dilution dummy 0.948** 
(4.41) 
1.265** 
(3.41) 
0.969** 
(3.42) 
 -0.770** 
 (-4.12) 
-0.281 
 (-0.95) 
-1.210**  
(-4.40) 
Fraction of debt due 
in three years 
(FD3) 
0.361 
(0.79) 
1.020 
(1.28) 
-0.079  
(-0.13) 
 1.238** 
(2.77) 
1.592** 
(2.62) 
1.295 
 (1.56) 
Dummy for 
loss*FD3 
-3.979**  
(-2.86) 
-4.473 
 (-1.94) 
-5.024  
(-1.88) 
 -1.614 
 (-1.55) 
-2.538 
 (-1.48) 
-1.019  
(-0.70) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,401 745 656  1,287 630 657 
Pseudo R2 0.177 0.223 0.180  0.400 0.312 0.381 
 
For the total spectrum of debt ratios, reported in Model (1), the difference 
between the target debt ratio and the current leverage significantly increases the 
likelihood that firms issue debt in our sample of investment grade firms, as the 
variable “target – leverage” is significant and has a positive sign. To test whether the 
debt capacity is important for firms’ debt-equity decisions, we look at the variable 
representing the difference between the debt capacity and the current leverage. It can 
be seen that this difference also has a significant impact on firms’ debt-equity choice 
in the total spectrum of debt ratios. For higher debt capacities with respect to the 
current leverage, the probability that the firm issues debt is larger.  
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For a comparison between the static tradeoff theory and the pecking order theory 
in predicting issue decisions, we focus on the situations in which a firm’s leverage is 
above the target. Therefore, we also estimate the model using only those observations 
for which the estimated target is lower than the firm’s current leverage. From the 
results in Model (3), it can be seen that the difference between the firm’s leverage and 
its targets loses statistical significance. That is, the estimated target does not have an 
influence on firms’ debt-equity choices when a firm is overlevered with respect to its 
supposed target. The difference with the debt capacity remains significant: the larger 
the deviation from the debt capacity, the higher the probability that debt is issued. 
Hence, if a firm has surpassed its potential target, the debt capacity predicts which 
security the firm will issue. Accordingly, we conclude that our test provides evidence 
for the pecking order theory. When the book leverage is below the target debt ratio, 
the impact of the debt capacity is significant at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level. 
Probably, this is because the debt capacity is generally substantially higher than the 
target. As the firms in this subsample are currently below their estimated targets, they 
are therefore unlikely to be constrained by the debt capacity.  
For repurchase decisions, reported in Models (4)-(6), we find that both the 
estimated target and the estimated debt capacity have an influence on firms’ financing 
decisions. An increase of the difference between a firm’s estimated target and its 
current leverage increases the probability that equity is repurchased, just as a higher 
debt capacity with respect to the current leverage, which is in accordance with 
findings of Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001). The finding that the variable 
“target – leverage” is negative for repurchase decisions does not necessarily indicate 
that low leverage firms prefer repurchasing equity over reducing debt, which would 
be evidence against the pecking order theory for repurchase decisions in Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999). Instead, the negative sign indicates that firms that are 
strongly underlevered are more likely to choose an equity repurchase over a debt 
reduction than otherwise identical firms that are slightly underlevered. We will 
examine the overall preference of firms facing a repurchase decision in Section 3.5.4. 
The finding that the target debt ratio is more influential in repurchase decisions than in 
issue decisions is also in line with the findings of Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman.  
Several control variables are significant at the 5% level. Firms for which an equity 
issue is likely to dilute earnings have a higher probability of preferring a debt issue 
over an equity issue. Firm-years in which losses are made reduce the probability that 
the fraction of debt due in three years leads to debt issues. Contrary to Hovakimian, 
Opler, and Titman (2001), we do not find significant effects of two-year stock returns 
and the market-to-book ratios on firms’ issuing choices in our overall sample. This is 
probably due to the fact that our sample only includes firms with investment grade 
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ratings. As could be seen from Table 9, median stock returns and market-to-book 
ratios are higher for these firms. 
More profitable firms are more likely to repurchase stock, and thus increase the 
debt ratio, which is in line with the indirect static tradeoff predictions on the effect of 
profitability on leverage (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995)). High market-to-book 
ratio firms are more likely to repurchase equity, which is also found by Hovakimian, 
Opler, and Titman (2001). This finding is intriguing, as high market-to-book ratios 
can imply overvaluation, which makes the firm repurchase at the inflated price. Firms 
for which an equity choice could be dilutive are more likely to repurchase equity, 
while firms with a large fraction of debt due in three years are more likely to reduce 
the debt level. 
To gauge the economic importance of the deviation of firms’ leverage from their 
targets and debt capacities on the debt-equity choice, we have also examined 
elasticities (not reported). These elasticities provide information on the change in the 
implied probability of a debt issue (retirement) for a change of a specific explanatory 
variable, while holding the other variables constant at their respective means. For the 
whole range of issue decisions, the elasticity with respect to a deviation from the 
target is 0.250 and with respect to a deviation from the debt capacity it is 0.156. This 
means that the probability of a debt issue increases by 25.0% in response to a 
doubling of the gap between a firm’s leverage and its target, and by 15.6% in response 
to a doubling of the gap between a firm’s leverage and the debt capacity. For issue 
decisions above the target, the elasticity is 0.124 with respect to a deviation from the 
target and 0.249 with respect to a deviation from the debt capacity. The elasticities are 
higher for repurchase decisions: for the whole range of repurchase decisions we find 
an elasticity of -1.832 for a deviation from the target, and an elasticity of -0.512 for a 
deviation from the debt capacity. Overall, we can conclude that the deviations from 
the target and debt capacity have substantial economic impact on a firm’s financing 
decisions. 
 
3.4.2 Alternative measures of target leverage 
 
We make several choices for our main proxy for leverage than can have an effect 
on our findings in Table 14. First, in estimating the target in Section 3.3.1, we might 
have missed important explanatory variables. We therefore include firms’ marginal 
tax rates (before interest expenses) into our target estimation model. Graham (1999) 
uses these marginal tax rates to show that firms with higher marginal tax rates have 
significantly higher leverage, indicating that interest deductibility encourages higher 
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debt ratios. We find our results to be robust for the inclusion of marginal tax rates: 
both the signs and the significance of all variables in our model remain unaltered. 
In estimating the target, we excluded firms that have speculative ratings, since 
these firms are not likely to be on their desired debt ratios. However, because firms 
with speculative ratings have relatively high leverage, the exclusion creates a 
downward bias on our estimated targets. We therefore re-estimate the target by 
including both investment grade and speculative grade firms in the target leverage 
regression. We indeed obtain higher estimated targets (the average estimated target 
debt ratio increases from 0.27 to 0.34). When we use these new targets as input for the 
debt-equity estimation in Table 14, we find the results to be largely robust. The main 
difference is the number of observations in the different regions: the number of 
observations in the issue decision that are estimated to be above target decreases from 
656 to 329, while the number of observations that are estimated to be below target 
increases from 745 to 1,072. 
We also test whether our results change when we use market leverage instead of 
book leverage. Interestingly, we find that the pseudo R2 in our credit rating regression 
increases when we replace book leverage with market leverage (the pseudo R2 
changes from 0.313 to 0.353). Apparently, market leverage is better able of predicting 
credit ratings than firms’ book leverage. We do not find strong changes for our 
findings in Table 14.  
Several papers, like Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), take the average historical 
leverage as the firm’s target. An advantage of this method is that the estimated targets 
for static tradeoff firms are not contaminated by firms that do not have a target, which 
potentially occurs in models that base the estimation of the target on firm 
characteristics. We therefore take the average debt ratio over the last five years as the 
target debt ratio.21 We do not find strong differences with our earlier results: in our 
overall sample, we find that the deviation of firms’ leverage from both the estimated 
target and debt capacity are significant. For the subset of observations where book 
leverage is above its target leverage, the spread between the target debt ratio and 
current leverage has no impact on the decision to issue debt versus equity. 
 
3.4.3 Firms without rated debt outstanding 
 
Because our estimation of the debt capacity requires firms to have a credit rating, 
our framework does not allow for a test on non-rated firms. Given that non-rated firms 
                                            
21 We also test the impact of target debt ratios that are specified as the three-year average debt ratio and the 
ten-year average debt ratio. 
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are fundamentally different from rated firms (Faulkender and Petersen (2006)), an 
interesting question is whether the debt capacity also plays a role in the financing 
decisions of non-rated firms. A potential answer to this question can be provided by 
estimating the credit rating that a non-rated firm would have upon requesting one. 
Faulkender and Petersen, however, argue that non-rated firms do not only have 
different internal characteristics than rated firms, but are also strongly affected by the 
supply side: a large portion of non-rated firms are restricted in their debt issuance by 
the market, in line with the credit rationing argument of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). As 
a result, it is problematic to estimate the debt capacity for non-rated firms, since we 
cannot observe the severity of the credit rationing. Fortunately, Lemmon and Zender 
(2007) have examined the effect of the debt capacity on non-rated firms. They 
develop a model that predicts whether firms have rated debt outstanding, and show 
that the firm-years with a prediction of no rated debt do not portrait pecking order 
behavior, in accordance with the limitations imposed by their debt capacity. Therefore, 
we would argue that our findings regarding the importance of the debt capacity do not 
only hold for the rated firms in our sample. In fact, the abovementioned study 
indicates that our results would be even stronger once we could measure non-rated 
firms’ debt capacities. 
 
3.5 The classification of pecking order and static tradeoff 
observations  
 
Our finding in Section 3.4 that the pecking order theory provides more accurate 
predictions for firms’ actual financing decisions can potentially be explained by 
various other factors. One factor relates to firm characteristics: the majority of firms in 
our sample might have high informational asymmetry. Another factor is related to the 
sample period: the majority of the observations can be in years with favorable 
conditions for the pecking order theory. Alternatively, the more accurate predictions 
of the pecking order theory might also be explained by a group of firms who 
constantly act in accordance with this theory. To establish why the pecking order 
theory predicts well, this section uses Figure 5 to segregate observations that are in 
accordance with the predictions of the pecking order theory from observations that are 
in accordance with the predictions of the static tradeoff theory. Pecking order 
observations, for example, correspond to firm-years in which a security has to be 
issued, while the firm’s leverage is above its supposed target but below the debt 
capacity, and the firm decides to issue debt. A typical static tradeoff observation is a 
firm in a similar situation that decreases leverage. We will use these classifications to 
analyze the strength of the pecking order theory in Section 3.6.  
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3.5.1 Estimating the firm’s position with respect to its estimated target 
 
In order to identify pecking order and static tradeoff observations, we need to 
determine the firm’s position towards the target and debt capacity. Basically, we have 
determined a firm’s position towards its estimated target in Section 3.4 when we used 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman’s (2001) regression specification. However, in the 
tests in Section 3.4, the firm’s current leverage is the debt ratio at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. We will extend the analysis by taking into account that firms do not only 
finance projects at the beginning or end of a book-year. Therefore, instead of the debt 
ratio that a firm has at the beginning of the year, we are interested in the debt ratio at 
the time of the financing decision. More specifically, we argue that firms’ managers 
compare the expected debt ratio at the end of the book-year with the firm’s possible 
target debt ratio at the time of the decision. This expected debt ratio is influenced by 
the expected retained earnings. When a firm expects to have retained earnings, it 
expects the balance sheet total of the firm to grow. The retained earnings do however 
not alter the absolute level of debt. Therefore, retained earnings decrease leverage 
when a firm obtains no external financing. In order to establish their position with 
respect to their possible targets, firms need to incorporate the effect of expected 
retained earnings: 
 
    dri,dec = dt / (at + ret+1),     (12) 
   
where dri,dec is the leverage at the time of decision, d is the debt level, a is total assets, 
and re are the expected retained earnings.  
Next, we determine whether a firm is below or above its estimated target. 
Basically, we can observe whether the estimated leverage at the time of the decision is 
higher or lower than the estimated target. However, we also take the estimation error 
of the target debt ratio into account. That is, we control for uncertainties about the 
exact value of the firm’s target. We determine the probability that a firm’s leverage at 
the time of the decision is above its estimated target as follows: 
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where se denotes the appropriate standard error. Remember that .* '1,
∧
+
∧ = βitti xdr  If we 
denote the estimated covariance matrix of 
∧β  by ∧∧ )(var β , then the appropriate standard 
error can be computed as 
 
  .)(var)*( '1, ititti xxdrse
∧∧
+
∧ = β       (14) 
     
3.5.2 Estimating the firm’s position with respect to its estimated debt 
capacity 
 
The identification of static tradeoff and pecking order observations further 
requires the determination of whether a firm is restricted by its debt capacity. A firm’s 
debt capacity is likely to become an issue when a firm substantially increases its 
leverage. The debt capacity therefore does not only relate to the current debt level, but 
also to the securities needed for financing decisions. The question is: does a firm get 
above its debt capacity when it uses debt to finance its investments? 
To answer this question, we employ the need for external financing. This 
financing deficit plays a prominent role in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and 
Frank and Goyal (2003). We calculate the hypothetical debt ratio as the debt ratio of a 
firm would it finance its deficit completely with debt. That is,  
 
   ),/()( 11;1;1;1, +++++ ++++= ttttttttthypti reeidiadefddr     (15) 
   
where hyptidr 1, +  is the hypothetical debt ratio, d is the debt level, def is the financing 
deficit, a is total assets, di is the net debt issued, ei is the net equity issued, and re are 
the expected retained earnings. The indication t;t+1 for the flow variables corresponds 
to a time frame between year t and year t+1. 
The probability that a firm is limited by its debt capacity depends on the 
hypothetical debt ratio and the estimated debt capacity. If we take into account the 
estimation error in determining the debt capacity, we can determine the chance that a 
firm cannot exclusively issue debt without losing its investment grade rating by: 
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where se denotes the standard error. This standard error can be derived from the 
covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood estimator for the coefficients in Eq. (7) 
and the functional form in Eq. (11) using the so-called delta method (see Greene 
(2003), p. 913). It is given by  
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c
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where )(var
∧∧ θ  is the estimated covariance matrix of the coefficients in Eq. (11) and fit 
is a vector with derivatives. Its elements are  
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3.5.3 Determining pecking order and static tradeoff observations for 
issue decisions 
 
Although Figure 5 provides our basic framework for comparing the pecking order 
theory and the static tradeoff theory, we extend the framework since we compare the 
target debt ratio with the leverage at the time of the financing decision and the debt 
capacity with the hypothetical debt ratio. For firms that need funding, our framework 
provides nine regions that relate to the firm’s current and hypothetical debt ratio; see 
Figure 6. A firm’s current debt ratio can be below its potential target, above its 
potential target, and above its debt capacity (firms with a speculative rating). Also, the 
firm’s hypothetical debt ratio can be below the potential target, above the potential 
target, and above the debt capacity. The target ratio of a firm lies below its debt 
capacity: financial distress, as incorporated in the debt capacity, is not the only factor 
that withholds firms from exclusively having debt. A firm’s target is also decreased by 
for example non-debt tax shields, personal taxes, and agency considerations. On the 
relation between a firm’s target and its debt capacity, Turnbull (1979) shows that a 
firm’s optimal leverage is below the level of debt that lenders are willing to provide. 
Figure 6 shows the nine possible regions. 
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Figure 6: The predictions of the theories for issue decisions.  
 
This figure shows whether the pecking order theory and the static tradeoff theory predict an increase or 
decrease of the debt ratio for different positions of the debt ratio. “PO” corresponds to the pecking order 
theory, and “ST” corresponds to the static tradeoff theory. The debt ratio at the time of decision can be below 
and above the target debt ratio. A firm’s hypothetical debt ratio is the debt ratio that a firm would have when it 
finances the investments with debt. The hypothetical debt ratio can be below and above the target debt ratio, 
and can also be above the debt capacity. 
 
We are interested in the financing decisions of firms that currently have 
investment grade ratings. These firms are not likely to have a high probability of 
being currently above the debt capacity. Also, the hypothetical debt ratio assumes that 
a firm solely uses debt for its investments. Therefore, the hypothetical debt ratio 
portraits higher leverage than the debt ratio at the time of the decision, which excludes 
the region in which a firm’s current ratio is above target and the hypothetical ratio is 
below target. This leaves five relevant regions. 
Figure 6 includes the predictions of both the pecking order theory and the static 
tradeoff theory in these five regions. For issue decisions the pecking order theory is 
well-known: firms will issue debt, as long as they have not reached their debt capacity. 
The static tradeoff theory predicts that firms will issue debt when they are below their 
target, and will issue equity when they are above their target. Previous papers have 
found that firms do not close the whole gap in one year, but move gradually towards 
their supposed target (e.g., Flannery and Rangan (2006)). For our research, this partial 
adjustment will not pose a problem, as we do not require that firms end up exactly at 
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their target to provide evidence for the static tradeoff theory. A move towards the 
target will suffice. 
A firm that is below its target will increase its leverage under both theories, when 
it is not constrained by its debt capacity. The pecking order model implies a 
preference for debt when external financing is needed, which will increase leverage. 
The static tradeoff model implies that a firm moves towards the target, which means it 
also has to increase its leverage. The difference is that the pecking order model 
implies that the firm solely issues debt, whereas the static tradeoff model would 
predict that some firms issue a mix between debt and equity, to exactly reach the 
target debt level.  
When a firm’s debt capacity constrains a firm to finance its investments with debt 
only (that is, against reasonable interest rates), the predictions of the pecking order 
model depend on a firm’s willingness to do a mixed issue. Possibly, a firm would still 
increase leverage by issuing more debt than equity. However, there are costs involved 
in issuing securities. Therefore, a firm can also opt for a single issue. Given the 
limitations imposed by the debt capacity for issuing debt, the most likely option would 
then be to solely issue equity.  
Again, when a firm is above its target and is not limited by its debt capacity, the 
pecking order model predicts that a firm will issue debt and herewith increase 
leverage. The static tradeoff theory predicts that a firm moves towards the target and 
decreases leverage. This region is therefore the most interesting one when comparing 
the theories, as they strongly disagree. We label this region as region X. We can 
compute each firm’s probability of being in a region by using the probabilities of 
being above the target and above the debt capacity. For example, the probability that a 
firm-year is in region X is the probability that the firm is above target and not 
restricted by the debt capacity, and is given by  
 
   }.{*}{ 1,1,* 1, ctihyptitiit drdrPdrdrP +++ <>  
 
These probabilities can be derived from the results in Subsection 3.5.2. In each 
region we want to know whether the firms increase or decrease leverage. We therefore 
compare the current leverage with the leverage after the financing decision, given by 
 
   dri,after = dt+1 / (at + dit;t+1 + eit;t+1 + ret+1).    (18) 
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We find that 73% of the observations that have a higher than 50% chance of being 
in region X (542 firm-years) increase leverage. Again, the pecking order theory 
predicts firms’ financing decisions better than the static tradeoff theory. We label the 
observations that account for the 73% as pecking order observations. Observations in 
which leverage is decreased (27%) are labeled as static tradeoff observations. 
 
3.5.4 Determining pecking order and static tradeoff observations for 
repurchase decisions 
 
We also construct a framework to identify pecking order and static tradeoff 
observations for repurchase decisions. The pecking order theory implies that firms 
have a preference of reducing debt over repurchasing equity (Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999)). Given firms’ preferences to pay down debt in the pecking order theory, 
our framework indicates that the theories have conflicting implications for repurchase 
decisions a firm’s debt ratio is below its target. The static tradeoff theory predicts that 
a firm in this situation increases leverage by repurchasing stock, whereas the pecking 
order theory predicts that the firm repurchases debt. For repurchase decisions, the debt 
capacity is not of interest for the predictions of the pecking order theory, as the 
repurchase of debt decreases leverage. What is of importance is the level of debt that a 
firm has outstanding: if a firm has a surplus worth more than the remaining 
outstanding debt, the firm cannot use the complete surplus to repurchase debt, even if 
it would want to do so. 
We select observations with repurchase decisions that have a higher than 50% 
chance of being below the estimated target. Deleting observations for which the 
financing surplus is larger than the debt outstanding, leaves us with 2,241 
observations. Our findings are that 60% of the observations use the repurchases to 
decrease leverage. Hence, we find that the pecking order theory is also a better 
predictor of firms’ financing behavior than the static tradeoff theory in repurchase 
decisions.  
 
3.6 Is pecking order and static tradeoff behavior situation-
specific or firm-specific? 
 
We exploit our classification of “pecking order observations” and “static tradeoff 
observations”, as established in Section 3.5, to examine whether a choice for a theory, 
as revealed by a firm’s decisions, is situation-specific or firm-specific. The possibility 
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that a choice for a theory is situation-specific results from Myers (2001). He argues 
that there is no universal theory of capital structure, but that the static tradeoff theory 
and the pecking order theory are good conditional theories. In other words, different 
theories are important in different circumstances. In contrast, several surveys of Chief 
Financial Officers have shown that some firms claim to follow a pecking order model, 
while others follow the tradeoff model (Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989); Kamath (1997); 
Graham and Harvey (2001)). This implies that a choice for a theory is manager-
specific or firm-specific. 
 
3.6.1 Testing whether pecking order behavior and static tradeoff 
behavior is situation-specific 
 
We test whether a choice for a capital structure theory is situation-specific in two 
ways. First, we test whether specific firm characteristics in region X can explain 
which observations are consistent with the pecking order theory and which are not. 
Second, we test whether the percentage of pecking order firms differs over the years. 
If macro-economic variables are of influence, we expect to find differences over the 
years. 
 
3.6.1.1 Explaining financing choices in Region X 
 
Our framework allows us to examine when an observation is consistent with the 
pecking order theory or with the static tradeoff theory by examining the financing 
choices of firms in Region X. A “pecking order observation” is an observation in 
Region X for which the leverage increases (dummy = 1), and a “static tradeoff 
observation” is an observation for which leverage decreases in Region X (dummy = 0). 
Table 15 shows the results for a multivariate probit model explaining pecking order 
behavior, where the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether 
leverage is increased or not. Because we cannot classify firm-year observations as 
being in Region X with absolute certainty, we estimate the model over all 
observations, but weigh them by their probability of being in Region X. That is, our 
model puts more weight on observations with a high probability of being in Region X 
than on observations with a low probability of being in Region X. 
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Table 15: Pecking order behavior in region X 
 
We exclude financial firms, utilities, and firm-years with gaps in the reporting of relevant data. We solely 
consider firm-years in which firms have financing needs and in which the firm has an investment grade rating. 
The sample period is 1985-2005. This table presents the results of the estimation of a weighted probit model. 
The observations are weighted by the probability of being in region X. The dependent variable is a dummy that 
equals one for observations in which leverage is increased, and zero otherwise. T-statistics appear in 
parentheses and are based on panel-robust standard errors. *, ** indicate significance at the 5%, and 1% 
confidence level, respectively. 
  Increase of leverage 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant  -0.774 
 (-1.08) 
 -0.600 
 (-0.86) 
 -0.579 
 (-0.83) 
 0.188 
 (0.30) 
Log(assets)  0.133*  
(2.05) 
 0.180**  
(3.14) 
 0.181** 
(3.14) 
 0.064  
(1.26) 
Tangibility  -0.275 
 (-0.76) 
 -0.387 
 (-0.93) 
 -0.363  
(-0.87) 
 -0.356 
 (-1.10) 
Book leverage  0.112  
(0.13) 
 -0.050  
(-0.06) 
 -0.009  
(-0.01) 
 -0.012  
(-0.02) 
EBIT  4.161*  
(2.50) 
 4.666**  
(2.64) 
 4.056  
(1.93) 
 4.121**  
(3.67) 
Loss-dummy      -0.252  
(-0.69) 
  
Market-to-book  -0.090 
 (-1.88) 
 -0.089 
 (-1.46) 
 -0.078 
 (-1.22) 
 -0.037 
 (-0.90) 
Retained earnings  0.242 
 (0.46) 
 0.125  
(0.22) 
 0.147 
 (0.26) 
 0.260 
 (0.56) 
Psi  0.117  
(0.43) 
 0.093 
 (0.39) 
 0.085 
 (0.36) 
  
Industry dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  2,096  2,096  2,089  3,215 
Pseudo R2  0.039  0.073  0.074  0.058 
 
The results in Table 15 indicate that the pecking order theory becomes of less 
importance when a firm is smaller (see also Frank and Goyal (2003)) and in situations 
in which profitability is lower. Apparently, firms with low profits in a given year do 
not want to take on more debt, even if their debt capacity allows for it. Firm-years for 
which we observe higher informational asymmetry are not associated with an 
increased likelihood of pecking order behavior: the coefficient for psi – which scores 
high for low informational asymmetry – is positive but statistically insignificant. As 
discussed earlier, the theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) does not necessary imply 
that high informational asymmetry leads to more pecking order behavior. In their 
model, the existence of informational asymmetry is sufficient. It can be argued that all 
firms or all situations have some level of informational asymmetry. Another issue 
relating to informational asymmetry is that the measure requires the availability of 
multiple variables, which substantially decreases our sample size. Model (4), which is 
estimated over a substantially larger sample, shows that excluding the proxy for 
informational asymmetry causes the size effect to disappear.  
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The pseudo R2 of the estimation is 0.039 without industry and year dummies, and 
0.073 with these dummies. Apparently, much of the variation in the dependent 
variable cannot be explained by the variables in our model. Also, profitability is the 
only variable that is uniformly significant in all four models. Hence, we do not find 
strong evidence in favor of circumstance-driven pecking order behavior in region X. 
 
3.6.1.2 Time-varying pecking order and static tradeoff behavior 
 
Macro-economic variables, like the U.S. inflation rate and GDP growth, vary over 
time. These variables can have an effect on for instance informational asymmetry and 
therewith financing decisions (Korajczyk and Levy (2003)). If circumstances drive the 
choice for a capital structure theory, we would expect the distribution of observations 
that are consistent with the pecking order theory and observations that are consistent 
with the static tradeoff theory to differ among years.  
 
Table 16: Percentages of pecking order behavior per year 
 
We exclude financial firms, utilities, and firm-years with gaps in the reporting of relevant data. The sample 
period is 1985-2005. This table presents the percentages of observations that we classify as “pecking order 
behavior” in regions X and A per year. Region X corresponds to the observations that issue securities, that are 
above their estimated target, and that are not restricted by their debt capacity. Increasing leverage in Region X 
classifies as pecking order behavior. Region A corresponds to the observations that repurchase securities and 
that are below their estimated target. Decreasing leverage classifies as pecking order behavior in Region A.  
 Issue decisions: percentage of pecking 
order behavior in Region X 
Repurchase decisions: percentage of pecking 
order behavior in Region A 
 % N % N 
Total 73% 542 60% 2,241 
1985 75% 12 57% 75 
1986 71% 7 66% 98 
1987 69% 13 58% 91 
1988 71% 21 52% 86 
1989 81% 26 49% 86 
1990 66% 29 75% 104 
1991 70% 27 72% 104 
1992 56% 32 75% 106 
1993 77% 48 70% 107 
1994 76% 37 59% 95 
1995 68% 37 64% 118 
1996 73% 37 55% 121 
1997 81% 31 46% 125 
1998 85% 27 44% 120 
1999 74% 38 60% 122 
2000 57% 21 65% 144 
2001 88% 24 64% 139 
2002 73% 26 61% 137 
2003 78% 27 60% 133 
2004 59% 22 58% 130 
St.dev. 0.09  0.09  
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Table 16 shows that the percentage of pecking order observations is in fact 
remarkably stable. This stability holds for both issue and repurchase decisions. For 
issue decisions, there is not a single year in which there are more static tradeoff 
observations than pecking order observations. Hence, we again find no strong 
evidence of circumstance-driven preferences.  
 
3.6.2 Testing whether pecking order behavior and static tradeoff 
behavior is firm-specific 
 
To test whether a choice for a theory is firm-specific, we examine whether a firm 
that acts according to a theory in one year is more likely to have acted in line with the 
same theory in the past year. We look at firms with investment grade ratings that issue 
securities. We assign a firm-year to the region for which it has the highest probability 
of being in, according to our previous computations. The dependent variable registers 
whether the firm acts according to the pecking order theory (static tradeoff theory) in 
a specific region. We look whether the firm acted according to the pecking order 
theory (static tradeoff theory) the year before. An important difference with our 
analysis in Section 3.4.1.1 is therefore that we do not solely focus on the observations 
in Region X: to establish firms’ lagged decisions, we include the other regions in 
which firms issue securities. In this way, we can track firms’ financing preferences 
over time, even if they are not constantly in region X. Note that in some regions a 
given observation can be one for both the dependent variable in the pecking order-
regression and the dependent variable in the static tradeoff-regression (for example 
when the firm’s leverage is below its estimated target and the firm issues debt). 
Model 1 in Table 17 shows that firms acting according to the pecking order theory 
in year t-1 are more likely to repeat this behavior in year t, as the variable “pecking 
order behaviort-1” is statistically significant and has a positive coefficient (0.322). This 
result holds when we include firms with missing values for our informational 
asymmetry variable psi (Model 2) and when we include a variable indicating that the 
firm acted according to the static tradeoff model in year t-1 (Model 3). In Models 4, 5, 
and 6 we test whether firms are more likely to adjust their debt ratio towards their 
target debt ratio in year t when they did so in year t-1. It can be seen that this is the 
case, as the impact of static tradeoff behavior in year t-1 is positive and significant at 
the 1% level. Moreover, the coefficients for lagged decisions are higher in Model (4)-
(6) than in Model (1)-(3), indicating that more persistence exists in acting according to 
the static tradeoff model. 
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Table 17: Firm-specific behavior 
 
We exclude financial firms, utilities, and firm-years with gaps in the reporting of relevant data. We solely 
consider firm-years in which firms have financing needs and in which the firm has an investment grade rating. 
The sample period is 1985-2005. This table presents the results of the estimation of a probit model. The 
dependent variable is either a dummy that equals one for observations that are consistent with the pecking 
order theory, and is zero otherwise (models 1, 2, and 3), or a dummy that equals one for observations that are 
consistent with the static tradeoff theory, and is zero otherwise (models 4, 5, and 6). The variable “Pecking 
order behaviort-1” equals one if the firm acted according to the pecking order theory in the year before, and is 
zero otherwise. The variable “Static tradeoff behaviort-1” equals one if the firm acted according to the static 
tradeoff theory in the year before, and is zero otherwise. T-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on 
panel-robust standard errors. *, ** indicate significance at the 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. 
 Pecking order behavior Static tradeoff behavior 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Log (assets) 0.041  
(0.95) 
0.020  
(0.57) 
0.021 
(0.58) 
-0.052 
 (-1.23) 
-0.011  
(-0.32) 
-0.007 
(-0.20) 
Book leverage -0.207  
(-0.40) 
-0.223  
(-0.50) 
-0.188 
(-0.41) 
-3.660**  
(-7.27) 
-3.343**  
(-7.84) 
-3.087** 
(-6.91) 
Profitability 1.740 
 (1.50) 
2.443**  
(2.69) 
2.448** 
(2.70) 
-1.586  
(-1.49) 
-1.078  
(-1.28) 
-1.093 
(-1.30) 
Retained earnings 0.622  
(1.54) 
0.398  
(1.22) 
0.390 
(1.20) 
0.555 
(1.38) 
0.715* 
 (2.21) 
0.736* 
(2.29) 
Tangibility -0.017 
 (-0.06) 
-0.033  
(-0.15) 
-0.037 
(-0.17) 
1.105**  
(3.93) 
0.796** 
 (3.59) 
0.764** 
(3.45) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.094* 
 (-2.34) 
-0.102**  
(-2.81) 
-0.100** 
(-2.81) 
-0.041  
(-0.77) 
-0.060  
(-1.21) 
-0.057 
(-1.15) 
Psi 0.120 
(0.72) 
  0.097 
 (0.62) 
  
Pecking order behaviort-1 0.322** 
 (2.87) 
0.401**  
(4.19) 
0.378** 
(3.37) 
  -0.172 
(-1.47) 
Static tradeoff behaviort-1    0.033 
(0.32) 
0.585** 
(5.46) 
0.591** 
(6.52) 
0.684** 
(6.22) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 971 1,398 1,398 971 1,398 1,398 
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.056 0.056 0.158 0.131 0.132 
 
Note the significance of book leverage in the static tradeoff regression: the lower 
the leverage, the higher the probability that the static tradeoff predicts correctly. This 
is in line with our findings in Table 14 that the target is important when a firm’s 
leverage is below the target. We can conclude that firms exhibit consistency in their 
capital structure decisions: a financing decision in accordance with a particular theory 
in year t-1 significantly increases the probability that the same firm will act according 
to the same theory in year t.  
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter stresses the importance of the debt capacity in firms’ financing 
decisions. Building on Chapter 2, Lemmon and Zender (2007), and Agca and 
Mozumdar (2007), we test a pecking order theory that does not imply that firms 
always issue debt when external financing is needed. Instead, the theory implies that 
firms have a preference for issuing investment grade debt over issuing equity. We 
construct a model in which we estimate the debt capacity as the maximum debt ratio 
that a firm can obtain before facing a higher than 50% probability of losing its 
investment grade rating. The loss of this investment grade rating would considerably 
increase the costs of debt. 
We show that the static tradeoff theory can appear to be true, even when the 
underlying financing behavior is driven by the pecking order theory. We hereby 
corroborate results of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). In an extended test of 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), we show that the debt capacity is of higher 
importance than the supposed target when the theories have conflicting predictions. 
We interpret these findings as evidence for the pecking order theory. 
We also construct a framework in which we focus on observations for which the 
pecking order theory and the static tradeoff theory have contrasting predictions 
regarding the preferred financing choices. We find that the pecking order theory is of 
primary importance for both issue and repurchase decisions. By exploiting our 
classifications of observations that are consistent with pecking order behavior and 
static tradeoff behavior, we do not find strong evidence that firms’ choices for a 
capital structure theory in a given year are situation-specific. Corroborating the survey 
evidence of Graham and Harvey (2001), we do find evidence that the choice for a 
theory is firm-specific: firms are to some extent consistent in their capital structure 
decisions. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Convertible security design22 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
Compared to other securities, there has been and continues to be a significant 
amount of innovation in the design of convertible securities. The rapid rate of 
innovation in convertible security design is particularly interesting in the context of 
the theories that explain company motivations for issuing convertible debt. The 
existing theoretical literature suggests that managers can design convertible debt to 
mitigate a variety of debt- and equity-related costs of external finance, including asset 
substitution problems (Green (1984)); financial distress and asymmetric information 
problems (Stein (1992)); risk uncertainty (Brennan and Schwartz (1988)); and over-
investment problems (Mayers (1998)). A common feature of these theories is the 
prediction that information and agency problems limit the ability of issuers to raise 
capital efficiently and to fund profitable investment opportunities.23 Since convertible 
debt issuers face different external financing costs, firms are expected to choose 
distinct security designs to mitigate these problems. 
In this chapter, we analyze three distinct decisions that issuers make when 
designing convertible securities: 1) the selection of conversion characteristics, 2) the 
type of fixed income claim, and 3) the method of payment. The interaction among 
                                            
22 This chapter is based on Lewis and Verwijmeren (2008). 
23 It should be noted that these theories are not mutually exclusive. Since we expect firms to use convertibles 
as a means to control for both concerns simultaneously, the actual security designs should reflect the relative 
importance of the problems for each issuer. 
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these choices determines whether particular designs are effective at mitigating 
external financing costs. 
Conversion characteristics include the conversion ratio, maturity date, call period, 
and time to first call. Taken together, they determine how closely a convertible 
security resembles debt or equity. Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (1999) consider 
whether actual security designs correspond to theoretical explanations that predict 
whether a convertible security substitutes for debt or equity. They find that debt-like 
issues replace straight debt in order to mitigate debt-related agency costs and that 
equity-like designs substitute for common equity when firms face adverse selection 
problems. 
The choice of a fixed income claim is a simple decision. An issuer either selects 
straight debt or preferred stock. A decision to issue straight debt entails the 
specification of a coupon rate (possibly zero), maturity date, call features, and call 
protection. By contrast, preferred stock is essentially a perpetual bond that pays 
investors fixed periodic dividends and possibly has redemption features. 
A significant innovation in the design of fixed income claims occurred in 1985 
when Merrill Lynch introduced Liquid Yield Option Notes (LYONs). Compared to 
plain-vanilla convertible debt, a LYON replaces a coupon paying bond with a zero-
coupon bond. The key advantage to this particular design choice is that it takes 
advantage of the Original Issue Discount (OID) provisions of the U.S. Tax Code, 
which allow firms to deduct interest expense as it accrues without requiring the issuer 
to actually make cash payments. A potential limitation associated with OID bonds is 
that investors must pay personal taxes on the accrued interest. 24  LYONs provide 
investors with more downside protection. By including a number of put options, the 
holder may sell the bond back to the issuer at the original issue price plus accrued 
interest. 
Convertible issuers also select a method of payment. This choice refers to the 
wide variety of settlement options that are currently in use. For convertible debt 
issuers, the main choice is whether to settle in stock, cash, or a combination of the two. 
Firms that choose partial cash settlement frequently pre-specify how much of the final 
payment is to be cash, typically the accreted value of the bond, although another 
popular settlement choice allows the issuer to pay any combination of stock and cash 
it desires with the exact proportions to be decided at conversion. For preferred stock, 
issuers specify whether conversion is optional or mandatory. Compared to convertible 
debt, there are very few instances where convertible preferred shares are settled in 
cash. 
                                            
24 Since these securities are primarily purchased by tax free institutions, this ultimately does not impose much 
of a personal tax penalty. 
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Compared to other aspects of convertible security design, the method of payment 
has changed the most. One of the first innovations was the introduction of mandatory 
conversion. Bear Stearns introduced the so-called Preferred Equity Redemption 
Cumulative Stock (PERCS) in 1991. A PERCS is structured like preferred stock, but 
requires the issuer to exchange the preferred stock claim for common stock on a pre-
specified date. 25  Given the initial success of PERCS, security offerings with 
mandatory conversion features were widely imitated by competing investment banks. 
Another innovation occurred in November 2000 when Tyco Industries issued the 
first Contingent Convertible debt (CoCo) offering. This Merrill Lynch product is 
similar to a LYON with the exception that holders may convert only if a certain 
knock-in threshold is reached. As argued by Marquardt and Wiedman (2005), the 
main benefit of this contingent conversion feature is that under Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standard (SFAS) 128, the shares can be excluded from diluted EPS 
calculations.26 
A third innovation in the method of payment is the inclusion of cash settlement 
features for which at least a portion of the convertible security may be settled in cash 
upon conversion. Securities that contain cash settlement features include one of the 
following conversion choices. An issuer must: 1) pay the conversion value (the 
number of shares a bondholder is entitled to receive times the stock price at the 
conversion date) in cash (Instrument A), 2) choose to pay either cash or the number of 
shares a bondholder is entitled to receive (Instrument B), 3) pay cash for the 
obligation’s accreted value (principal value plus accrued interest) and may satisfy the 
conversion spread (the excess of the conversion value over the accreted value) in 
either cash or equity (Instrument C or “net share settlements”), or 4) pay any 
combination of cash and equity (Instrument X). Cash settlement features were 
incorporated into convertible offerings almost immediately after the FASB clarified 
the accounting treatment of fully diluted earnings as it relates to convertible securities. 
Specifically, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) amended Emerging 
Issues Task Force (EITF) 90-19 in January 2002 to allow for the exclusion of 
convertible shares in fully diluted earnings calculations. By the year 2007, cash 
settlement offerings were the most popular method of payment choice, representing 
over 86% (94 of 109) of all convertible issues. Reinforcing the notion that accounting 
treatment is an important design consideration, Marquardt and Wiedman (2007) find 
                                            
25 These securities contain call provisions that provide the issuer with the opportunity to force conversion at 
dates prior to maturity, usually at a premium to the conversion value. 
26 Marquardt and Wiedman (2005) find that firms that are likely to experience large adjustments to fully 
diluted earnings because of the convertible issue are more likely to issue CoCos. They also show that firms are 
more likely to issue CoCos when managers’ bonuses are based on fully diluted earnings. 
84
Chapter 4 
 
72
that 20% of CoCos are restructured into cash settlements after they have lost their 
favorable accounting treatment in 2004.27 
We study convertible security design choices using a nested logit model that treats 
design choices as a set of simultaneous decisions. We assume that convertible issuers 
decide how “debt-like” or “equity-like” to structure an offering in the top level of the 
nested logit model. The choice of a fixed income security (straight debt or preferred 
stock) represents the middle level, whereas the choice of a method of payment 
represents the bottom level. 
Such an analysis presumes that firms will choose both debt- and equity-like 
security designs. Historically, this has been the case. For example, Lewis, Rogalski, 
and Seward (2003) report that, even though equity-like issues are offered at an 
approximately three-to-one rate relative to debt-like issues, debt-like issues are a 
common design choice. More recently, the number of debt-like issues has declined 
significantly. For example, only 5 of the 819 issues are classified as debt-like for our 
sample, which covers the years 2000 through 2007. 
Given the limited number of debt-like issues, it is not feasible to model 
conversion characteristics as a separate component of a nested logit model. While this 
limits our ability to test theoretical explanations specific to debt-like designs, their 
relative absence may simply indicate that these factors are not particularly important 
over our sample period.28 By conditioning on equity-like convertible securities, we 
eliminate what would have been the top level of our nested logit model. This results in 
a specification where the fixed income choice is the top level and the method of 
payment choice is the bottom level. 
Our empirical analysis characterizes the determinants of the actual designs of 
convertible securities. With respect to the fixed income choice, we find that firms 
choose straight debt rather than preferred stock when they are best able to benefit 
from additional tax benefits, can minimize expected refinancing costs, and are most 
susceptible to agency costs associated with managerial discretion. The method of 
payment choice follows the decision to issue either convertible debt or convertible 
preferred stock. For issuers that choose convertible debt, our results indicate that these 
firms make method of payment choices that are consistent with the earnings 
management hypothesis. We document that firms choosing cash settlement would 
have had the largest potential decreases in reported earnings without favorable 
accounting treatment. We also show that a number of these firms repurchase shares 
                                            
27 EITF 04-08 proposes recognizing CoCos in diluted earnings per share calculations. The FASB has ratified 
this proposal in the fall of 2004. 
28  The prevalence of equity-like issues appears to be consistent with Stein’s (1992) “backdoor equity 
hypothesis.” That is, firms use convertible securities as an indirect method for implementing equity financing. 
To a large degree, the increasing use of cash settlement features mitigates the observation. 
85
Convertible security design 
 
73
and adopt call spread overlays. Share repurchase programs reduce the number of 
shares outstanding and raise earnings per share. Call spread overlays use derivative 
securities to raise the effective conversion price. Since reported interest expense is 
based on the stated rather than effective conversion price, the reported interest 
expense decreases, and firms are again able to report higher earnings per share. We 
find that certain banks may develop reputations for facilitating innovative security 
designs. For example, Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, and JP Morgan are more 
likely to underwrite the offerings of firms that use cash settlements, call spread 
overlays, and/or share repurchases. 
For firms that issue preferred stock, we consider the choice to include mandatory 
conversion provisions. This reflects the fact that mandatory conversion rapidly 
became a part of the security design “equation” following its introduction in 1991. 
Any firm that issues convertible preferred stock must consider this option. Since 
mandatory convertible preferred stock automatically converts into equity, its marginal 
impact on the probability of financial distress in minimal. We find that the large 
majority of the mandatory convertibles are used to reduce the indebtedness of the firm, 
and conclude that mandatory conversion is used to decrease the chance of bankruptcy. 
Consistent with this, we find that all issuers of mandatory convertible preferred stock 
have credit ratings that are close to the investment-speculative grade cut-off. 
The paper by Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (1998) is most closely related to this 
chapter. They use a simultaneous equations model to examine specific design 
elements (the dilution ratio, issue maturity, and call structure) and find that some 
issuers design convertible debt to control for risk shifting problems, while others 
design securities with the backdoor-equity explanation in mind. Lee and Figlewicz 
(1999) study the fixed income choice for 308 issues over the period 1977-1988, and 
find that convertible debt issuers have lower nondebt tax shields, lower risk, and 
greater free cash flows than firms that issue convertible preferred stock. Chemmanur, 
Nandy, and Yan (2004) study the mandatory conversion option. They examine 298 
convertible issues over the period 1991-2001 and find that firms issue mandatory 
conversion features when they have low informational asymmetry but high 
probabilities of financial distress. We extend the previous studies by jointly evaluating 
the choices in convertible security design. Moreover, we are the first to closely 
examine cash settlement features, which have been a popular innovation in 
convertible security design. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses 
theoretical explanations of convertible security design and characterizes testable 
hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes our sample and provides summary statistics based 
on the fixed income and method of payment choices. In Section 4.4, we describe the 
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econometric specification of the nested logit model. Section 4.5 reports our empirical 
results. Section 4.6 provides additional analysis of the earnings management 
hypothesis and analyzes the method of payment choice in more detail. It estimates a 
multinomial logit model that treats different cash settlement options as independent 
choices. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2 Security design hypotheses 
 
Security design decisions are important because they influence the cost and terms 
of raising new investment capital. Financial economists have offered explanations that 
stress how an appropriately designed convertible can reduce information and agency 
costs faced by companies when raising external capital. By exploiting a convertible’s 
hybrid nature, a company can achieve different security designs simply by changing 
its contractual features. 
One of the main concerns associated with testing security design hypotheses is the 
endogenous nature of the choice of different contractual features. The fact that 
different combinations of contractual features can lead to very similar security designs 
makes it difficult to analyze specific features in isolation. For example, if a 
convertible bond is offered with a 30-year maturity but has no call protection it may 
have a shorter effective maturity than an otherwise identical security that has a 5-year 
maturity but offers three years of call protection. As a consequence, one must evaluate 
the effective security design by finding a systematic way to incorporate all of the 
relevant contractual features. Taken together, security design hypotheses make 
predictions about how the choice of an appropriately designed set of contractual 
features can minimize the costs associated with raising external capital. 
 
4.2.1 Conversion characteristics 
 
The central theme that characterizes discussions about optimal security design is 
that convertible securities can be structured so that they substitute for debt or equity 
financing (Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (1998, 1999)). The actual choice of the 
various contractual features determines whether the conversion characteristics 
produce a debt- or equity-like design. The hedge ratio (“Delta”) embedded in the 
conversion option is a measure of the equity-likeness of a convertible security 
(Calamos (2003)). It measures the convertible’s sensitivity to small stock price 
changes. The delta can be calculated as: 
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where δ is the continuously compounded dividend yield, T is the maturity of the bond, 
N(.) is the cumulative standard normal probability distribution, S is the price of the 
underlying stock measured one week prior to the announcement date, X is the 
conversion price, r is the yield on a 10-year U.S. Treasury Bond, and σ is the stock 
return variance per annum. By construction, the delta is in between zero and one. A 
high delta means that the convertible bond value is sensitive to the common stock 
value, which makes the convertible equity-like in nature. Inversely, a low delta value 
indicates that the convertible is debt-like in nature. If we classify all firms with a Delta 
below 0.5 as debt-like, only 5 of the 819 issues are considered debt-like. 
Although the scarcity of debt-like issues limits our ability to analyze conversion 
characteristics as a separate design choice, it is still important to include a measure of 
convertibility in our regression analysis. In the next chapter, we include delta as our 
measure of convertibility, which is in line with Loncarski, Ter Horst, and Veld (2007), 
among others. In this chapter, we construct a somewhat different measure: the actual 
probability of conversion over the life of the convertible security. This measure has 
the added benefit of incorporating call features. Still, when we use the delta as a 
control variable in our regressions, we obtain similar results. 
We estimate the actual probability of conversion via Monte Carlo simulation. To 
do this, we assume that stock prices follow a geometric Brownian motion process. 
The drift rate is expected to grow at the annualized expected return from the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model.29 The volatility rate is estimated with ten-years of monthly stock 
return data. We use a long-horizon for calculating the volatility rate because we want 
an estimate of volatility over the life of the bond. 
We simulate 60,000 (antithetic) stock price paths that have 10,000 compounding 
periods over the life of the fixed income security. Since the optimal call policy is to 
force conversion as soon as the conversion option is in-the-money, we calculate 
whether the firm would have forced conversion prior to maturity subject to constraints 
that restrict the time to first call. The probability of conversion is then calculated for 
each convertible issue as the total number of price paths that result in conversion 
divided by the total price paths. 
                                            
29 The expected return is calculated as the yield on a ten-year U.S. Treasury bond plus a risk premium. The risk 
premium equals the equity beta times a market risk premium of 7.5%. The equity beta is estimated from a 
market model regression that uses the realized return from the CRSP equally-weighted stock index. 
88
Chapter 4 
 
76
 
4.2.2 Fixed income component 
 
The choice of a fixed income claim is potentially motivated by corporate taxes 
and external financing costs related to financial distress, refinancing, and managerial 
discretion. We summarize our discussion of the testable implications in Table 18. 
 
4.2.2.1 Corporate taxes 
 
Interest payments generate a tax shield because they are deductible for corporate 
taxes. By contrast, preferred stock is generally considered equity for tax purposes and 
dividend payments are not tax deductible. Firms that are profitable, have low debt 
levels, and pay significant corporate taxes are expected to choose convertible debt 
rather than convertible preferred stock. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show that non-
debt related tax shields, such as depreciation, can make interest redundant as a tax 
shield, reducing the incentive to use debt. Therefore, firms that have tax loss 
carryforwards and high levels of depreciation expense are expected to choose 
convertible preferred stock. 
 
4.2.2.2 Reduction of financial distress costs 
 
Firms with a relatively high probability of financial distress would not be 
expected to prefer convertible straight debt over convertible preferred stock, since 
convertible straight debt has a fixed maturity date that requires repayment of the 
principal if the conversion option is out-of-the money. Firms that would be vulnerable 
to financial distress costs are often characterized as high-growth firms, firms that are 
relatively small, firms that have significant amounts of financial leverage, and firms 
with low interest coverage ratios. 
 
4.2.2.3 Refinancing and external financing costs 
 
Related to the probability of financial distress are the costs of refinancing. Firms 
that issue convertible debt must pay the accreted value in cash if the conversion option 
is out-of-the-money at maturity. Since these firms have not performed well, cash 
reserves are likely to be low and current debt levels are likely to exceed their target 
capital structures. In this scenario, firms are unlikely to have sufficient capital on hand 
and are forced to refinance. Since credit profiles are not expected to be particularly 
strong, it will be difficult to find additional capital at attractive rates. We predict that
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firms with low slack, bad credit ratings, low interest coverage ratios, and high debt 
levels will choose preferred stock rather than debt to avoid refinancing. 
 
4.2.2.4 Managerial discretion and free cash flows 
 
The existence of managerial discretion allows managers to pursue their own 
objectives, such as excessive firm growth, at the expense of shareholders. Straight 
debt creates less managerial discretion than preferred stock because it mandates the 
payment of the principal on the maturity date, whereas there is no principal associated 
with preferred stock. Therefore, firms with severe managerial discretion costs are 
expected to choose convertible straight debt. Firms facing managerial discretion 
problems are expected to have few positive NPV investment opportunities, and are 
characterized by low market-to-book ratios, good credit ratings, high interest coverage 
ratios, and low debt levels. 
 
4.2.3 Method of payment 
 
Theories that explain the method of payment predict that the design choice is 
largely determined by the tradeoff between debt and equity-related financing costs. 
We examine theories related to financial distress, managerial discretion, staged 
investment, and earnings management. The expected relation between the method of 
payment choices and the explanatory variables is summarized in Table 18. 
 
4.2.3.1 Reduction of financial distress costs 
 
As discussed in the choice of fixed income claim section, firms that face relatively 
high financial distress costs are likely to choose preferred stock over straight debt 
because it places fewer financial constraints on the issuer. The big difference is that 
straight debt requires the repayment of the principal at maturity, while preferred stock 
is infinitely lived and requires no payment at “expiration.” 
The method of payment choice for convertible debt is also affected by financial 
distress costs. When firms issue convertible preferred stock because financial distress 
costs are high, they are likely to opt for mandatory conversion because it enables them 
to pay with newly issued shares rather than cash (in case of mandatory redemption). 
For firms choosing convertible straight debt as the fixed income component, the 
relatively distressed firms may refrain from cash settlement since it requires the firm 
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to have cash reserves available. 30  As noted above, firms that are vulnerable to 
relatively high financial distress costs have high-growth rates, relatively small size, 
significant amounts of financial leverage, and low interest coverage ratios. 
 
4.2.3.2 Managerial discretion and free cash flows 
 
Not only does the managerial discretion explanation predict that firms will use 
convertible straight debt rather than convertible preferred stock, but it predicts that 
these firms will select cash settlement features as well. Compared to stock settlement, 
cash settlement features require firms to pay free cash flows following periods of 
good stock price performance, i.e. when managerial discretion is relatively high. As 
we note above, firms that face high managerial discretion costs tend to have poor 
growth opportunities, good credit ratings, high interest coverage ratios, and low debt 
levels. 
 
4.2.3.3 Staged-investment and free cash flow 
 
Mayers (1998) argues that firms with sequential financing needs can lower 
financing costs and avoid managerial discretion costs by issuing convertible securities. 
By setting the maturity of the fixed income claim or times to first call to coincide with 
the need for new funds, a convertible security creates debt capacity at the time a firm 
needs another round of financing. The benefit to shareholders is that the firm is 
obligated to repay the principal amount if it has not achieved its growth objectives. 
This eliminates managerial discretion at times when the incentive to invest in 
unprofitable projects is relatively high. 
Firms are expected to use mandatory conversion and stock settlement when they 
face significant managerial discretion costs because additional debt capacity can only 
be created if investors convert to common stock. Firms that plan to pay at least the 
principal amount in cash are not as concerned about staged investment. 
We predict that firms with large future investment requirements plan to create 
additional debt capacity at times when they require another round of financing. Since 
future investment is unobservable, we assume that investment activity around the time 
of the offering can be used as a proxy for future investment activity. We predict that 
capital expenditures in the offer year are positively related to the choice of stock 
settlement and mandatory conversion. 
                                            
30 Although facing lower financial distress costs than convertible preferred stock issuers, convertible straight 
debt issuers can still have substantial costs of financial distress. This is commonly believed to be an important 
reason for issuing convertible securities instead of straight debt (see, e.g., Stein (1992)). 
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4.2.3.4 Earnings management 
 
In 2002, the FASB amended Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) 90-19 to permit 
firms that pay the accreted value of the fixed income claim in cash to exclude 
convertible shares from fully diluted EPS, allowing them to report higher fully diluted 
EPS. Issues with potential cash settlements that have a stated policy of paying the 
accreted value in cash also receive this favorable accounting treatment.31 
We consider three main indicators that relate to cash settlements and that point to 
the possibility of earnings management. The first is the decrease in diluted earnings 
per share when the convertible shares are not excluded from the diluted EPS 
calculations. In effect, we consider whether firms are more likely to choose cash 
settlement when the potential decrease of diluted EPS is higher.32 
The second indicator for earnings management is the adoption of share repurchase 
programs at the time of issue. A number of companies issued a convertible security 
with cash settlement features and used part of the proceeds to buyback common stock. 
The convertible debt has a below-market interest rate (often 1%-2%, sometimes even 
0%), which has minimal impact on reported earnings. By repurchasing shares with the 
proceeds from a cash settlement issue, an issuer can significantly reduce the number 
of outstanding shares with a minimal reduction to reported earnings from the 
increased debt balance. Firms following this strategy often achieve a substantial 
immediate boost to their basic and diluted earnings per share.33 
The third indicator is the use of call spread overlays. This strategy uses equity 
derivatives to synthetically increase the effective conversion price of a convertible 
security. To see how this strategy works, consider that a firm issues a convertible that 
has a low interest rate, and then takes part of the proceeds to purchase call options on 
its own shares struck at the conversion price. It then writes call options on its own 
shares at a higher strike price. The effect of this combination of equity derivatives is 
to synthetically increase the strike price in the conversion option itself. Had the issuer 
                                            
31 Note that in a perfect world, changes in accounting standards will not affect decision-making behavior since 
accounting reports do not have direct cash flow effects and the prospects of firms remain unaltered. However, 
empirical evidence suggests that in the real world accounting reports do affect the real decisions made by 
managers, rather than simply reflecting the results of these decisions. Carter and Lynch (2003), Verwijmeren 
(2005), De Jong, Rosellón, and Verwijmeren (2006), Remmerswaal and Verwijmeren (2007), and Marquardt 
and Wiedman (2007), among others, provide examples of accounting changes that have influenced firms’ 
decision-making.  
32 This variable is based on the “Impact1” variable in Marquardt and Wiedman (2005). 
33 Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) show that share repurchase programs do not necessarily boost earnings 
per share. These programs are accretive in the context of a concurrent convertible issue because the interest 
rates associated with convertible debt are very low. 
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simply offered the convertible bond with a higher conversion price initially, the 
interest rate would have been higher. By using call spread overlays, the issuing firm 
gets to report low interest expense for book purposes and higher effective interest rate 
for tax purposes (i.e., Original Issue Discount provisions) because the convertible debt 
instrument and purchased call option are “linked” for tax reporting purposes. 
We expect that firms are more likely to choose cash settlement features if the 
potential decrease in reported earnings is relatively large. Firms that concurrently 
adopt share repurchase programs and use call spread overlays are also more likely to 
choose cash settlement. 
 
4.3 Sample description 
 
This section describes our sample selection procedure and presents summary 
statistics. Summary statistics are presented for each decision node in the nested logit 
model. 
 
4.3.1 Sample selection 
 
We collect convertible issuances from the Securities Data Company (SDC) for the 
period January 2000 to September 2007. Line (1) of Table 19 indicates that the initial 
sample consists of 1,326 convertible bond issues. 
To be included in the final sample of 819 firms we impose a number of data filters. 
The first is a requirement that firms must have an offering prospectus available on the 
SEC’s Edgar database. This filter eliminates 197 issues. 
Next, we delete a number of issues based on security design characteristics and 
industry affiliation. Specifically, we eliminate equity units (17 observations), purchase 
contracts (13 observations), utilities (38 observations) and financial institutions (151 
observations). We also delete exchangeable securities (6 observations). Finally, we 
require issuer firms to have stock return information available on the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, and financial statement information in 
COMPUSTAT, which eliminates an additional 85 observations. This results in a final 
sample consisting of 819 convertible issues (line (10)). 
Table 19 indicates that over our eight year sample period, the number of total 
issues per year ranges from a low of 113 to a high of 256. Although there is 
significant year-to-year variation in the number of issues, the market for convertible 
securities appears to have been robust with no obvious trends in issue activity. One
94
 
T
ab
le
 1
9:
 N
um
be
r 
of
 c
on
ve
rt
ib
le
 se
cu
ri
ty
 is
su
es
 o
ve
r 
tim
e.
 
 Th
e 
ta
bl
e 
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 c
on
ve
rti
bl
e 
is
su
es
 b
y 
se
cu
rit
y 
ty
pe
 o
ve
r t
im
e.
 T
ot
al
 is
su
es
 (
SD
C
) 
ar
e 
al
l r
ep
or
te
d 
U
.S
. c
on
ve
rti
bl
e 
se
cu
rit
ie
s 
in
 th
e 
SD
C
 d
at
ab
as
e,
 
w
hi
ch
 in
cl
ud
es
 c
on
ve
rti
bl
e 
de
bt
, c
on
ve
rti
bl
e 
pr
ef
er
re
d 
st
oc
k,
 e
qu
ity
 u
ni
ts
, a
nd
 p
ur
ch
as
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
s. 
Pr
os
pe
ct
us
es
 a
re
 o
bt
ai
ne
d 
fr
om
 th
e 
SE
C
 E
dg
ar
 d
at
ab
as
e.
 P
ur
ch
as
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
s 
va
ry
 i
n 
th
ei
r 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
(U
pp
er
 D
ec
s, 
Pr
id
es
, 
Pa
cs
, 
Sp
ac
es
). 
C
oC
os
 a
re
 C
on
tin
ge
nt
 C
on
ve
rti
bl
es
. 
Ex
ot
ic
s 
is
su
es
 r
ep
re
se
nt
 o
th
er
 s
pe
ci
fic
 t
yp
es
 o
f 
co
nv
er
tib
le
 b
on
ds
 (e
.g
., 
C
ar
z,
 C
od
es
, M
ed
s, 
O
ce
an
s, 
Pe
ac
s, 
Pe
ar
s, 
Ph
on
es
, P
ie
s, 
or
 T
id
es
). 
Is
su
es
 d
es
ig
na
te
d 
as
 L
Y
O
N
s, 
C
oC
os
 a
nd
 E
xo
tic
s r
ep
re
se
nt
 d
is
tin
ct
 s
ec
ur
ity
 
ty
pe
s t
ha
t m
ay
 h
av
e 
st
oc
k 
or
 c
as
h 
se
ttl
em
en
t f
ea
tu
re
s. 
C
on
ve
rti
bl
e 
bo
nd
s i
n 
th
e 
ye
ar
 2
00
7 
ar
e 
on
ly
 c
ol
le
ct
ed
 u
nt
il 
th
e 
en
d 
of
 S
ep
te
m
be
r. 
 
 
 
Y
ea
rs
 
 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
To
ta
l 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
(1
) 
To
ta
l i
ss
ue
s (
SD
C
) 
13
26
 
15
4 
20
8 
11
7 
25
6 
18
1 
11
3 
14
3 
15
4 
(2
) 
N
o 
pr
os
pe
ct
us
 fo
un
d 
19
7 
47
 
43
 
21
 
17
 
9 
8 
15
 
37
 
(3
) 
N
et
 is
su
es
 (S
D
C
), 
(1
)-
(2
) 
11
29
 
10
7 
16
5 
96
 
23
9 
17
2 
10
5 
12
8 
11
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4
) 
Eq
ui
ty
 U
ni
ts
 
17
 
0 
1 
8 
1 
1 
6 
0 
0 
(5
) 
Pu
rc
ha
se
 C
on
tra
ct
s 
13
 
0 
2 
7 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
(6
) 
Pr
ef
er
re
d 
st
oc
k 
90
 
13
 
5 
7 
12
 
16
 
17
 
12
 
8 
(7
) 
C
on
ve
rti
bl
e 
de
bt
 
10
09
 
94
 
15
7 
74
 
22
4 
15
3 
82
 
11
6 
10
9 
(8
) 
N
et
 is
su
es
 (S
D
C
), 
(4
)+
(5
)+
(6
)+
(7
) 
11
29
 
10
7 
16
5 
96
 
23
9 
17
2 
10
5 
12
8 
11
7 
(9
) 
D
at
a 
fil
te
rs
 (C
R
SP
, e
tc
.) 
31
0 
25
 
41
 
38
 
51
 
49
 
38
 
37
 
31
 
(1
0)
 
Fi
na
l s
am
pl
e,
 (8
)-
(9
) 
81
9 
82
 
12
4 
58
 
18
8 
12
3 
67
 
91
 
86
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1
1)
 
Po
te
nt
ia
lly
 c
as
h 
se
ttl
ed
 
47
3 
5 
9 
15
 
89
 
88
 
69
 
10
4 
94
 
(1
2)
 
St
oc
k 
se
ttl
ed
 
53
6 
89
 
14
8 
59
 
13
5 
65
 
13
 
12
 
15
 
(1
3)
 
C
on
ve
rti
bl
e 
de
bt
, (
11
)+
(1
2)
=(
7)
 
10
09
 
94
 
15
7 
74
 
22
4 
15
3 
82
 
11
6 
10
9 
(1
4)
 
LY
O
N
  
31
 
4 
20
 
5 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(1
5)
 
C
oC
o 
 
19
4 
0 
15
 
13
 
67
 
63
 
12
 
22
 
2 
(1
6)
 
Ex
ot
ic
 
31
 
5 
12
 
3 
2 
5 
3 
1 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1
7)
 
10
0%
 c
as
h 
se
ttl
em
en
t 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(1
8)
 
A
t o
pt
io
n 
of
 fi
rm
 in
 e
ith
er
 c
as
h 
or
 
st
oc
k 
 
25
 
1 
5 
3 
10
 
6 
0 
0 
0 
(1
9)
 
Pr
in
ci
pa
l i
n 
ca
sh
, r
em
ai
nd
er
 in
 c
as
h,
 
st
oc
k,
 o
r c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 c
as
h 
an
d 
st
oc
k 
(a
t o
pt
io
n 
of
 fi
rm
) 
23
1 
0 
0 
0 
6 
29
 
38
 
86
 
72
 
(2
0)
 
A
t o
pt
io
n 
of
 fi
rm
 in
 c
as
h,
 st
oc
k,
 o
r 
a 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 c
as
h 
an
d 
st
oc
k 
&
 
21
5 
2 
4 
12
 
73
 
53
 
31
 
18
 
22
 
(2
1)
 
Po
te
nt
ia
lly
 c
as
h 
se
ttl
ed
 
47
3 
5 
9 
15
 
89
 
88
 
69
 
10
4 
94
 
95
Convertible security design 
 
83
 
aspect of security design worth noting is the tendency for issuers to switch from stock 
settlement to potential cash settlement structures. At the beginning of our sample, 
94.7% of all convertible debt issues in 2000 contained a stock settlement feature. By 
the end of our sample period, 86.2% are potentially settled in cash. 
 
4.3.2 Summary statistics 
 
We report summary statistics for our sample of convertible issuers based on 
financial characteristics, security design features, and industry affiliation. Financial 
characteristics include stock price performance (announcement period excess returns, 
pre-issue stock price run-up, dividend yield, and volatility), firm size (total assets, 
sales, and market value of equity), profitability (earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) and free cash flow), tax status (tax payments, tax loss carryforwards, and 
depreciation), capital structure (book and market leverage, interest coverage, and 
decrease in diluted earnings per share), and asset structure (market-to-book, 
investments, and issue proceeds). We use Factiva to identify announcement dates. The 
event window used for estimating the excess returns is [-1; 0]; the estimation window 
we use is [-200; -30]. The market proxy is the CRSP Equally-weighted stock index. 
Calculation details including COMPUSTAT item numbers are reported in the 
associated tables. 
Security design features and industry association are based on the percentage of 
issuers that conform to different classifications. Security design features include the 
percentage of issuers that include potential cash settlement, mandatory conversion, put 
rights, and call features. We also report the frequency that issuers adopt certain issue 
strategies that are used to report higher fully diluted earnings (stock repurchase 
programs and call spread overlays). The percentage of issues that are privately placed 
and have investment grade ratings are also reported. 
 
4.3.2.1 Choice of fixed income component 
 
Table 20 indicates that firms choosing convertible debt over convertible preferred 
stock have on average lower tangibility, lower leverage, and higher interest coverage. 
The observation that straight debt issuers have more conservative capital structures 
may be an optimal response to having less collateral relative to issuers that choose 
preferred stock. Convertible debt issuers also have higher growth opportunities but 
lower investments. In addition, they pay higher taxes, have more slack, and have 
higher free cash flows than convertible preferred stock issuers. 
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Table 20: Summary statistics for convertible securities differentiated by choice of fixed income claim. 
 
Excess returns are computed over a [-1,0] event window using the market model. Issue proceeds are the gross 
proceeds of the issue reported in SDC. Firm characteristics are one year lagged. Assets are determined by 
Compustat Item 6. Sales is Item 12. The market value of equity is calculated by multiplying Item 24 and Item 
25. Tangibility is Item 8. Book leverage is computed by dividing the sum of Item 9 and Item 34 by Item 6, and 
market leverage is (Item 9 + Item 34) / (Item 34 + Item 9 + Item 24 * Item 25). The market-to-book ratio is 
calculated as (Item 24 * Item 25 - Item 60 + Item 6) / Item 6. EBIT is Item 18 + Item 15 + Item 16. Tax 
payments are determined by Item 16. Tax loss carryforwards is a dummy that equals one if Item 52 is larger 
than zero, and equals zero otherwise. Interest coverage is Item 13 divided by Item 15. Depreciation 
corresponds to Item 14, and investments are Item 128. Dividend yield is calculated by dividing Item 21 by the 
market value. Slack is Item 1. Free cash flow is calculated as Item 13 - Item 128. Volatility is calculated as the 
annualized standard deviation over the period 1987 through 2007 using CRSP monthly data. The stock price 
run-up is the firm-specific raw return over a period of 75 trading days ending two days before the 
announcement date. Delta is the convertible’s sensitivity for small stock price changes. Decrease EPS is the 
change in diluted earnings per share that would occur upon issuing the convertible when the “if-converted” 
accounting method applies. The probability of conversion is calculated over the life of the convertible security 
using a Monte Carlo simulation. Tangibility, EBIT, tax payments, depreciation, investments, slack, and free 
cash flows are scaled by total assets. Dollar amounts are in millions of dollars. 
 Straight debt 
(N = 768) 
 Preferred stock 
(N = 46) 
 Diff. in means 
Variable definition Mean Median  Mean Median  t-stat p-value 
Excess returns [-1; 0]  
(%) -4.240 -3.820  -4.170 -3.300  -0.086 0.931 
Issue proceeds 350.2 200.0  321.9 162.5  0.411 0.681 
Total assets 5081.9 1069.6  5635.1 2789.9  -0.356 0.722 
Total sales 3433.9 735.1  3750.2 1461.9  -0.288 0.773 
Market value of 
equity 4691.2 1289.4  3691.8 1510.6  0.892 0.372 
Tangibility 0.239 0.163  0.464 0.395  -5.266 0.000 
Book leverage 0.273 0.254  0.385 0.376  -3.296 0.001 
Market leverage 0.209 0.154  0.360 0.373  -4.711 0.000 
Market-to-book ratio 2.792 1.825  1.798 1.324  4.887 0.000 
EBIT -0.002 0.049  -0.017 0.016  0.541 0.589 
Tax payments 0.018 0.009  0.002 0.000  2.140 0.032 
Tax loss 
carryforwards 0.457 0.000  0.522 1.000  -0.845 0.402 
Interest coverage 6.301 5.362  4.257 3.667  3.389 0.001 
Depreciation 0.046 0.037  0.059 0.042  -1.559 0.119 
Investments 0.056 0.036  0.127 0.046  -3.068 0.002 
Dividend Yield 0.004 0.000  0.007 0.000  -1.419 0.156 
Slack 0.245 0.160  0.108 0.058  6.035 0.000 
Free cash flow 0.002 0.050  -0.061 -0.006  1.881 0.060 
Volatility 0.325 0.314  0.306 0.316  1.249 0.212 
Stock price run-up 0.231 0.163  0.136 0.097  1.758 0.079 
Delta 0.826 0.849  0.828 0.900  -0.066 0.947 
Decrease diluted 
earnings per share 0.057 0.041  0.039 0.000  2.256 0.024 
Probability of 
conversion 0.732 0.760  0.531 0.615  3.242 0.001 
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Table 21: Summary statistics for convertible security design characteristics and industry representation 
by choice of fixed income claim. 
 
LYONs are liquid yield option notes. A call spread overlay is a strategy that increases the effective strike price 
implicit in the conversion option. Additional share repurchase indicates that the issuer repurchases shares 
subsequent to issue. Put rights provide the investor with downside protection in the event the firm does not 
perform well. A convertible security is callable if the firm has the right to force conversion prior to the 
maturity date. Securities that are sold to private investors rather than through a public offering are considered 
private placements. Industries are based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification. 
 Straight debt 
(N = 768) 
 Preferred stock 
(N = 46) 
Panel A: Percentage of issues that contain a specific design and offer placement characteristics (%) 
    
Potentially cash settled 43.10  8.70 
Contingent convertible 18.23  6.52 
LYON  2.86  0.00 
Mandatory conversion 0.00  26.09 
Call spread overlay 9.77  0.00 
Additional stock repurchase 10.29  6.52 
Put rights 42.97  0.00 
Callable 72.14  69.57 
Private placement 84.64  43.48 
Issuer has investment grade rating 17.71  13.04 
    
Panel B: Proportion of issues across industry groupings (%) 
    
Consumer nondurables 2.08  4.35 
Consumer durables 1.69  0.00 
Manufacturing 7.29  6.52 
Energy 4.30  23.91 
Chemicals 1.17  6.52 
Business equipment 32.42  15.22 
Telephone 5.34  13.04 
Utility 0.00  0.00 
Wholesale 8.85  4.35 
Healthcare 23.44  2.17 
Other 13.41  23.91 
 
Panel A of Table 21 indicates that 43.10% of straight debt issuers include 
potential cash settlement features. A similar number of straight debt issuers also 
include put rights (42.97%). By contrast, the large majority of preferred stock issuers 
do not include cash settlement features (only four firms do). No convertible preferred 
stock issuer includes put options. 
Another interesting distinction between security designs is that straight debt never 
includes a mandatory conversion feature, whereas it is quite common for preferred 
stock issues (26.09%). Finally, we note that, although private placements are quite 
common regardless of the fixed income choice, straight debt issues employ this 
method much more frequently (84.64% vs. 43.48%). 
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Panel B of Table 21 reports the percentage of issues across industry groupings. 
For the most part, the issue rates are comparable. Still, issuers in the business 
equipment and healthcare industry tend to prefer convertible straight debt, while 
issuers in the energy business choose convertible preferred stock. 
 
4.3.2.2 Choice of method of payment for convertible debt issuers 
 
Table 22 indicates that convertible debt issuing firms that choose stock settlement 
have lower announcement period excess returns and higher levels of pre-issue stock 
price run-up. On average, firms that issue stock settlements are smaller (total assets 
and sales) and raise less capital. Stock settlement firms also have better growth 
prospects (market-to-book), and are characterized by higher volatility. These findings 
suggest that firms needing additional capital to finance the exercise of growth options 
are more likely to choose stock settlement. 
A comparison of the credit risk profiles for convertible debt issuers across stock 
and cash settlement is somewhat ambiguous. Issuers that choose stock settlement have 
less debt, more financial slack, and pay lower dividends. Taken together, this would 
lead to a relatively favorable credit risk assessment. However, these firms also have 
lower interest coverage, are less profitable, and have lower free cash flows, which 
tend to be mitigating factors. 
The possibility also exists that firms choose cash settlement features in order to 
manage reported earnings. Since the accounting treatment for cash settled securities is 
accretive for fully diluted earnings, one would expect firms to choose this type of 
security design if they need an earnings boost. Consistent with this argument, Table 5 
indicates that cash settlement adopters face larger drops in earnings per share under 
the if-converted method. Also consistent with the earnings management hypothesis, 
Panel A of Table 23 reports that firms choosing cash settlement are more likely to 
implement strategies that increase reported earnings per share (additional stock 
repurchases and call spread overlays). 
Panel A of Table 23 also indicates that stock settlement designs are less likely to 
include put rights (34.55% vs. 54.08%) and more likely to be callable (81.24% vs. 
60.12%). It is interesting to note that, regardless of the payment choice, the majority 
of convertible debt issues are privately placed. 
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Table 22: Summary statistics for convertible debt securities differentiated by settlement choice. 
 
Excess returns are computed over a [-1,0] event window using the market model. Issue proceeds are the gross 
proceeds of the issue reported in SDC. Firm characteristics are one year lagged. Assets are determined by 
Compustat Item 6. Sales is Item 12. The market value of equity is calculated by multiplying Item 24 and Item 
25. Tangibility is Item 8. Book leverage is computed by dividing the sum of Item 9 and Item 34 by Item 6, and 
market leverage is (Item 9 + Item 34) / (Item 34 + Item 9 + Item 24 * Item 25). The market-to-book ratio is 
calculated as (Item 24 * Item 25 - Item 60 + Item 6) / Item 6. EBIT is Item 18 + Item 15 + Item 16. Tax 
payments are determined by Item 16. Tax loss carryforwards is a dummy that equals one if Item 52 is larger 
than zero, and equals zero otherwise. Interest coverage is Item 13 divided by Item 15. Depreciation 
corresponds to Item 14, and investments are Item 128. Dividend yield is calculated by dividing Item 21 by the 
market value. Slack is Item 1. Free cash flow is calculated as Item 13 - Item 128. Volatility is calculated as the 
annualized standard deviation over the period 1987 through 2007 using CRSP monthly data. The stock price 
run-up is the firm-specific raw return over a period of 75 trading days ending two days before the 
announcement date. Delta is the convertible’s sensitivity for small stock price changes. Decrease EPS is the 
change in diluted earnings per share that would occur upon issuing the convertible when the “if-converted” 
accounting method applies. The probability of conversion is calculated over the life of the convertible security 
using a Monte Carlo simulation. Tangibility, EBIT, tax payments, depreciation, investments, slack, and free 
cash flows are scaled by total assets. Dollar amounts are in millions of dollars. 
 Stock 
(N = 437) 
 Potential cash 
(N = 331) 
 Diff. in means 
Variable definition Mean Median  Mean Median  t-stat p-value 
Excess returns [-1; 0]  
(%) -5.360 -5.060  -2.760 -2.410  -5.417 0.000 
Issue proceeds 292.1 190.0  426.8 200.0  -3.195 0.001 
Total assets 3199.9 752.8  7566.5 1356.9  -2.164 0.030 
Total sales 2238.0 510.9  5012.6 1023.5  -2.412 0.016 
Market value of equity 4176.6 1419.1  5370.7 1147.4  -1.296 0.195 
Tangibility 0.232 0.160  0.247 0.165  -0.920 0.358 
Book leverage 0.264 0.240  0.284 0.273  -1.241 0.215 
Market leverage 0.190 0.128  0.235 0.183  -2.920 0.004 
Market-to-book ratio 3.284 1.975  2.143 1.630  6.411 0.000 
EBIT -0.039 0.020  0.048 0.069  -6.371 0.000 
Tax payments 0.020 0.006  0.017 0.014  0.957 0.339 
Tax loss carryforwards 0.428 0.000  0.495 0.000  -1.860 0.063 
Interest coverage 5.936 4.720  6.784 6.116  -2.410 0.016 
Depreciation 0.048 0.038  0.044 0.036  0.939 0.348 
Investments 0.057 0.039  0.054 0.031  0.742 0.458 
Dividend Yield 0.003 0.000  0.004 0.000  -2.214 0.027 
Slack 0.288 0.206  0.187 0.125  6.031 0.000 
Free cash flow -0.035 0.027  0.050 0.066  -7.084 0.000 
Volatility 0.348 0.343  0.295 0.278  6.398 0.000 
Stock price run-up 0.294 0.214  0.147 0.122  6.055 0.000 
Delta 0.827 0.832  0.825 0.863  0.221 0.825 
Decrease diluted 
earnings per share 0.045 0.000  0.074 0.073  -6.259 0.000 
Probability of 
conversion 0.693 0.717  0.784 0.830  -6.742 0.000 
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Table 23: Summary statistics for convertible debt security design characteristics and industry 
representation by settlement choice for straight debt offers. 
 
LYONs are liquid yield option notes. A call spread overlay is a strategy that increases the effective strike price 
implicit in the conversion option. Additional share repurchase indicates that the issuer repurchases shares 
subsequent to issue. Put rights provide the investor with downside protection in the event the firm does not 
perform well. A convertible security is callable if the firm has the right to force conversion prior to the 
maturity date. Securities that are sold to private investors rather than through a public offering are considered 
private placements. Industries are based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification. 
 Stock 
(N = 437) 
 Potential cash 
(N = 331) 
Panel A: Percentage of issues that contain a specific design and offer placement characteristics (%) 
    
Contingent convertible 13.27  24.77 
LYON  4.35  0.91 
Mandatory conversion 0.00  0.00 
Call spread overlay 2.06  19.94 
Additional stock repurchase 2.97  19.94 
Put rights 34.55  54.08 
Callable 81.24  60.12 
Private placement 84.67  84.59 
Issuer has investment grade rating 16.70  19.03 
    
Panel B: Proportion of issues across industry groupings (%) 
    
Consumer nondurables 1.83  2.42 
Consumer durables 1.37  2.11 
Manufacturing 4.81  10.57 
Energy 3.89  4.83 
Chemicals 0.69  1.81 
Business equipment 35.70  28.10 
Telephone 5.95  4.53 
Utility 0.00  0.00 
Wholesale 7.09  11.18 
Healthcare 26.32  19.64 
Other 12.36  14.80 
 
Panel B of Table 23 indicates that business equipment manufacturers and 
healthcare providers tend to be industries that choose a relatively large number of 
convertible security offerings with stock settlement features. Similar to our results for 
the choice of a fixed income claim in Table 21, we do not see much industry variation 
across the method of payment choice.  
 
4.3.2.3 Choice of method of payment for preferred stock issuers 
 
Table 24 indicates that the difference between the announcement effects of 
convertible preferred stock issues with mandatory and optional (i.e. non-mandatory) 
conversion options are not statistically significant.  
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Table 24: Summary statistics for convertible preferred securities differentiated by conversion feature. 
 
Excess returns are computed over a [-1,0] event window using the market model. Issue proceeds are the gross 
proceeds of the issue reported in SDC. Firm characteristics are one year lagged. Assets are determined by 
Compustat Item 6. Sales is Item 12. The market value of equity is calculated by multiplying Item 24 and Item 
25. Tangibility is Item 8. Book leverage is computed by dividing the sum of Item 9 and Item 34 by Item 6, and 
market leverage is (Item 9 + Item 34) / (Item 34 + Item 9 + Item 24 * Item 25). The market-to-book ratio is 
calculated as (Item 24 * Item 25 - Item 60 + Item 6) / Item 6. EBIT is Item 18 + Item 15 + Item 16. Tax 
payments are determined by Item 16. Tax loss carryforwards is a dummy that equals one if Item 52 is larger 
than zero, and equals zero otherwise. Interest coverage is Item 13 divided by Item 15. Depreciation 
corresponds to Item 14, and investments are Item 128. Dividend yield is calculated by dividing Item 21 by the 
market value. Slack is Item 1. Free cash flow is calculated as Item 13 - Item 128. Volatility is calculated as the 
annualized standard deviation over the period 1987 through 2007 using CRSP monthly data. The stock price 
run-up is the firm-specific raw return over a period of 75 trading days ending two days before the 
announcement date. Delta is the convertible’s sensitivity for small stock price changes. Decrease EPS is the 
change in diluted earnings per share that would occur upon issuing the convertible when the “if-converted” 
accounting method applies. The probability of conversion is calculated over the life of the convertible security 
using a Monte Carlo simulation. Tangibility, EBIT, tax payments, depreciation, investments, slack, and free 
cash flows are scaled by total assets. Dollar amounts are in millions of dollars. 
 Mandatory 
(N = 12) 
 Optional 
(N = 34) 
 Diff. in means 
Variable definition Mean Median  Mean Median  t-stat p-value 
Excess returns [-1; 0]  
(%) -3.220 -2.950  -4.510 -3.300  0.862 0.389 
Issue proceeds 497.1 275.0  260.0 150.0  1.188 0.235 
Total assets 10215.9 7797.9  4018.3 1621.9  2.357 0.018 
Total sales 6251.3 5227.9  2867.4 633.7  1.794 0.073 
Market value of 
equity 5006.6 3993.8  3227.7 1119.1  1.013 0.311 
Tangibility 0.422 0.386  0.479 0.439  -0.636 0.525 
Book leverage 0.388 0.380  0.383 0.375  0.069 0.945 
Market leverage 0.451 0.446  0.328 0.372  1.848 0.065 
Market-to-book ratio 1.330 1.224  1.964 1.393  -2.348 0.019 
EBIT 0.051 0.045  -0.041 -0.002  1.366 0.172 
Tax payments 0.022 0.005  -0.004 0.000  1.251 0.211 
Tax loss 
carryforwards 0.588 1.000  0.333 0.000  1.536 0.140 
Interest coverage 4.800 4.018  4.065 3.053  0.694 0.488 
Depreciation 0.042 0.042  0.064 0.045  -1.979 0.048 
Investments 0.084 0.036  0.142 0.052  -1.322 0.186 
Dividend Yield 0.013 0.003  0.005 0.000  1.154 0.249 
Slack 0.066 0.042  0.122 0.061  -1.728 0.084 
Free cash flow 0.047 0.038  -0.099 -0.032  2.238 0.025 
Volatility 0.241 0.229  0.328 0.336  -3.455 0.001 
Stock price run-up -0.024 0.028  0.192 0.196  -2.049 0.040 
Delta 0.598 0.580  0.909 0.928  -14.218 0.000 
Decrease diluted 
earnings per share 0.057 0.041  0.032 0.000  1.192 0.233 
Probability of 
conversion 1.000 1.000  0.366 0.405  10.253 0.000 
 
Firms with lower stock price run-ups are more inclined to include mandatory 
conversions. This tendency to use mandatory conversion for firms that have not had 
strong recent performance is in line with their relatively poor growth prospects 
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(market-to-book) and lower volatility. Firms issuing mandatory convertibles also have 
more assets and higher free cash flows. 
 
Table 25: Summary statistics for convertible preferred security design characteristics and industry 
representation by conversion feature for preferred stock offers. 
 
LYONs are liquid yield option notes. A call spread overlay is a strategy that increases the effective strike price 
implicit in the conversion option. Additional share repurchase indicates that the issuer repurchases shares 
subsequent to issue. Put rights provide the investor with downside protection in the event the firm does not 
perform well. A convertible security is callable if the firm has the right to force conversion prior to the 
maturity date. Securities that are sold to private investors rather than through a public offering are considered 
private placements. Industries are based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification. 
 Mandatory 
(N = 12) 
 Optional 
(N = 34) 
Panel A: Percentage of issues that contain a specific design and offer placement characteristics (%) 
    
Potential cash settlement 0.00  11.76 
Contingent convertible 8.33  5.88 
LYON  0.00  0.00 
Call spread overlay 0.00  0.00 
Additional stock repurchase 8.33  5.88 
Put rights 0.00  0.00 
Callable 25.00  85.29 
Private placement 0.00  58.82 
Issuer has investment grade rating 25.00  8.82 
    
Panel B: Proportion of issues across industry groupings (%) 
    
Consumer nondurables 8.33  2.94 
Consumer durables 0.00  0.00 
Manufacturing 16.67  2.94 
Energy 8.33  29.41 
Chemicals 8.33  5.88 
Business equipment 8.33  17.65 
Telephone 8.33  14.71 
Utility 0.00  0.00 
Wholesale 8.33  2.94 
Healthcare 0.00  2.94 
Other 33.33  20.59 
 
With respect to specific design features, the most notable differences in Panel A 
of Table 25 are that issues with mandatory conversion are much less likely to include 
call features (25.00% vs. 85.29%) but are more likely to publicly underwrite their 
offerings. 
Panel B of Table 25 presents the distribution of firms choosing different methods 
of payment for convertible preferred stock across different industry groups. 
Manufacturing firms are more likely to include mandatory features, whereas firms in 
the energy industry are less likely to include mandatory features. 
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4.4 Econometric specification 
 
A Hausman specification test rejects the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption, which indicates that a simple multinomial logit model is not appropriate 
for our analysis. We therefore use a nested logit model (McFadden (1981)) to test our 
various hypotheses related to convertible security design. The structure imposed by 
the nested logit model is appropriate for our analysis because it reflects the nature of 
the actual design choices faced by an issuer. The model assumes that a firm chooses 
the best outcome among the available alternatives. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) use a 
similar approach to investigate the choice between rights offerings and private equity 
placements. Their analysis demonstrates the importance of simultaneously modeling 
joint decisions. 
Adopting their notation, we assume that the objective function for choice j by firm 
i takes the form: 
 
       (20) 
 
where jiV ,ˆ  is the fitted value for the objective function based on observable firm 
characteristics and ji,ε  is an idiosyncratic component that reflects unmeasured 
characteristics. 
The convertible design choices are illustrated in Figure 7. We partition the choice 
space into disjoint subsets. Firms make a choice of fixed income claim indexed by j = 
1, …, F and method of payment indexed by k = 1, …, Mj. We assume that lowest level 
objective functions are specified as: 
 
      (21) 
 
where kjiV ,,ˆ  is linear in firm characteristics and additively separable into components 
that reflect method of payment Mi,j and fixed income Fj choices. We assume that kji ,,ε  
is generalized extreme-value distributed. The functional form for kjiV ,,ˆ  is 
 
      (22) 
 
where α and β are parameter vectors and Ai,j and Bi,j,k denote vectors of explanatory 
variables that correspond to choices j and k for firm i. 
 
 
,ˆ ,,, jijiji VV ε+=
,''ˆ ,,,,, kjijikji BAV βα +=
,ˆ ,,,,,, kjikjikji VV ε+=
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Figure 7: The security design choice structure.  
 
This figure shows the choices at the different levels of our nested logit model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under the nested logit model, the joint probability of firm i choosing the security 
design choice j,k is 
 
      (23) 
 
where Pi,j is the marginal probability of choosing straight debt or preferred stock and 
Pi,j,k|j is the probability of choosing a particular method of payment if the choice was j 
at the previous level. The conditional probability Pi,j,k|j of method of payment choice 
j,k is 
 
     (24) 
 
and the marginal probability of the choice of a fixed income claim is 
 
     (25) 
 
 
where the inclusive values for fixed income choice j is defined as 
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   (26)  
 
The inclusive value at a given level represents the expected value from a 
particular choice made at the next lower level.  
We estimate the parameter vectors α, β, and λ using sequential maximum 
likelihood. Lower-level coefficients are consistently estimated by maximizing the 
conditional log-likelihood function. Inclusive values are estimated using the procedure 
in McFadden (1981). Upper level estimates are consistently estimated by sequential 
maximum likelihood. 
 
4.5 Empirical results 
 
Table 26 reports the estimated coefficients and their associated p-values for all 
levels of the nested logit model. Statistical significance is based upon Huber-White 
standard errors. For ease of interpretation, the expected signs for the coefficients are 
carried forward from Table 18. We organize our discussion of the results according to 
the different design choices and the different hypotheses under consideration. 
 
4.5.1 Choice of fixed income component 
 
We test four hypotheses for the fixed income choice. These are the tax benefits 
hypothesis, the financial distress hypothesis, the refinancing hypothesis, and the 
managerial discretion hypothesis. 
 
4.5.1.1 Corporate taxes 
 
We find evidence that firms choose straight debt rather than preferred stock when 
interest expense can be used to shield income from corporate taxes. Firms that have 
higher interest coverage ratios (p-value = 0.004) are more likely to issue convertible 
debt. The relatively high credit ratings typically associated with these firms suggest 
that they have unused debt capacity and are likely to be underlevered. Firms with 
relatively low depreciation levels (p-value = 0.066) are also more likely to choose 
convertible debt. This is sensible because depreciation is a non-debt tax deduction that  
106
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makes interest payments potentially redundant as tax shields. The variables tax 
payments and tax loss carryforwards also have the correct sign, but their effects are 
not statistically significant (p-values of 0.203 and 0.679, respectively). 
 
4.5.1.2 Reduction of financial distress costs 
 
Since convertible straight debt has a fixed maturity that requires repayment of the 
principle when the conversion option is out-of-the-money, we predict firms with 
higher costs of financial distress to choose convertible preferred stock. We find some 
evidence for the financial distress cost hypothesis in the fixed income decision. Firms 
with higher interest coverage ratios opt for convertible straight debt, which is in line 
with the financial distress hypothesis as these firms are better able to pay the principal. 
However, the effects of the other proxy variables (size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, 
profitability, and whether the firm has an investment grade rating) are not statistically 
significant in the fixed income regression. 
 
4.5.1.3 Refinancing costs 
 
We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that firms choose a fixed income 
security in an attempt to minimize external financing costs. All of the coefficients in 
Table 26 have the correct sign. Firms that have stronger free cash flows (p-value < 
0.001), higher interest coverage ratios (p-value = 0.004), and greater financial slack 
(p-value < 0.001) are more likely to choose convertible debt because they are more 
likely to be able to refinance principal balances with debt in the event that the 
conversion option is not exercised. Generally, firms prefer to refinance with debt 
because underwriting costs are much lower relative to equity issues, particularly when 
stock performance has not been as good as the firm anticipated it to be at the time it 
was originally issued. 
 
4.5.1.4 Managerial discretion 
 
Straight debt does a better job mitigating managerial discretion costs because 
interest payments are mandatory. Since preferred stock has no maturity date, the 
mandatory repayment of principal associated with debt forces firms to commit more 
of their free cash flows to the repayment of financial claims. Firms that have the 
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greatest propensity to encounter managerial discretion problems are therefore the most 
likely to choose straight debt. Relatively speaking, the results for the choice of fixed 
income claim are strong. We find that firms with higher free cash flows (p-value < 
0.001), higher interest coverage ratios (p-value = 0.004), and greater financial slack 
(p-value < 0.001) are more likely to choose straight debt. 
 
4.5.2 Choice of method of payment for convertible debt issuers 
 
Two of the hypotheses that potentially explain the fixed income choice also 
potentially explain the method of payment choice for convertible debt issuers. These 
are the financial distress hypothesis and the managerial discretion hypothesis. Table 
26 also provides results for the staged investment and the earnings management 
hypotheses. 
 
4.5.2.1 Reduction of financial distress costs 
 
The financial distress cost hypothesis makes predictions regarding the choice of 
fixed income claim and the method of payment. Firms that choose convertible straight 
debt as the fixed income component can decide to settle in cash, stock, or a 
combination of cash and stock. We predict that firms with high costs of financial 
distress choose stock settlement. In line with this prediction, we find that high-growth 
firms choose stock settlement in the convertible straight debt sample. However, we do 
not find the expected significant effects for the other variables of the financial distress 
hypothesis. 
 
4.5.2.2 Managerial discretion 
 
The managerial discretion hypothesis also makes predictions about the method of 
payment choice assuming that the firm chooses convertible straight debt. For this case, 
we predict that firms seeking to mitigate managerial discretion problems are more 
likely to choose cash settlement. The evidence in Table 26 is mixed. As predicted, we 
find that firms with relatively poor growth opportunities (p-value = 0.003) are more 
likely to choose cash settlement. However, despite greater propensity for managerial 
discretion, firms that have higher stock price run-ups (p-value = 0.038) are more 
likely to choose stock settlement, which is inconsistent with our predictions. 
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4.5.2.3 Staged investment 
 
The staged investment hypothesis makes predictions about the method of payment 
choices for convertible straight debt and convertible preferred stock. The results for 
convertible straight debt issuers are mixed. Consistent with our predictions, we find 
that firms with significant growth opportunities (p-value = 0.003) are more likely to 
choose stock settlement. This finding indicates firms attempt to preserve debt capacity 
in case additional rounds of financing are needed to complete an investment project. 
However, firms with higher investments are not more likely to choose stock 
settlement, which is inconsistent with the staged investment hypothesis. 
 
4.5.2.4 Earnings management 
 
Our results support the predictions of the earnings management hypothesis. 
According to this hypothesis, firms wanting to report higher fully diluted earnings 
choose cash settlement. Cash settlement is accretive for fully diluted earnings per 
share because the shares that would be included in an “as-if” converted calculation 
had the issuer chosen stock settlement instead are ignored. 
Firms often take actions that exacerbate this effect. For example, some firms use 
part of the offer proceeds to repurchase shares. Although not all share repurchase 
programs are accretive with respect to fully diluted earnings, the relatively low 
interest rates that are typically associated with convertible bonds are sufficient for the 
net effect to be positive. 
Other firms select call spread overlays. Under this strategy, a firm issues 
convertible debt and simultaneously eliminates the equity component by taking an 
offsetting position in call options. The net effect is to synthetically increase the 
conversion price. It is accretive with respect to reported earnings because the interest 
expense that is recognized for financial statement reporting purposes is lower than it 
would have been had the firm issued the convertible at the synthetic conversion price. 
Since the firm selects cash settlement (the shares are not reflected in fully diluted 
earnings), the strategy is accretive for reported earnings. 
Consistent with our predictions, firms that use repurchase additional shares (p-
value < 0.001) and firms that adopt call spread overlays (p-value < 0.001) are more 
likely to choose cash settlement features. The decrease in fully diluted earnings per 
share also has the predicted sign, but is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.158). 
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4.5.3 Choice of method of payment for convertible preferred stock 
issuers 
 
We have two hypotheses that potentially explain the choice for mandatory 
conversion: the staged investment hypothesis and the financial distress hypothesis. A 
potential third hypothesis would be related to tax benefits, since some mandatory 
convertible preferred stock issues provide tax advantages (for example, the dividend 
payments of Feline PRIDES are tax deductable). However, since we could not find 
tax advantages for the mandatory convertible preferred stock issues in our sample, we 
focus our analysis on the staged investment and financial distress hypothesis. We 
could not include the probability of conversion as a control variable in the regression 
of the mandatory choice since this variable has no variation for convertibles that are 
mandatorily convertible (for these convertibles the probability of conversion equals 
one). 
 
4.5.3.1 Staged investment 
 
Firms are expected to use mandatory conversion when they face significant 
managerial discretion costs because additional debt capacity can only be created if 
investors convert to common stock. We predict that capital expenditures in the offer 
year are positively related to the choice of mandatory conversion. However, Table 26 
shows that the effect of capital expenditures on the decision to add a mandatory 
feature is not significant. In fact, none of the variables that are statistically significant 
have the expected sign for the staged investment hypothesis. 
 
4.5.3.2 Reduction of financial distress costs 
 
Regarding the mandatory choice, firms with higher costs of financial distress are 
predicted to choose mandatory conversion features. Table 26 does not provide 
evidence for the financial distress hypothesis. Mandatory issuers are not smaller and 
do not have higher leverage, higher market-to-book ratios, or lower profitability. 
However, remember that the costs of financial distress have an effect on the fixed 
income decision: convertible preferred stock issuers have higher costs of financial 
distress than convertible debt issuers. Therefore, the costs of financial distress of 
mandatory issuers are relatively high. 
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To further examine whether the costs of financial distress have an effect on the 
mandatory choice, we focus on the actual credit ratings of firms rather than whether 
the firm has investment grade debt. The reason for this additional analysis on credit 
ratings is that mandatory convertible preferred stock is a relatively beneficial 
instrument for a firm's credit rating. Since issuers do not have to repay the principal 
and the securities automatically convert into common equity within a limited period of 
time, the instrument is relatively similar to common equity. Therefore, given the 
choice for a convertible issue, a choice for mandatory convertible preferred stock 
generates the lowest probability of default. Mandatory convertible preferred stock 
issue will especially improve a firm's credit rating when the proceeds are used to 
repay straight debt. 
Firms that are most concerned about their credit ratings are likely to be close to 
the investment-speculative grade cut-off. Credit ratings above BB represent 
investment grade ratings (i.e. ratings AAA, AA, A, and BBB), whereas lower credit 
ratings (BB, B, CCC, CC, C, and D) represent speculative grade ratings. The cut-off 
between investment grade ratings and speculative grade ratings is important since 
getting a speculative grade rating substantially increases the cost of debt. Grinblatt 
and Titman (2002), for example, argue that many bond portfolio managers are 
restricted from owning speculative grade bonds. 
In line with the importance of credit ratings, we find that all of the mandatory 
convertible preferred stock issuers in our sample have ratings that fall in the range 
BBB-B at the time of the offering. Hence, all mandatory convertible preferred stock 
issuers are close to the speculative grade cut-off. In fact, 75% of the mandatory 
convertible preferred stock issuers have BB ratings, indicating a high need to 
refinance in order to obtain an investment grade rating. An examination of issue 
announcements indicates that all but one of the mandatory convertible preferred stock 
issuers plan to use (part of) the issue proceeds to reduce the indebtedness.34  For 
regular convertible preferred stock issuers and convertible bonds issuers the 
percentage of issuers within the BBB-B range is much lower: for regular convertible 
preferred stock issuers, the percentage with a rating between BBB and B is 56% (29% 
has a BB rating), while this percentage is 49% (20% has a BB rating) for the 
convertible bonds in our sample. 
                                            
34 When we look at the credit ratings of the issuing firms two years after the issue, we find that 55% of the 
credit ratings have improved. 
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4.6 Earnings management and the method of payment 
choice 
 
Most of the hypotheses we examine are based on the premise that managers 
choose particular security designs to maximize long-run shareholder value. Consistent 
with this viewpoint, our evidence finds support for the tax minimization, refinancing 
costs, and managerial discretion hypotheses. However, not all of our hypotheses are 
grounded in the shareholder value paradigm. Specifically, firms that use cash 
settlement features to manage earnings are not necessarily interested in maximizing 
shareholder value, since future cash flows are not affected by changes in reported 
diluted earnings per share. 
Given that we find evidence consistent with the earnings management hypothesis, 
this section explores this possibility more carefully. We begin our analysis by 
providing an expanded description of the relevant accounting issues related to 
convertible debt and earnings. Since particular investment banks may be responsible 
for contract innovations that are linked to particular security designs, we then 
characterize the distribution of underwritten offerings by different investment banks. 
The idea is to shed light on whether firms desiring particular structures are more likely 
to choose investment banks that have expertise in this area. The third part of our 
analysis is to characterize the type of firms that adopt share repurchase programs and 
call spread overlays. For our sample, there are 79 (75) instances where firms 
repurchase shares (call spread overlays). In addition, there are 31 cases where firms 
adopt both strategies simultaneously. We examine the use of these strategies by 
estimating a logit regression model of the determinants of earnings management. 
Finally, we estimate a multinomial logit model to characterize the use of cash 
settlement features. 
 
4.6.1 Accounting for convertible debt and the calculation of fully diluted 
earnings per share 
 
There are two issues related to the accounting for convertible securities: 1) the 
allocation of the security between its debt and equity components for financial 
reporting purposes, and 2) the appropriate way to calculate fully diluted earnings per 
share. Although the former issue may have some bearing on the determination of bond 
ratings, we consider it to be second order because, in the absence of agency costs and 
asymmetric information problems, the pricing of convertible securities is unaffected 
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by the decision to pay a fraction of the entire claim in cash (i.e., the final payoff is the 
same). 
By contrast, the calculation of fully diluted earnings is highly relevant to our 
earnings management hypothesis. The basic regulations for calculating fully diluted 
earnings can be found in Statement 128 (1997). Paragraph 26 indicates that: 
The dilutive effect of convertible securities shall be reflected in diluted EPS by 
application of the if-converted method. Under that method: 
1. If an entity has convertible preferred stock outstanding, the preferred 
dividends applicable to convertible preferred stock shall be added back to 
the numerator. 
2. If an entity has convertible debt outstanding, (1) interest charges 
applicable to the convertible debt shall be added back to the numerator, (2) 
to the extent nondiscretionary adjustments based on income made during 
the period would have been computed differently had the interest on 
convertible debt never been recognized, the numerator shall be 
appropriately adjusted, and (3) the numerator shall be adjusted for the 
income tax effect of (1) and (2). 
3. The convertible preferred stock or convertible debt shall be assumed to 
have been converted at the beginning of the period (or at time of issuance, 
if later), and the resulting common shares shall be included in the 
denominator. 
This treatment recognizes the dilutive nature of convertible securities and requires 
that potential shares be included in the total shares calculation and that firms add any 
interest or preferred dividends to income. This treatment can lead to substantial 
reductions in fully diluted earnings per share estimates relative to undiluted EPS. 
In 1991, the application of this approach to convertible securities that contain cash 
settlement features was considered an emerging issue by the FASB’s Task Force 
when investment banks began discussing potential issuances. The Task Force released 
EITF Issue 90-19 (Convertible bonds with issuer option to settle for cash upon 
conversion).35 The discussion in 90-19 provides guidance regarding securities that can 
potentially be settled in cash and is contained in Paragraph 29 of Statement 128: 
If an entity issues a contract that may be settled in common stock or in cash at the 
election of either the entity or the holder, the determination of whether that contract 
shall be reflected in the computation of diluted EPS shall be made based on the facts 
                                            
35 It is not clear whether there were in fact any such instruments issued prior to EITF 90-19. If so, we believe 
that they were used on a very limited basis. 
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available each period. It shall be presumed that the contract will be settled in 
common stock and the resulting potential common shares included in diluted EPS (in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of this Statement) if the effect is more dilutive. 
A contract that is reported as an asset or liability for accounting purposes may 
require an adjustment to the numerator for any changes in income or loss that would 
result if the contract had been reported as an equity instrument for accounting 
purposes during the period. That adjustment is similar to the adjustments required for 
convertible debt in paragraph 26(b). The presumption that the contract will be settled 
in common stock may be overcome if past experience or a stated policy provides a 
reasonable basis to believe that the contract will be paid partially or wholly in cash. 
In January 2002, the Task Force amended EITF 90-19. Among other things, the 
amendment addresses two issues: 1) whether the initial balance sheet treatment by the 
issuer should provide for separate or combined accounting for the conversion feature 
and debt obligation, and 2) how each instrument should be treated in earnings-per-
share computations. The amendment makes a distinction between three security types:  
1. Instrument A: Upon conversion, the issuer must satisfy the obligation 
entirely in cash based on the fixed number of shares multiplied by the stock 
price on the date of conversion (the conversion value). 
2. Instrument B: Upon conversion, the issuer may satisfy the entire obligation 
in either stock or cash equivalent to the conversion value. 
3. Instrument C: Upon conversion, the issuer must satisfy the accreted value 
of the obligation (the amount accrued to the benefit of the holder exclusive 
of the conversion spread) in cash and may satisfy the conversion spread 
(the excess conversion value over the accreted value) in either cash or 
stock. 
The amended guidance in Issue 90-19 provides more favorable accounting and 
EPS treatment for Instrument C (“net share settlements”). The January 23-24, 2002 
meeting minutes explain that because the features of Instruments C are sufficiently 
different from conventional convertible debt, paragraphs 12-32 of Issue 00-19 should 
be applied in determining whether the conversion feature meets the criteria for 
classification as permanent equity. If the conversion feature does not meet those 
criteria, Instruments C should be bifurcated by the issuer and the conversion option 
should be marked to market.36 
                                            
36  FSP APB 14-a nullifies this treatment of Instruments C. As a result, convertible securities that are 
potentially (either partially or wholly) settled in cash, will be divided into a debt and an equity component. The 
value of this debt component is calculated by using the interest rate that would apply to a similar debt 
instrument without a conversion option. The value of the equity component is then the remainder. FSP APB 
14-a is into effect from December 2008 (retrospectively). 
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With respect to the calculation of fully diluted earnings per shares, the guidance in 
Issue 90-19 concludes that the if-converted method should not be used for Instrument 
C, due to the cash-settled portion. The conversion spread of Instruments C should be 
included in diluted earnings per share based on the provisions of paragraph 29 of 
Statement 128.37 
For our sample, approximately half of the cash settlements can be settled in any 
combination of cash and stock at the option of the firm. This security is not considered 
in (amended) EITF 90-19, and is referred to in practice as Instrument X; a term 
initially used in a speech by Robert Comerford of the SEC at the AICPA National 
Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments in December 2003. Although 
Instrument X offerings have the option, upon conversion, to settle for any 
combination of equity and cash, many issuers of Instrument X securities have adopted 
a “stated” policy to pay the principal in cash and the conversion spread in equity (that 
is, even though they are legally entitled to settle the if-converted value in any 
combination of cash and shares, they adopt a policy to settle the principal amount of 
the instrument in cash upon conversion). Specifically, entities apply the guidance in 
paragraph 29 of FAS 128, which indicates that the presumption of share-settlement 
can be overcome if an entity has a past practice or “stated policy” of settling an 
instrument in cash. Because of their policy to settle the principal in cash, they do not 
apply the if-converted method of computing diluted EPS for Instrument X securities. 
Rather, they apply a treasury stock-type method whereby only the net shares that 
would be issuable if conversion occurred at the current stock price are included in 
diluted EPS. Because such instruments are typically issued with a conversion feature 
that is significantly out-of-the-money, there is often no diluted EPS impact at all for 
several years. 
Since the 2002 amendment of 90-19, cash settlements have become very popular, 
which led to new discussions on the subject. The Task Force has questioned whether 
the accounting guidance in (amended) 90-19 “appropriately reflects the economics of 
those instruments.”38 
More recently, the accounting for convertible securities has been revisited as part 
of the FASB’s and IASB’s agreement to work together toward the convergence of 
global accounting standards. The FASB and the IASB have had an earnings per share 
convergence project on their agenda for the past several years. One of the proposed 
changes to U.S. GAAP (FAS 128) in that project is to eliminate an entity’s ability to 
overcome the presumption of share settlement based on a past practice or stated policy. 
                                            
37 The revised guidance for Instruments C should be applied to instruments issued after January 24, 2002. 
38 EITF 07-2 (Accounting for convertible debt instruments that are not subject to the guidance in paragraph 12 
of APB Opinion 14, March 2007 and June 2007) provides a historical perspective of the issues. 
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That proposed change to U.S. GAAP contained in FASB Staff Position (FSP) 14-a 
would converge to the guidance that is already required under IFRS.  
 
4.6.2 Distribution of underwriters by security design choice 
 
When a firm decides to issue a convertible security, it must obtain the services of 
an investment bank to facilitate the transaction. Investment banks develop expertise in 
designing certain types of transactions and are likely to attract underwriting business 
because of their reputation. 
Table 27 reports the distribution of investment bank participation across different 
methods of payment. Panel A reports the total number of issues by investment bank. 
The totals represent counts based on proportional participation. For example, Bank of 
America and Bear Stearns are credited with 0.5 issues if they are both identified as 
lead underwriters in the SDC database. 
Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan 
Stanley account for 48.5% of all issue activity. 39  By contrast, Bear Stearns only 
recorded 20.81 issues over our sample period. This is somewhat surprising given the 
firm’s reputation as a design innovator in this area. 
Panel B reports the proportion of issues for each method of payment choice by 
investment bank. The proportion of stock settlement issues is highest for Solomon 
Smith Barney (18.92 of the 21.92 issues, which is 86%). Panel C indicates the degree 
to which banks specialize in issuing particular security designs. It reports the ratio of 
this proportion to the average proportion across all investment banks. For example, 
the proportion of Instrument C issues for Bank of America is about twice the industry 
average (41% compared to 21%). 
 
4.6.3 Earnings management regressions 
 
Table 28 reports the results for our logit analysis of the determinants of the 
adoption of share repurchase programs and call spread overlays. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm repurchases shares 
(Model (1)) or uses a call spread overlay (Model (2)). We also consider the case 
where either the firm repurchases shares or uses a call spread overlay (Model (3))
                                            
39 CSFB, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley respectively made 83.23, 87.08, 117.73, and 
84.75 issues out of 768 convertible bond issues over our sample period. 
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Model (4) is an expanded version of Model (3) that includes underwriter dummy 
variables. 
We find that large firms with relatively poor recent stock performance and no 
investment grade debt are more likely to adopt an earnings management strategy. 
Issuing firms are more likely to repurchase shares if free cash flows are high, and 
more likely to use call spread overlays if they have relatively low investment 
requirements and high interest coverage ratios. Firms that face larger potential 
decreases of reported diluted EPS under the if-converted method are more likely to 
adopt a call spread overlay. The coefficient estimate for the decrease in earnings per 
share is 8.769 (p-value < 0.001). 
Table 28 indicates that the Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, and JP Morgan are 
more likely to handle the underwriting for firms that adopt earnings management 
strategies. By contrast, issues underwritten by Salomon Smith Barney are less likely 
to coincide with attempts to manage earnings. 
 
4.6.4 Specific cash settlement options 
 
The security design model we estimate in Table 26 does not distinguish among 
alternative cash settlement features. Since different cash settlement choices may be 
useful at resolving different financing problems, we consider an alternative 
specification for the choice of settlement features that distinguishes between 
Instrument B, C, and X designs.40 Table 29 reports the results of a multinomial logit 
regression model, and also reports the corresponding marginal effects. These marginal 
effects are calculated by applying a one standard deviation shock to the mean of each 
explanatory variable, while holding all other explanatory variables at their sample 
means. Dummy variables are set to zero for these calculations. Marginal effects for 
dummy variables are calculated by setting the dummy variables to one. 
The tables provide a number of interesting insights. We hypothesized that pre-
specified partial cash settlements (Instruments C) or stated policies to settle in cash 
(Instruments X) are useful security designs for reducing managerial discretion costs 
associated with free cash flows. This follows because issuers commit future free cash 
flows to pay the accreted value in cash. Consistent with this prediction, we find that 
firms choosing an Instrument X-style settlement are more likely to have relatively 
high levels of free cash flows (marginal effect of 0.416 with a p-value of 0.046) and
                                            
40 Our sample includes only one Instrument A issue. We combine this issue with Instrument C issues, based on 
the large portion of the value that is assured to be settled in cash for both Instruments A and C. 
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Table 29: Multinomial logit model based on convertible debt settlement type 
 
The table reports the estimation of a multinomial logit model that examines the determinants of the settlement 
types (stock settlement, Instrument B, Instrument C, and Instrument X). The sample consists of convertible 
straight debt issues. One firm issued an Instrument A specification; we reclassify this issue as an Instrument C 
specification. Panel A reports the coefficient estimates and the associated p-values (based on Huber-White 
standard errors). Panel B reports the marginal effects and p-values for the economic significance of the 
marginal effect. Marginal effects are based on a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable 
holding all other explanatory variables at their sample means. Dummy variables are set to zero. Their marginal 
effects are calculated by evaluating the fitted value assuming the dummy variable under consideration equals 
one. 
Panel A: Coefficients of multinomial logit on settlement type 
 
 Instrument B 
 (N = 18) 
Instrument C 
 (N = 160) 
Instrument X  
(N = 153) 
Variable definition Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Constant -7.461 0.001 -6.179 0.000 -0.276 0.727 
Log(market value) 0.537 0.016 0.326 0.006 -0.156 0.156 
Book leverage 2.510 0.190 -0.054 0.937 0.246 0.628 
Market-to-book ratio -0.671 0.018 -0.118 0.147 -0.205 0.004 
EBIT 3.730 0.186 1.005 0.412 -0.859 0.411 
Interest coverage 0.020 0.785 0.036 0.256 -0.044 0.114 
Investment -5.568 0.225 -3.161 0.255 1.933 0.334 
Slack -0.152 0.906 -0.194 0.756 0.156 0.778 
Free cash flow -1.833 0.600 0.822 0.668 2.683 0.043 
Stock price run-up 0.821 0.236 -1.777 0.000 -0.723 0.025 
Decrease diluted earnings per share 5.552 0.109 8.658 0.000 -0.286 0.887 
Investment grade 0.088 0.892 -1.399 0.000 0.086 0.775 
Probability of conversion  0.489 0.764 3.784 0.000 1.463 0.016 
       
N 768      
χ2 (p-value) 0.000      
Pseudo R2 0.138      
       
Panel B: Marginal effects of multinomial logit on settlement type 
 
 Stock settlement 
(N = 437) 
Instrument B 
(N = 18) 
Instrument C 
(N = 160) 
Instrument X 
(N = 153) 
Variable definition Marg. 
effect 
p-value Marg. 
Effect 
p-value Marg. 
effect 
p-
value 
Marg. 
effect 
p-value 
Log(market value) -0.013 0.507 0.006 0.109 0.043 0.001 -0.036 0.038 
Book leverage -0.045 0.652 0.027 0.149 -0.018 0.828 0.036 0.659 
Market-to-book 
ratio 0.042 0.001 -0.007 0.005 -0.007 0.429 -0.028 0.009 
EBIT -0.005 0.979 0.041 0.218 0.141 0.323 -0.177 0.276 
Interest coverage 0.002 0.658 0.000 0.741 0.006 0.142 -0.008 0.060 
Investment 0.074 0.857 -0.061 0.305 -0.430 0.200 0.418 0.187 
Slack -0.002 0.987 -0.002 0.903 -0.028 0.702 0.031 0.715 
Free cash flow -0.414 0.139 -0.028 0.496 -0.025 0.910 0.416 0.046 
Stock price run-up 0.251 0.000 0.013 0.056 -0.196 0.000 -0.068 0.182 
Decrease diluted 
earnings per share -0.790 0.053 0.048 0.211 1.050 0.000 -0.309 0.310 
Investment grade 0.079 0.857 0.002 0.749 -0.126 0.000 0.044 0.388 
Probability of 
conversion  -0.540 0.000 -0.004 0.838 0.416 0.000 0.127 0.182 
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poor growth opportunities (marginal effect of -0.028 with a p-value of 0.009). The 
marginal effects of these variables are not significant for Instrument C issuers. 
Firms that want to manage earnings are hypothesized to favor Instrument C 
settlements. We indeed find that firms choosing Instrument C settlements face the 
largest decreases in diluted EPS under the if-converted method (marginal effect of 
1.050 with p-value of < 0.001). In unreported analysis, we find that Instrument C 
issuers are most likely to use stock repurchases and call spread overlays (29.56% and 
33.96%, respectively). For Instrument X issuers, these percentages are 12.42% and 
7.84%, whereas no Instrument B issuer uses stock repurchases or call spread 
overlays.41 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines convertible security design for a sample of 819 issuers over 
the years 2000 through 2007. We find that almost all of the firms in our sample issue 
equity-like convertibles; only five convertible issues have a Delta below 0.5. Hence, 
the probability that the securities will be converted is relatively high for almost all 
issues in our sample. For these equity-like convertible issues, we examine the 
determinants of the choice of the fixed income claim and the method of payment 
using a nested logit regression model. For our sample of 814 issues of equity-like 
convertible securities, we find that firms select a fixed income claim - either a bond or 
preferred stock - based on incentives to reduce corporate income taxes, minimize 
refinancing costs, and mitigate managerial discretion costs. 
We further find that convertible debt issuers frequently select payment methods 
that permit them to report higher earnings. Especially net share settlements, which are 
convertible securities for which at least the principal will be settled in cash, are 
popular instruments to manage earnings. Some of the firms also adopt concurrent 
financial strategies that inflate reported earnings. The first strategy is to 
simultaneously repurchase stock, which reduces the number of outstanding shares and 
hence dilution. We will examine this strategy further in the next chapter. The second 
strategy is to use a call spread overlay, which reduces reported interest expenses by 
synthetically increasing the strike price of the conversion option. 
Given the significant amount of innovation in the design of convertible securities, 
we also examine the role of the underwriters of the convertible securities. We 
                                            
41 The regression specification in Table 29 does not include dummies for stock repurchases and call spread 
overlays to reduce the number of variables compared to the number of observations (only 18 observations for 
Instrument B). 
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especially find the Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, and JP Morgan to be the 
underwriters of firms that use cash settlements, stock repurchases, and/or call spread 
overlays.
123
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Convertible arbitrage and stock 
repurchases42 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
Over the last few years, firms have started to simultaneously repurchase common 
stock when issuing a convertible bond. An example is Equity Office Properties Trust, 
the largest office real estate investment trust in the U.S., which issued a $1.5 billion 
convertible bond and simultaneously repurchased $622 million of common stock 
(Wall Street Journal, July 5th, 2006). Of all the convertible bond issues in 2006, 
33.1% were accompanied by a stock repurchase. On average, the stock buybacks 
account for 43.2% of the proceeds of the convertible bond issue. Our goal in this 
chapter is to obtain more insight on what motivates firms to combine convertible debt 
offerings with stock repurchases. 
Chapter 4 already discussed the combination of convertible debt offerings with 
stock repurchases (“combined offerings”) in light of earnings management. We found 
some evidence linking stock repurchases to earnings management. However, it is 
                                            
42 This chapter is based on De Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren (2008). Part of this article was written while 
Patrick Verwijmeren was visiting at Owen Graduate School, Vanderbilt University. Ekkehart Boehmer, Nico 
Dewaelheyns, Rudi Fahlenbrach, Andrew Karolyi, Craig Lewis, Sophie Manigart, Ronald Masulis, Miguel 
Rosellón, Anil Shivdasani, Randall Thomas, Linda van de Gucht, Mathijs van Dijk, Chris Veld, and seminar 
participants at Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Catholic University of Leuven, Maastricht University, 
University of Melbourne, RSM Erasmus University, and the 2007 Australasian Finance and Banking 
conference provided useful comments. 
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unlikely that earnings management is the sole reason for the existence of combined 
offerings: especially with cash settlements, earnings per share dilution because of a 
convertible offering is not severe. Reasons for the existence of combined offerings are 
also not evident from existing convertible issuance theories. According to Stein’s 
(1992) backdoor equity rationale for convertible debt issuance, firms with large 
equity-related financing costs use convertible bonds as delayed equity financing. In 
Stein’s framework, firms would not simultaneously repurchase equity, since this 
mitigates their indirect equity issue. Green (1984) in turn argues that firms with high 
debt-related financing costs use convertibles as sweetened debt financing. Combining 
a convertible debt offering with a stock repurchase is also not consistent with this 
model, because, ceteris paribus, repurchasing equity increases firms’ debt ratios and 
thus enhances the potential for debt-related financing problems.  
Our main hypothesis in this chapter is that the recent surge in combined 
convertible debt offerings and stock repurchases can be explained by the influence of 
convertible debt arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs (i.e., mostly hedge funds, but also 
institutional investors) are strongly involved in convertible issues. In the U.S., for 
example, convertible debt arbitrage funds buy about 75% of the convertible bonds 
(Arshanapalli, Fabozzi, Switzer, and Gosselin (2004), Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino 
(2007)). To exploit underpriced convertible issues, arbitrageurs buy the convertibles 
and short the common stock of the firms that issue convertibles. The increased open 
market short selling creates a downward pressure on the stock price of the convertible 
debt issuer (Bechmann (2004), Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004), Loncarski, ter 
Horst, and Veld (2007)). Therefore, firms might want to mitigate the negative stock 
price impact by repurchasing their own stock, which prevents the open market short 
sales.  
The International Finance Review (IFR)’s comments on the specific convertible 
offerings provide several examples of this strategy, e.g.: “United Therapeutics bought 
back 1.8m shares, about 8% of outstanding, for $112m, […] enabling buyers to pre-
hedge positions through sales of stock back to the company” (October 28th, 2006) and 
“AmeriCredit repurchased $254m of its stock on the convertible issue, providing a 
built-in hedge for convertible arbitrage funds” (September 16th, 2006).  
The mechanism works as follows. The issuing firm sells convertibles to a 
convertible debt arbitrageur via an underwriter. To obtain an arbitrage position (i.e. to 
be hedged against stock price decreases), the arbitrageur borrows issuer shares and 
sells them to the underwriter at a pre-agreed-to price. The underwriter sells these 
shares to the issuing firm, thereby completing the stock repurchase. The benefit for 
the issuer is that crossing the arbitrageur’s trades avoids concentrated open market 
short sales by convertible debt arbitrageurs and their associated negative stock price 
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effect. The benefit for the arbitrageurs is that they do not have to short stock in a 
market that is crowded with other short sellers, at an uncertain price. Given this win-
win situation, the package of a convertible issue and a stock repurchase is often 
referred to as a “Happy Meal” in practitioners’ circles.  
We combine data from the Securities Data Company (SDC), Compustat, CRSP 
and the NYSE TAQ REG SHO database and obtain the following main findings. First, 
the issue date percentage of shares sold short (relative to trading volumes) is 
significantly smaller for combined offerings (20.7%) than for uncombined offerings 
(35.5%).43 This finding can be explained by the fact that, in combined offerings, short-
selling positions of arbitrageurs are established in a private negotiation with the 
underwriter. Unlike the open market short sales that happen in uncombined offerings, 
such transactions are not marked as short sales in the NYSE TAQ REG SHO database. 
Second, average issue date abnormal stock returns are significantly less negative for 
combined offerings (-0.87%) than for single convertible offerings (-4.48%). Third, the 
number of stocks that the convertible issuers announce to repurchase strongly 
correlates with the number of shares expected to be shorted by arbitrageurs, assuming 
that they use a delta-neutral hedging technique to obtain their positions (correlation 
coefficient of 0.88). Finally, the typical firm engaged in a combined offering 
repurchases 85.5% of the announced number of shares in the first quarter after the 
announcement, whereas for uncombined stock repurchases this percentage is much 
lower (2.5%). The immediate execution of stock repurchases is consistent with 
arbitrageurs setting up their positions. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, earnings management provides an additional potential 
reason for the concurrent stock repurchases. We also examine whether firms engage 
in combined offerings to signal their true value to the market, to move closer to their 
target debt ratio, or to finance a stock repurchase program. We fail to find convincing 
evidence for these alternative motivations.  
Our contributions to the literature are the following. We contribute to the 
literature on the impact of short-selling activity on corporate actions. Lamont (2004) 
describes a variety of methods that firms use to impede short selling, including legal 
threats and lawsuits. We provide further evidence that firms actively anticipate the 
short-selling transactions of arbitrageurs. This chapter also contributes to the literature 
on convertible debt. Our study is related to a number of other papers that also examine 
innovations in convertible debt design, including Chapter 4 of this dissertation. Other 
examples are Korkeamaki and Moore (2004), who examine different call provisions in 
convertible bonds, and Hillion and Vermaelen (2004), who study the motives for 
issuing death spiral convertibles. Further, we contribute to the literature on stock 
                                            
43 On normal trading days, these percentages are 19.8% and 19.9%, respectively. 
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repurchases. Prior studies have shown that stock repurchases tend to be used to signal 
good prospects (Bhattacharya (1979), Vermaelen (1984)), to reduce the amount of 
free cash flows at management’s disposal (Jensen (1986)), to reduce earnings per 
share dilution (Weisbenner (2000), Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong (2003)), to bring 
the firm closer to its optimal debt ratio (Dittmar (2000)), and to deter takeovers 
(Bagwell (1991), Billett and Xue (2007)). We add another important motivation for 
repurchasing stock, being the avoidance of negative stock returns associated with 
open market short-selling activity.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides the 
theoretical background. Section 5.3 discusses the data, and Section 5.4 shows the 
empirical results regarding the main hypothesis. Section 5.5 investigates alternative 
explanations, and Section 5.6 concludes. 
 
5.2 Hypothesis and testable predictions  
 
In this section, we first explain our main hypothesis regarding the motivations for 
firms to combine a convertible debt offering with a stock repurchase and discuss the 
relevant literature. Subsequently, we discuss the testable predictions that can be 
derived from this hypothesis.  
 
5.2.1 The happy meal explanation for combined offerings 
 
In the U.S., convertible debt arbitrageurs buy about three quarters of the issues of 
convertible bonds (Arshanapalli, Fabozzi, Switzer, and Gosselin (2004), Mitchell, 
Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007)). Convertible arbitrage opportunities arise when 
convertibles are underpriced. Several studies have documented evidence of 
convertible debt underpricing (Ammann, Kind, Wilde (2003), Calamos (2003), 
Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld (2007)). Potential reasons for such underpricing 
include underestimation of the stock return volatility (Calamos (2003)) and 
complexities associated with the valuation of these hybrid securities (Lhabitant 
(2002)). Agarwal, Fung, and Naik (2007) and Batta, Chacko, and Dharan (2007) 
argue that the excess returns from convertible arbitrage strategies are not mainly due 
to underpricing. Instead, the discounts on convertible bond issues represent a 
compensation for bearing liquidity risk, since convertible bonds are relatively illiquid. 
Since convertibles embed a call option on the underlying stock, convertible debt 
arbitrageurs generally go short in the common stock of the issuing firm in order to 
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hedge their positions. That is, the short position hedges against the risk of decreasing 
stock prices. Brent, Morse, and Stice (1990), Ackert and Athanassakos (2005), and 
Choi, Getmansky, and Tookes (2007) indeed document that firms with convertible 
debt outstanding report higher monthly short interest than other companies.44 
A number of theoretical studies predict a negative impact of short-selling activity 
on stock prices. Miller (1977) argues that only informed traders with strong negative 
information will be willing to engage in short selling, as short selling is costly. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argue that rational market participants should know 
that high levels of unexpected short sales are bad news, and incorporate this 
information into their trading decisions. Therefore, high levels of short selling should 
cause stock prices to drop. 
Several papers have empirically tested the relation between short sales and stock 
prices. Senchack and Starks (1993) look at U.S. firms’ reported monthly stock interest 
in the period 1980 to 1986, and find weak support for the hypothesis that the market 
reaction to increased short interest is negative around the announcement date. Aitken, 
Frino, McCorry, and Swan (1998) study the effect of short sales on instantaneous 
price changes by examining the Australian stock market, in which short sales are 
disclosed immediately. They find that prices react negatively. Ackert and 
Athanassakos (2005) argue that stock prices may also react when disclosure is not 
immediate, as in the U.S. and Canada. In line with their expectations, they find 
negative contemporaneous price effects for Canadian stocks. Cohen, Diether, and 
Malloy (2007) find that an increase in shorting demand leads to negative abnormal 
returns of 2.54% in the following month. 
Brent, Morse, and Stice (1990) make a distinction between short selling based on 
private information and arbitrage-related short selling. Arbitrageurs that short sell 
shares of a convertible issuer are not directly trading on adverse information about the 
firm’s stock. Instead, these arbitrageurs seek to exploit the fact that convertibles tend 
to be underpriced. Still, various studies show downward stock price pressures caused 
by arbitrage-related short selling. Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004) study stock 
price reactions to mergers, and find that nearly half of the negative price reaction for 
the acquirer reflects downward price pressure because of arbitrage-induced short 
selling. Bechmann (2004) examines why the announcement of an “in-the-money” 
convertible bond call is associated with an average contemporaneous abnormal stock 
price decrease of 1.75%. He shows that the decrease is due to arbitrage-related short 
                                            
44 Short sales are regulated by SEC Rules 240.10a-1 and 240.10a-2. Rule 240.10a-1(a) stipulates that short 
sales are prohibited when stock prices are declining according to the so-called up-tick rule. However, Rule 
240.10a-1(e) states that the up-tick rule does not apply if you are the owner of a convertible bond. This means 
that even if stock prices are declining, it will be possible for arbitrageurs who own convertible bonds to short 
sell the corresponding stock. 
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selling. Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld (2007) show that short-selling activity by 
arbitrageurs has a negative impact on the stock price of Canadian convertible debt 
issuers. 
Based on the IFR comments accompanying several of the combined offerings, as 
well as on informal conversations with convertible bond issuers and their financial 
advisors, we hypothesize that the combinations of convertibles with stock repurchases 
are driven by the issuer’s wish to mitigate the downward stock price impact of 
arbitrage-related short selling. The issuer sells the bond to an underwriter in a private 
144A offering. 45  The transaction can be completed as rapidly as overnight. The 
underwriter resells the 144A security for a spread to qualified institutional buyers. 
These buyers are generally arbitrageurs that hedge their positions by borrowing shares 
and selling these shares to the underwriter at a pre-agreed-to price. The issuer buys 
these shares from the underwriter, thus avoiding the downward pressure resulting 
from open market short sales. The arbitrageur should also be satisfied with this 
outcome, since he obtains his hedged position without having to engage in open 
market short sales at an uncertain price. Thus, every party engaged in the transaction 
gains, which explains its “Happy Meal” nickname in practitioners’ circles. 
 
5.2.2 Testable predictions 
 
From our main hypothesis regarding the motivations for combined offerings, we 
derive four testable predictions. First, for combined transactions, issue date open 
market short sales should be lower than for uncombined transactions, after controlling 
for other factors that determine short-selling activity. The reason is that, in combined 
offerings, the underwriter and the arbitrageur set up the shorting position in a private 
transaction executed at a pre-agreed-to price. Unlike open market short sales, such 
privately-negotiated short sales are not registered in the NYSE TAQ REG SHO 
database. Second, due to the lower open market short-selling activity, issue date 
abnormal returns should be less negative for combined offerings than for single 
convertible offerings. Third, since the combined repurchases result from an 
anticipation of the actions of convertible arbitrage funds, the number of shares that a 
                                            
45 Combinations of convertible issues and stock repurchases have been prohibited under Rule 10b-6 of the 
Securities Act of 1934 (Lowenfels (1973)). The restrictions of trading during distributions are relaxed in 
Regulation M, which has replaced Rule 10b-6 since December 1996. Regulation M allows the combination of 
convertible issues and stock repurchases for issues under Rule 144A. Rule 144A was issued in 1990 to 
improve the liquidity and efficiency of the private placement market by giving more freedom to institutional 
investors to trade securities. Securities issued under Rule 144A do not require registration with the SEC, but 
can be traded without restriction in the secondary market among qualified institutional buyers (i.e., institutions 
that own over $100 million in assets). 
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convertible debt issuer announces to repurchase should closely match the expected 
short positions of arbitrageurs. Fourth, whereas normal stock repurchases often take 
years to be effectively executed (Stephens and Weisbach (1998)), convertible debt 
issuers should repurchase their stock almost immediately after the repurchase 
announcement, in order to allow convertible debt arbitrageurs to adopt their arbitrage 
positions. 
 
5.3 Data 
 
We acquire information on convertible issues and share repurchases in the U.S. 
for the period 1997 to 2006. We start in 1997, because Regulation M, which made 
combined offerings legal, was introduced late 1996. We obtain a sample of 
convertible debt offerings from the Securities Data Company (SDC)’s New Issues 
Database, and a sample of stock repurchase announcements from SDC’s Mergers & 
Acquisitions Database. We exclude stock repurchases that SDC classifies as Dutch 
auctions or self-tender offers. We retrieve company accounts data from Compustat 
and stock price data from CRSP.  
We use Factiva to determine the announcement dates of the convertible debt 
offerings and the stock repurchases. We mark a convertible issue as a “combined 
offering” if the firm announces that it uses the proceeds to repurchase stock, or when 
both transactions are announced separately at the same date. We also search the 
window [-5, 5] relative to the convertible debt announcement date for stock 
repurchases, but this yields no additional observations. 
Panel A of Table 30 shows the number of convertible issues, stock repurchases, 
and combined offerings over the sample period.46 As in Chapter 4, we find that the 
number of convertible debt issues fluctuates somewhat over time. In the period 1997 
to 2006, convertible issuance peaks in 2003 (256 issues). The low point, 108 issues, 
occurs in 1999. After a decrease of convertible issuance in 2004 and 2005, the number 
of issues again increases in 2006. The number of stock repurchases has been fairly 
constant since 2000. Before that year, the number of repurchases is substantially 
higher than it has been since then. The number of combined convertible debt issues 
and stock repurchases, in turn, has strongly increased over the years. Before 2003,
                                            
46 We constructed this sample before we constructed the sample used in Chapter 4. As a result, we have not 
included 2007. Also, since SDC sometimes changes its dataset, the number of issues per year can slightly 
differ. 
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Table 30: Dispersion over time, value of the transactions, and industrial dispersion. 
 
This table presents summary statistics. The sample period in Panel A is 1997-2006, the sample period in 
Panels B and C is 2003-2006. Panel A reports the number of convertible issues, stock repurchases, and 
combined offerings of convertible issues and stock repurchases per year. We label a convertible issue as a 
combined offering when the firm announces to use part of the proceeds of the convertible debt offering to 
repurchase stock, or when both transactions are announced on the same date. Panel B compares the proceeds of 
the convertible issue with the size of the announced stock repurchase. The proceeds of the convertible issue are 
obtained from SDC; the size of the stock repurchase is obtained from SDC or from the repurchase 
announcement. We also compare the announced size of the repurchase to firms’ market values. We calculate a 
firm’s market value by multiplying Compustat Item 25 with Item 199. In Panel C, we show the distribution of 
convertible issues over the Fama-French 12-industry classification. 
Panel A: Dispersion over time 
Year  Number of 
convertibles 
issued 
 Number of 
repurchases 
announced 
 Number of 
combined 
offerings 
 Percentage combined 
offerings of total convertible 
issues 
1997  237  1,286  0  0.0% 
1998  145  1,934  0  0.0% 
1999  108  1,515  0  0.0% 
2000  153  806  1  0.7% 
2001  207  659  3  1.4% 
2002  117  469  2  1.7% 
2003  256  470  10  3.9% 
2004  181  563  9  5.0% 
2005  113  638  13  11.5% 
2006  142  586  47  33.1% 
Panel B: Value of the announced stock repurchases compared to the proceeds of the convertible issue 
and firms’ market values 
  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Standard 
deviation 
Value repurchase / 
proceeds convertible 
issue 
 0.432  0.369  0.050  1.111  0.276 
Value repurchase / 
market value 
 0.072  0.054  0.004  0.489  0.070 
Panel C: Industry classification  
Fama-French 12-
industry classification 
 Firms that issue a convertible and 
repurchase shares 
 Firms that issue a convertible without 
repurchasing shares 
  N  %  N  % 
Consumer nondurables  1  1.3%  7  1.1% 
Consumer durables  2  2.5%  9  1.5% 
Manufacturing  4  5.1%  43  7.0% 
Energy  0  0.0%  43  7.0% 
Chemicals  0  0.0%  8  1.3% 
Business equipment  15  19.0%  126  20.6% 
Telephone  1  1.3%  29  4.7% 
Utility  1  1.3%  20  3.3% 
Wholesale  9  11.4%  46  7.5% 
Healthcare  16  20.3%  107  17.5% 
Financial  16  20.3%  103  16.8% 
Other  14  17.7%  72  11.7% 
Total  79   100.0%  613   100.0% 
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these combined offerings are very scarce. In 2003 and 2004 they account for 3.9% and 
5.0% of the total number of convertibles, respectively. In 2005, the combined 
offerings comprise 11.5% of that year’s convertible issues. The year 2006 is the most 
popular year with 33.1% of the total number of convertible issues combined with a 
stock repurchase.  
Overall, these findings indicate that there is an increasing trend to combine 
convertible issues with stock repurchases, and that this trend is not matched by a 
strong increase in the overall number of repurchases. Given the very low number of 
combined offerings prior to 2003, we will from now on limit our research window to 
the period 2003 to 2006. 47  This leaves us with a sample of 613 uncombined 
convertible offerings, 2,257 uncombined stock repurchases, and 79 combined 
offerings.  
Panel B of Table 30 compares the size of the convertible offerings with that of the 
stock repurchases. The proceeds of the convertible debt offerings and the size of the 
uncombined stock repurchases are obtained from SDC. The size of the stock 
repurchases that are not covered in SDC are retrieved from Factiva.  
We find that the proceeds of the convertible issues are generally substantially 
larger than the funds used to repurchase shares. The average (median) size of the 
stock repurchase represents 43.2% (36.9%) of the proceeds of the convertible issue. 
Still, in five firms the value of the announced repurchase exceeds the proceeds of the 
convertible issue. The minimum percentage of the proceeds used to repurchase shares, 
given that a firm opts for a combined offering, is 5.0%. On average, the stock 
repurchases represent 7.2% of the firm’s market value. 
Panel C of Table 30 breaks down the sample by the Fama-French 12-industry 
classification. Most convertibles are issued by firms in the business equipment 
industry, the financial sector, and the healthcare sector. Firms that engage in 
combined offerings are spread among 10 of the 12 industries, although the wholesale, 
financial, and healthcare sector are slightly overrepresented. 
 
 
 
                                            
47 The gradual increase in combined offerings suggests that these transactions are a financial innovation: since 
the introduction of Regulation M, the possibility and benefits of using a simultaneous convertible issue and 
stock repurchase have become known to more and more firms. We have checked whether particular advisory 
firms are overrepresented in the sample of firms with combined offerings, because these advisors may drive 
the increase in combined offerings. We do not find a significant overrepresentation of any advisory firm in 
combined offerings, compared to the advisory firms involved in uncombined convertible issues.  
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5.4 Empirical evidence on the Happy Meal explanation 
 
In this section, we test our hypothesis that combinations of convertibles and stock 
repurchases are driven by the wish to facilitate convertible debt arbitrageurs in 
obtaining their hedged positions. Each subsection examines one of our four testable 
predictions.  
 
5.4.1 Short-selling activity for convertible issuers 
 
To test our first prediction, we retrieve all short sale flows for convertible debt 
issuers in 2005 and 2006 from the NYSE TAQ database’s REG SHO file. We start in 
2005 as daily data are only available as of January 2005. Thus, in all analyses 
involving short-selling data, we limit our research window to the period 2005 to 2006. 
This is not a large limitation since the bulk of combined offerings are made in this 
time frame. 
We compute the total short sales per firm on a specific day by summing all short 
sales for that firm on that day. We follow Ackert and Athanassakos (2005) by scaling 
the daily number of short sales by the firm’s daily trading volume. We also compute 
the change in short sales to capture the abnormal part of firms’ short sales:  
 
.
volumetradingnormal
salesshortnormaldateissuesalesshortsalesshortinChange −=   (27) 
 
We calculate normal short sales (trading volume) by taking the average short sales 
(trading volume) over the period ranging from ten to four trading days before the issue 
date. 
Table 31 reports the results of a univariate analysis comparing average short-
selling activity for convertible issuers that simultaneously repurchase stock to short-
selling activity of regular convertible debt issuers. For convertible debt issuers that 
simultaneously repurchase stock, issue date short sales represent on average 20.7% of 
trading volume. For other convertible debt issuers, the average ratio of issue date short 
sales to trading volume is 35.5%. This difference is significant at the 1% level. Our 
findings are similar when we compute the percentage of short sales relative to the 
number of shares outstanding. By contrast, the issue date ratio of trading volume to 
shares outstanding is not significantly different between both subsamples. Short-
selling activity prior to the convertible issue date is also similar: both groups have a 
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short sales to trading volume ratio of about 20% over the trading days [-10, -4]. This 
percentage is similar to findings reported by Diether, Lee, and Werner (2007). 
  
Table 31: Univariate analysis of the differences between combined and uncombined convertible issuers 
 
This table presents the results of univariate tests of the differences between combined and uncombined 
convertible debt issuers. The sample period is 2005-2006, and we only include convertible issuers for which 
we have short-selling data available. We label a convertible issue as a combined offering when the firm 
announces to use part of the proceeds of the convertible debt offering to repurchase stock, or when both 
transactions are announced on the same date. Short sales at the issue date are the sum of all short sales for that 
firm that day, as reported in the NYSE TAQ database’s REG SHO file. We compute the change in short sales 
by dividing the difference between short sales at the issue date and short sales over trading days [-10, -4] by 
the trading volume over this same period. Daily trading volume and the number of shares outstanding are from 
CRSP. Normal short sales is a firm’s daily short sales over trading days [-10, -4] divided by the trading volume 
over that same period. Delta is the convertible’s sensitivity to small stock price changes. Stock liquidity is the 
average trading volume divided by the average number of shares outstanding in the year prior to the offering. 
Dividend paying is a dummy variable registering whether a firm paid a dividend in the year prior to the 
offering, which can be established with Compustat Item 21. The stock price run-up is the firm-specific raw 
return over the 75 trading days before the announcement date, and is computed with CRSP Item RETX. Total 
assets (expressed in millions of dollars and measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement date) 
correspond to Compustat Item 6. Book leverage (measured at fiscal year-end prior to the announcement date) 
is Compustat Item 9 divided by Item 6. The market-to-book ratio (measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
announcement date) is computed as (Item 25 * Item 199 – Item 60 – Item 6) / Item 6. Proceeds represent the 
total amount of money raised by the convertible issue in millions of dollars. Private placement is a dummy 
variable equal to one when the bond is privately placed, and equal to zero otherwise. t-statistics are for the 
difference in means between the combined and the uncombined samples. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 Total convertible 
debt sample 
Combined 
offerings 
 Uncombined  
offerings 
 t-statistics 
 N Mean  N Mean  N  Mean   
Short sales / trading volume at 
issue date 
112 0.316  29 0.207  83 0.355  -5.00*** 
Change in short sales 112 1.329  29 0.227  83 1.714  -5.33*** 
Short sales / shares 
outstanding at issue date  
112 0.012  29 0.007  83 0.013  -3.01*** 
Trading volume / shares 
outstanding at issue date 
112 0.036  29 0.039  83 0.035  0.50 
Normal short sales / trading 
volume 
112 0.199  29 0.198  83 0.199  -0.06 
Delta 78 0.893  25 0.874  53 0.902  -0.57 
Stock liquidity 112 0.010  29 0.010  83 0.010  0.01 
Dividend paying 110 0.527  28 0.393  82 0.573  -1.66* 
Stock price run-up 112 0.001  29 0.001  83 0.001  0.99 
Total assets 112 33,706  29 17,565  83 39,345  -1.07 
Book leverage 112 0.495  29 0.494  83 0.496  -0.02 
Market-to-book ratio 112 1.633  29 1.660  83 1.623  0.19 
Proceeds 112 395  29 480  83 366  1.07 
Private placement 110 0.927  29 1.000  81 0.901  2.96*** 
 
Of course, the lower issue date open market short sales for combined convertible 
offerings could be driven by the fact that these offerings are different with respect to 
determinants that drive short-selling activity. We therefore incorporate the following 
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potential short sales determinants in our analysis. Unless otherwise mentioned, these 
variables are measured at the fiscal year-end preceding the convertible announcement 
date. 
Delta: The delta of a convertible measures the convertible’s sensitivity to small 
stock price changes (Calamos (2003)). The delta is calculated in a similar way as in 
Chapter 4. Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld (2007) find that convertible arbitrageurs 
prefer convertible bonds with relatively high deltas, as these convertibles are more 
likely to be underpriced. 
Liquidity: The average trading volume divided by average shares outstanding in 
the year prior to the offering. Arbitrageurs want to quickly establish or close positions, 
and therefore prefer more liquid stocks (Calamos (2003)). 
Dividend paying: A dummy variable that equals one when the firm has paid a 
dividend in the fiscal year preceding the convertible announcement date, and zero 
otherwise. Calamos (2003) argues that short sellers have a preference for stocks that 
pay no dividends, since the dividend represents a cash outflow for them. 
Stock price run-up: The average daily firm-specific raw return calculated over the 
75 trading days before the announcement date, as in Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward 
(2003). Note that the run-up used in Chapter 4 was based on the total raw return over 
75 days; this difference does not influence our results. The stock price run-up serves 
as a proxy for the perceived overvaluation of the firm by the market. We expect a 
positive relation with short-selling activity, as overvalued stock is more likely to be 
sold short.  
We also include some standard control variables for which we have no strong 
prediction on the influence on short sales: 
Assets: The book value of total assets.  
Book leverage: The ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
Market-to-book ratio: The market price per share of common stock divided by the 
book value per share. 
Proceeds: The total amount of money raised by issuing the convertible. 
Private placement: A dummy variable that equals one when the convertible issue 
is privately placed under Rule 144A, and zero otherwise. 
Table 31 shows that, as expected, firms that issue convertible bonds in 
combination with a stock repurchase are significantly less likely to pay dividends. All 
combined offerings are privately placed, while 90.1% of the regular convertible issues 
are privately placed. The other control variables are not significantly different 
between the two groups. 
135
Convertible arbitrage and stock repurchases 
 
123
In Table 32, we test the impact of a concurrent stock repurchase on short-selling 
activity by using an OLS regression analysis. 
 
Table 32: Impact of adding a stock repurchase to a convertible offering on short-selling activity  
 
This table presents the results of an OLS regression analysis on the impact of adding a stock repurchase to a 
convertible issue on short-selling activity around the issue date. The sample period is 2005-2006. Short sales at 
the issue date are the sum of all short sales for that specific firm that day, as reported in the NYSE TAQ 
database’s REG SHO file. We compute the change in short sales by dividing the difference between short sales 
at the issue date and short sales over trading days [-10, -4] by the trading volume over that same period. Daily 
trading volume is obtained from CRSP. Combined offering is equal to one for combined offerings, and zero 
otherwise. We label a convertible issue as a combined offering when the firm announces to use part of the 
proceeds of the convertible debt offering to repurchase stock, or when both transactions are announced on the 
same date. Delta is the convertible’s sensitivity to small stock price changes. Log(stock liquidity) is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of the average trading volume to the average shares outstanding in the year prior to the 
offering. Dividend paying is a dummy variable registering whether a firm paid a dividend in the year prior to 
the offering, which can be established with Compustat Item 21. The stock price run-up is the firm-specific raw 
return over the 75 trading days before the announcement date, and is computed with CRSP Item RETX. 
Log(assets) corresponds to the natural logarithm of Compustat Item 6 (measured at the fiscal year-end 
preceding the announcement date). Book leverage is Compustat Item 9 divided by Item 6. The market-to-book 
ratio is computed as (Item 25 * Item 199 – Item 60 – Item 6) / Item 6. Book leverage and the market-to-book 
ratio are both measured at the fiscal year-end preceding the announcement date. Log(proceeds) represents the 
natural logarithm of the total amount of money raised by the convertible issue. Normal short sales is a firm’s 
daily short sales over trading days [-10, -4] divided by the trading volume over that same period. We also 
include industry dummies based on the Fama-French 12-industry classification. We report t-statistics 
calculated with Huber-White standard errors, to control for heteroscedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
   Short sales at issue date / 
trading volume at issue date 
 Change in short sales 
   (1)  (2) 
Combined offering   -0.143*** 
(-4.37) 
 -1.333*** 
(-2.71) 
Delta   0.173** 
(2.52) 
 3.242*** 
(3.67) 
Log(stock liquidity)   -0.055 
(-1.22) 
 -1.275 
(-1.48) 
Dividend paying   -0.009 
(-0.27) 
 -0.674 
(-1.04) 
Stock price run-up   12.398** 
(2.08) 
 150.913 
(1.38) 
Log(assets)   -0.125*** 
(-3.74) 
 -1.703*** 
(-2.70) 
Book leverage   0.146** 
(2.03) 
 2.392 
(1.23) 
Market-to-book ratio   -0.031* 
(-1.83) 
 -0.610** 
(-2.13) 
Log(proceeds)   0.036 
(1.45) 
 0.764 
(1.65) 
Normal short sales    0.551** 
(2.17) 
  
N   76  76 
R2   56.4%  30.7% 
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Model 1 shows the results with the ratio of issue date short sales to trading 
volume as the dependent variable. The right-hand side of the regression includes a 
Combined offering dummy variable that equals one for combined offerings and zero 
for other convertible issues. We also include the potential short sales determinants 
described earlier, as well as industry dummy variables based on the Fama-French 12-
industry classification. We take the normal level of short-selling activity into account 
by including the variable Normal short sales, which registers average short-selling 
activity over the trading days [-10, -4].  
In line with our first prediction, we find a significant negative impact of the 
Combined Offering dummy variable. Hence, even after controlling for other potential 
determinants, open market issue date short sales are still significantly lower for 
combined convertibles. Model 2 shows that the results are similar when we use 
Change in short sales as the dependent variable.  
For the other variables, we find that the delta of a convertible and the stock price 
run-up significantly increase short-selling activity. These results are in line with our 
expectations. Normal short sales and Book leverage have a significant positive impact 
on short-selling activity, while Market-to-book ratio and Total assets have a 
significant negative impact.  
To check the robustness of our finding that open market short selling is 
significantly lower for combinations of convertible issues and stock repurchases, we 
perform the following additional analyses, which are not reported for parsimony. First, 
we scale short sales by shares outstanding, and obtain similar results. Second, instead 
of the Liquidity variable incorporated in the regression, we construct an alternative 
liquidity measure that takes the size of the convertible issue into account. This 
liquidity measure is calculated as the number of shares expected to be sold short (on 
the basis of delta, see Equation (28)) divided by the average daily trading volume 
prior to the offering. We find that our results are robust for this different measure of 
liquidity. Third, we allow for the possibility that the decision to repurchase stock is 
endogenous. That is, there could be (unobserved) characteristics that influence both 
the firm’s decision to repurchase stock and the expected short sales. We use 
Heckman’s (1979) two-step selection model, and still find a significant positive 
impact of the Combined offering dummy variable. 48  Fourth, we re-estimate the 
analysis for short-selling activity in the period from one day prior to one day after the 
issue date. We find similar results. Fifth, we look at the influence of single 
                                            
48  The first step consists of estimating a probit regression with the dependent variable equal to one for 
combined offerings and equal to zero for uncombined offerings, and with the same explanatory variables as 
those included in Table 32 on the right-hand side. In the second step, we estimate the same models as those in 
Table 32, except that we include the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the first-step analysis as an additional 
explanatory variable.  
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(uncombined) stock repurchase announcements on short selling. We find that short-
selling activity at repurchase announcement dates does not significantly differ from 
short-selling activity in prior periods. This result indicates that the reduction in open 
market short-selling activity is a characteristic of stock repurchases combined with 
convertible offerings, rather than a general feature of stock repurchases. 
 
5.4.2 Issue date abnormal stock returns 
 
To test our second prediction, we calculate abnormal stock returns around the 
convertible debt issue date by means of standard event study methodology as 
described in Brown and Warner (1985). Our primary observation window is [-1, 0] 
with day 0 representing the issue day, and we estimate the normal return over the 
window [-200, -30]. The market return is the CRSP equally-weighted market index. 
Panel A of Table 33 presents the results. 
For the sample of uncombined convertible issues, we find an average cumulative 
abnormal return of -4.481%. Excess returns for convertible debt issuers that combine 
their offering with a stock repurchase are less negative and not significantly different 
from zero, i.e., -0.873% on average. In unreported robustness checks, we obtain 
similar findings for other event windows. These results are in line with our hypothesis 
that convertible debt issuers use stock repurchases to avoid a highly negative issue 
date abnormal return caused by open market short-selling activity.  
To formally test the influence of an increase in short sales on the issue date 
returns, we regress abnormal returns measured over the window [-1, 0] on Change in 
short sales and control variables. Panel B of Table 33 presents the results of this 
regression. We find that Change in short sales has a significantly negative impact on 
the issue date abnormal returns. This result is consistent with our conjecture that the 
differences in issue date abnormal return between combined and uncombined 
convertibles are driven by differences in short-selling activity.49  
The delta and the market-to-book ratio also have a significant coefficient with a 
negative and a positive sign, respectively. These findings are in line with findings on
                                            
49 For 93.0% of the uncombined convertible offerings, the announcement happens either on the trading date 
before the issue date or on the issue date itself. The reason is that the large majority (90.1%) of the offerings 
are privately placed, which means that they can be issued very quickly. For the sample of combined issues, 
93.7% of the announcements happen either on the trading date before the issue date or on the issue date itself. 
Therefore, an alternative explanation for the abnormal return differences between combined and uncombined 
convertible offerings is that the former offerings signal a higher firm quality than the latter. We examine this 
explanation in Section 5.5.1.  
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Table 33: Cumulative abnormal stock returns at the issue date 
 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns at the issue date of (un)combined convertible debt 
offerings. We label a convertible issue as a combined offering when the firm announces to use part of the 
proceeds of the convertible debt offering to repurchase stock, or when both transactions are announced on the 
same date. The estimation window for determining the abnormal returns is [-1, 0], with day zero representing 
the issue date. Panel A reports the average cumulative abnormal returns. The sample period in Panel A is 
2003-2006. Panel B shows the results of OLS regression analyses examining the effects of various 
characteristics on the abnormal returns at the issue date. Given that we need short-selling data, the sample 
period is 2005-2006. We compute the change in short sales by dividing the difference between short sales at 
the issue date and short sales over trading days [-10, -4] by the trading volume over that same period. Delta is 
the convertible’s sensitivity to small stock price changes. Log(stock liquidity) is the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of the average trading volume divided by the average shares outstanding in the year prior to the offering. 
Dividend yield is Compustat Item 21 divided by the market value, calculated as Item 25 * Item 199 (measured 
at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement date). The stock price run-up is the firm-specific raw return 
over the 75 trading days before the announcement date, and is computed with CRSP Item RETX. Log(assets) 
corresponds to the natural logarithm of Compustat Item 6 (measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
announcement date). Book leverage is Compustat Item 9 divided by Item 6. The market-to-book ratio is 
computed as (Item 25 * Item 199 – Item 60 – Item 6) / Item 6. Leverage and market-to-book ratio are both 
measured at fiscal year-end prior to the announcement date. Log(proceeds) represents the natural logarithm of 
the total amount of money raised by the convertible issue. We also include industry dummies based on the 
Fama-French 12-industry classification. We report t-statistics (calculated with Huber-White standard errors to 
control for heteroscedasticity) in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns at the issue date 
  Combined offerings Uncombined offerings  Difference in means 
Mean  -0.873% -4.481%*** 3.608%*** 
Patell Z statistics  -0.43 -26.47  
t-statistic for difference 
in means 
   6.07*** 
N  73 531  
Panel B: Impact of short sales, firm characteristics, and bond characteristics on cumulative abnormal 
returns 
  Cumulative abnormal returns at the issue date 
Change in short sales  -0.008** 
(-2.10) 
Delta  -0.049** 
(-2.05) 
Log(stock liquidity)  -0.005 
(-0.35) 
Dividend yield  -0.099 
(-0.47) 
Stock price run-up  1.741 
(0.40) 
Log(assets)  0.023 
(0.97) 
Book leverage  0.051 
(1.60) 
Market-to-book ratio  0.015** 
(2.19) 
Log(proceeds)  0.001 
(0.04) 
N  76 
R2  30.7% 
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the determinants of the abnormal returns at convertible debt announcements reported 
by Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003). 
 
5.4.3 The number of shares announced to be repurchased 
 
Convertible arbitrageurs use the delta to determine the number of shares to be 
shorted against the long position in the convertible (Calamos (2003)). To calculate the 
expected number of shares sold short, we assume that convertible arbitrageurs follow 
a so-called delta-neutral hedging technique, which makes their positions invariant to 
small stock price movements. The expected number of shares that will be shorted 
using a delta-neutral hedging technique can be determined by means of the following 
formula:  
 
.**##
priceconversion
deltavaluefaceissuedesconvertiblshortsharescommon =   (28) 
 
The IFR comments on various convertible bond issues effectively relate the 
simultaneous stock repurchases to the delta of the convertible, e.g.: “Proceeds from 
the offering [of Medimmune] were used […] to repurchase $150m of stock on the 
deal; […] the delta hedge is a common application to mitigate the impact of short 
selling” (June 24th, 2006) and “Generally, when you model a convertible, you allow 
for some slippage on the stock, but by buying back the delta, you are guaranteeing the 
hedge” (convertible issue of Waste Connections, March 18th, 2006).  
If the repurchase behavior in combined offerings is indeed influenced by arbitrage 
activities, we expect the correlation between the number of shares that should be 
repurchased according to the delta-neutral technique and the number of shares the 
firm announces to repurchase to be high. For 50 of the firms engaging in a combined 
offering, we have all the necessary information to calculate the expected number of 
shares sold short. We find that the correlation coefficient between the common stock 
expected to be shorted and the common stock the firm announces to repurchase is 
0.88. The median ratio of shares announced to be repurchased to shares predicted to 
be repurchased is 55.6%. This relatively low median could be caused by a bias in our 
calculation of the delta. For instance, delta is biased because it does not take the time 
to first call into account. When we calculate delta using the time to first call as the 
input for the time to maturity, we find that the median ratio of shares announced to be 
repurchased is 79.4%. This percentage is close to the percentage of convertible bonds 
that tend to be bought by convertible debt arbitrageurs (Arshanapalli, Fabozzi, Switzer, 
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and Gosselin (2004), Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007)). Hence, we interpret the 
findings in this section as evidence in favor of an influence of convertible debt 
arbitrage. 
 
5.4.4 The speed with which common stock is repurchased 
 
A fourth test relates to the speed with which shares are actually repurchased. An 
announcement of a stock repurchase does not precommit firms to acquire a specified 
number of shares. If convertible debt issuers buy back shares to help arbitrageurs 
obtain their arbitrage positions, then we expect the stock repurchases to be executed 
very quickly after their announcement.  
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) study a sample of 450 repurchase programs from 
1981 to 1990. Employing CRSP data, they find that firms on average acquire only 
6.3% of the number of stocks announced to be repurchased in the same quarter of the 
repurchase announcement, 46.2% within a year, and 73.9% within three years after 
the announcement. Similar to these authors, we examine changes in shares 
outstanding obtained from CRSP. Among the combined issues, we have 48 
observations with sufficient data to determine the changes in shares outstanding for 
the first quarter. We also re-estimate the percentage of shares that is repurchased for 
normal (uncombined) stock repurchases. We have 1,701 stock repurchase 
observations with sufficient data. In line with Stephens and Weisbach, we reset 
observations in which the number of shares increases to zero, since we are only 
interested in decreases.  
Figure 8 shows the actual shares repurchased in normal stock repurchases and in 
combined offerings during the first quarter after the announcement date. The white 
bars represent the percentage of stock repurchased in uncombined stock repurchases. 
More than 70% of the firms do not repurchase more than 20% of the announced 
repurchases in the first quarter. For calculating the average percentage of shares 
repurchased, we reset observations in which the number of shares repurchased 
exceeds the announced number to 100%. For normal stock repurchases, we find that 
on average 18.5% of the announced shares are repurchased in the first quarter (the 
median value equals 2.5%). This percentage is higher than the 6.3% found by 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998), indicating that firms have increased their actual stock 
repurchases over time.  
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Figure 8: Percentages of actual repurchases in the first quarter after the announcement of a stock 
repurchase.  
 
This figure shows which percentage of an announced stock repurchase is actually repurchased within the first 
three months after the announcement. The sample period is 2003-2006. The black bars represent stock 
repurchases that are announced in combination with convertible bond issues. The white bars represent stock  
repurchases that are announced without a simultaneous convertible bond issue. 
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The black bars represent the percentage of stock repurchased in combined 
offerings. A relatively large number of firms (27 or 56.3%) perform more than 80% of 
the announced stock repurchase in the first quarter after the announcement. The 
average (median) percentage of shares repurchased in the first quarter is 63.6% 
(85.5%). Due to potential simultaneous increases in shares outstanding (e.g., due to 
stock option exercises), the real percentages that are repurchased should be even 
higher. Apparently, firms in a combined offering repurchase shares much faster than 
in normal repurchases, which is consistent with arbitrageurs obtaining their positions. 
 
5.5 Alternative explanations 
 
In this section, we examine which other factors might induce firms to opt for a 
combined offering. We also discuss the possibility that the convertible debt offering 
serves to finance a stock repurchase. 
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5.5.1 Signal firm value 
 
Constantinides and Grundy (1989) suggest that the combinations of convertible 
debt offerings with stock repurchases might also be inspired by signaling motivations. 
They examine which security a firm should issue when it has private information 
about its own value, and show that the company can reveal its true value to the market 
by combining a convertible debt offering with a stock repurchase. The intuition is that, 
when issuing a convertible, firms have an incentive to overstate their true value. 
Convertible debt announcements therefore have a negative impact on stock prices, 
which is confirmed in findings of Davidson, Glascock, and Schwartz (1995), Lewis, 
Rogalski, and Seward (2003), and Marquardt and Wiedman (2005). The stock 
repurchase provides a countervailing incentive, since firms will be more likely to buy 
back stock when they are undervalued. Stock repurchase announcements therefore 
tend to have a positive impact on stock prices (Asquith and Mullins (1986), Comment 
and Jarrell (1991), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995)).  
Constantinides and Grundy’s (1989) model implies that announcement returns 
should be less negative for convertible debt offerings combined with a stock 
repurchase than for uncombined offerings. However, since for the large majority of 
the convertible debt offerings the announcement happens very close to the issuance, 
we cannot disentangle announcement effects from issuance effects.  
We therefore test the validity of the signaling explanation in an alternative way. 
We develop three proxy variables for a firm’s need for signaling, and predict that 
these variables should have a positive impact on the likelihood of adding a stock 
repurchase to a convertible offering, if the signaling explanation holds.  
The first proxy is the Stock run-up variable defined earlier. When a firm has a 
high stock run-up prior to an equity(-linked) offering announcement, the market is 
more likely to think that the offering is inspired by firm overvaluation. For such 
companies, repurchasing stock might be a way to signal that their stock is in fact not 
overvalued. The other two proxies relate to the level of informational asymmetry: 
Informational asymmetry 1: This variable measures the firm-specific variation, psi, 
as constructed in Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003). The measure is based 
on the assumption that greater firm-specific variation in stock prices reflects more 
information getting into the stock price, i.e., less informational asymmetry. The firm-
specific stock return variation is obtained from the regression: 
 
Firm returnt = β0 + β1*market returnt + β2*industry returnt + ε,   (29) 
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which is estimated for each firm using monthly returns measured over the 
previous calendar year. Industry returns are estimated based on 2-digit SIC-codes. The 
market and industry returns are value-weighted averages excluding the firm for which 
the regression is estimated. The variance of ε is scaled by the total variance of the 
dependent variables in the regression. This operation is equal to dividing the residual 
sum of squares by the total sum of squares, or 1 – R2. The resulting psi is a firm-
specific return variability in a given year relative to the total return variability. We 
also employed this variable in Chapter 3. 
Informational asymmetry 2: This measure is based on the quality of working 
capital accruals and earnings. Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Lee and Masulis (2007) 
argue that accruals quality is a synonym of earnings quality. They construct a measure 
of accruals quality that maps accruals into cash flow realizations at time t-1, time t, 
and time t+1. Dechow and Dichev suggest that estimation errors in accruals are likely 
to reduce the beneficial role of accruals: the quality of accruals decreases when the 
standard deviation of the estimation errors increases. Since poor accounting quality 
raises investor uncertainty about a firm, the standard deviation of the estimation errors 
should be positively related to informational asymmetry. 
We use McNichols’ (2002) modification of the model, which is: 
 
Cat = γ0 + γ1*cfot + γ2*cfot+1 + γ3*cfot-1 + γ4*Δsalest + γ5*ppet + νt,  (30) 
 
where Ca are the total current accruals, cfo are the cash flows from operation, and ppe 
is the value of property, plant, and equipment. The term νt is the error term. Since we 
are interested in the firm-specific variation, we take the standard deviation of this 
error term (with a minimum number of observations of four consecutive years, and a 
maximum of fifteen).  
High informational asymmetry increases the need for signaling, and therefore the 
likelihood that firms will add a stock repurchase to their convertible offering. We test 
the effects of the three signaling proxy variables on the decision to combine a 
convertible debt offering with a stock repurchase in a probit model, in which the 
dependent variable is equal to one for combined offerings, and equal to zero for 
uncombined offerings. Table 34 shows the results. 
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Table 34: Impact of Firm and Bond Characteristics on the Decision to Combine a Convertible Issue with 
a Stock Repurchase 
 
This table presents the results of the estimation of a probit model. The sample period is 2003-2006. The 
dependent variable is a dummy that equals one for combined offerings and zero for uncombined offerings. We 
label a convertible issue as a combined offering when the firm announces to use part of the proceeds of the 
convertible debt offering to repurchase stock, or when both transactions are announced on the same date. 
Decrease EPS is the change in diluted earnings per share that would occur without a stock repurchase. Bonus is 
the correlation between the change in annual CEO cash bonus (reported in Execucomp) and the change in 
diluted EPS by 2-digit SIC code for the year before the offering. Both Decrease EPS and Bonus are calculated 
as in Marquardt and Wiedman (2005). Delta is the convertible’s sensitivity to small stock price changes. The 
stock price run-up is the firm-specific raw return over the 75 trading days before the announcement date, and is 
computed with CRSP Item RETX. Log(assets) corresponds to the natural logarithm of Compustat Item 6 
(measured at the fiscal year-end preceding the announcement date). Book leverage is Compustat Item 9 
divided by Item 6. The market-to-book ratio is computed with Compustat data as (Item 25 * Item 199 – Item 
60 – Item 6) / Item 6. Book leverage and market-to-book ratio are measured at the fiscal year-end preceding 
the announcement date. Volatility represents the stock return variance in the year prior to the issue date, and is 
estimated as the standard deviation of the monthly returns (reported in CRSP). Informational asymmetry 1 
measures the firm-specific variation in stock prices; Informational asymmetry 2 measures the quality of 
working capital accruals and earnings. We also include industry dummies based on the Fama-French 12-
industry classification as well as year dummies. We report t-statistics (calculated with Huber-White standard 
errors to control for heteroscedasticity) in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.  
  Combined offering 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Decrease EPS  2.236 
(1.31) 
 2.635 
(0.92) 
 0.859 
(0.41) 
Bonus  -0.385 
(-0.90) 
 -0.545 
(-0.97) 
 -0.217 
(-0.49) 
Delta  -0.328 
(-0.75) 
 -0.259 
(-0.36) 
 -0.159 
(-0.30) 
Stock price run-up  -26.383 
(-0.87) 
 -72.929 
(-1.41) 
 -39.547 
(-1.26) 
Log(assets)  -0.028 
(-0.19) 
 0.257 
(1.11) 
 0.031 
(0.18) 
Book leverage  -0.034 
(-0.12) 
 0.281 
(0.62) 
 0.018 
(0.06) 
Market-to-book ratio  0.099 
(1.59) 
 0.107 
(1.36) 
 0.133* 
(1.74) 
Volatility  -3.063* 
(-1.96) 
 -4.601* 
(-1.80) 
 -2.196 
(1.50) 
Informational asymmetry 1    -0.035 
(-0.06) 
  
Informational asymmetry 2      -1.391 
(-0.86) 
N  425  282  347 
Pseudo R2  23.1%  40.2%  24.7% 
 
None of the signaling proxies has a significant influence on the decision to 
combine a convertible with a stock repurchase. Hence, we do not find evidence that 
firms combine convertible issues and stock repurchases to signal their true value to 
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the market. 50  The relatively high pseudo R2 of 23.1% of the estimation can be 
explained by the significance of year dummy variables (not reported for parsimony). 
 
5.5.2 Optimize capital structure 
 
The decision to add a stock repurchase to a convertible issue could be explained 
by the fact that firms want to move towards their optimal debt ratios. Repurchasing 
stock increases the debt ratio, which could bring firms closer to their target debt ratios 
if they were previously underlevered (Dittmar (2000)). If this explanation holds, then 
firms that combine their convertible issue with a stock repurchase should be more 
underlevered than other convertible issuers. Our findings are not consistent with this 
prediction. More particularly, Table 31 shows that combined and single convertible 
debt issuers are not significantly different with respect to their debt ratios. Moreover, 
they are similar with respect to other firm-specific characteristics (see Table 34) and 
come from the same industries (see Table 30), which casts doubt on the conjecture 
that they have different target debt ratios.  
To more formally examine the possibility that the combined offerings are 
motivated by the wish to optimize capital structure, we extend the probit analysis 
reported in Model 1 of Table 34 with two variables. The first variable captures the 
difference between firms’ leverage and the industry median leverage, in which the 
industries are based on the Fama-French 12-industry classification. The second 
variable is the marginal tax rate of firms (before interest expenses), which is 
downloaded from John Graham’s website. Graham (1999) argues that firms with 
higher marginal tax rates have a significantly higher target debt ratio, due to the tax 
deductibility of interest payments. We thus expect a significant positive impact of 
both the deviation from the target debt ratio and the marginal tax rate on the decision 
to add a stock repurchase to a convertible debt offering. We find that none of these 
additional two variables is significant (detailed results not reported for parsimony). 
We therefore conclude that the adjustment of firms’ leverage towards a target debt 
                                            
50  The estimation also includes two earnings management proxies of Marquardt and Wiedman (2005): 
“Decrease EPS” and “Bonus”. Earnings management potentially has an effect on the choice to repurchase 
stock since a stock repurchase decreases the number of outstanding shares and therefore mitigates (short-term) 
decreases in diluted earnings per share. The variable Decrease EPS was also tested in Chapter 4; we find that 
both in Chapter 4 and in Table 35 the variable’s coefficient has the right sign but the effect is not significant. 
Bonus measures the correlation between the change in the annual CEO cash bonus and the change in the 
diluted EPS by 2-digit SIC code for the fiscal year before the offering (only if the number of observations for 
each industry-year is larger than five). We obtain CEO cash bonus data from Execucomp and expect that 
managers are more concerned with diluted earnings per share when their bonus plans relate to this measure, 
i.e., when Bonus is high. We do not find the expected sign for Bonus, indicating that earnings management is 
not a strong motivation for additional stock repurchases (contrary to cash settlements and call spread overlays; 
see Chapter 4). 
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ratio does not drive the decision to combine a convertible debt offering with a stock 
repurchase. 
  
5.5.3 Combined offerings from the perspective of stock repurchasers 
 
Throughout the chapter, we have assumed that firms engaging in a combined 
offering add a stock repurchase to a convertible issue. One argument in favor of this 
reasoning is that, on average, the convertible issue is about twice the size of the stock 
repurchase. However, the possibility exists that the initial decision is to repurchase 
stock, and that the convertible issue is added simply to obtain funds for the repurchase. 
Therefore, we also examine the differences between pure stock repurchasers and firms 
that combine stock repurchases with convertible issues.  
If the main motivation for the combined offerings is to repurchase stock, we 
predict that firms engaging in combined offerings have less slack (i.e., cash and 
marketable securities as a percentage of total assets) than normal stock repurchasers – 
otherwise, the former firms would not have to issue convertibles in order to obtain the 
necessary funding. We do not find significant differences in the amount of slack 
between firms in combined offerings and uncombined stock repurchasers, however (t-
test statistic for the difference in means equals -0.32). Also, we have checked whether 
firms engaging in a combined offering regularly announce stock repurchases and are 
therefore expected to do so again. We find that, for the combined issuers, the number 
of announced stock repurchases over the five years preceding the convertible debt 
announcement does not significantly differ from the numbers for separate stock 
repurchasers or convertible issuers.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
In this study, we examine why U.S. convertible debt issuers add a stock 
repurchase to their offering. We argue that the combinations of convertible debt 
offerings and stock repurchases result from an interplay between convertible debt 
issuers and arbitrageurs. Convertible arbitrageurs generally short the issuers’ common 
stock in the open market, which is an undesired side effect as these short sales create a 
downward pressure on the stock price. The stock repurchase serves to facilitate the 
convertible debt arbitrageurs in obtaining their short position, which mitigates the 
downward price pressure of the convertible debt issuance.  
We obtain strong evidence consistent with this hypothesis. First, open market 
short-selling activity around convertible debt issuance is lower for combined offerings. 
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Second, issue date abnormal returns are significantly less negative for combined 
issuers than for issuers that do not repurchase stock. Third, the number of shares that a 
firm announces to repurchase correlates strongly with the expected short positions of 
convertible arbitrageurs. Finally, the speed with which stock is repurchased is 
substantially higher in the combined transactions than in pure stock repurchases. 
Combined, this evidence indicates that convertible arbitrage provides an important 
reason for convertible debt issuers to repurchase stock. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Summary and concluding comments 
 
 
This thesis consists of studies that examine firms’ financing choices. We study 
debt financing, equity financing, and convertible securities, which are securities that 
combine debt and equity characteristics. 
In the first study we collect data on firms’ financing decisions over the period 
1971-2005. Our intention is to use these data to examine whether firms prefer debt 
financing over equity financing in case external financing is needed, which is 
predicted by the pecking order theory of Myers (1984). Previous evidence on this 
issue is mixed. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) for example provide evidence that 
firms do prefer debt over equity, while Frank and Goyal (2003) find evidence that this 
is not the case. Fama and French (2005) even go as far as claiming that the pecking 
order theory is dead. 
We differ from previous studies by disentangling the various financing needs that 
firms face. We first examine situations in which firms have relatively small financing 
requirements; for these small needs they are not restricted in issuing either debt or 
equity. We find that firms prefer debt financing in this situation. The second situation 
deals with larger financing needs, in which firms are restricted in issuing debt. We 
report that equity financing becomes the selected choice for large financing needs. 
Firms that have negative financing needs, i.e. have more funds than they need for their 
investments, prefer to repurchase debt over repurchasing equity. 
In the second study of this thesis we extend our analysis of the pecking order 
theory. We compare the pecking order theory with the static tradeoff theory, which 
argues that firms make financing decisions in order to move towards a target debt 
ratio. The question we ask is: when firms are not restricted in issuing securities, do 
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they target a specific mix of debt and equity, or do they follow a pecking order in 
which debt financing is preferred over equity financing? To answer this question, we 
focus on situations in which firms are not restricted in their financing choice and in 
which firms have more debt than you would expect on the basis of their supposed 
target debt ratios, which are determined by looking at firm characteristics. For the 
firms in this situation, a debt issue would provide evidence in favor of the pecking 
order theory, while an equity issue yields evidence for the static tradeoff theory. 
We find that for most firms the pecking order theory is a better descriptor of their 
financing behavior than the static tradeoff theory: when firms are not restricted in 
their debt issuing, they prefer debt financing over equity financing, even when they 
already have surpassed their supposed target debt ratios. We further find that firms 
repeatedly make financing decisions in line with a specific capital structure theory: a 
firm that acts in line with the pecking order theory in a given year, is more likely to do 
so again in a subsequent year, while a firm that acts in line with the static tradeoff 
theory in a given year is more likely to keep making financing decisions in line with 
this theory.  
The other two studies of this dissertation focus on convertible securities. These 
securities are structured as a bond or preferred stock, but can be converted into a pre-
determined number of common shares. In this way, convertible security holders 
benefit when the share price of the firm rises. 
The third study examines the design features of convertibles. Design choices that 
issuers face are for example the fixed income choice (convertible bonds or convertible 
preferred stock) and the settlement choice (settlement in cash or stock). These design 
choices are particularly interesting since they provide information on the external 
financing costs that are important for security offerings.  
One of the external financing costs relates to taxes: firms that choose convertible 
debt instead of convertible preferred stock generally get a tax benefit since the interest 
payments related to debt are tax deductible. We find that convertible issuing firms 
with higher needs of reducing taxes are more likely to select convertible debt as the 
fixed income component. We also find that some firms favor convertible bonds over 
convertible preferred stock because the required interest payments lower the free cash 
flows in the hands of managers, and thus reduce the chance that managers make 
investment decision that benefit the manager instead of the firm. Another source of 
financing costs relates to payment of the principal at maturity: a bond requires 
payment of the principal at maturity, while preferred stock generally has no finite 
maturity. When firms are unable to pay the principal at maturity, they need to 
refinance. In line with our expectations, we find that firms with the highest probability 
of needing costly refinancing favor convertible preferred stock over convertible bonds. 
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A final finding on the design choices of convertible securities relates to earnings 
management. Particular designs (like cash settlements) lead to higher reported diluted 
earnings per share than other designs. We find that earnings management is an 
important factor in the design of convertible securities. 
The fourth study examines the relation between convertible securities and stock 
repurchases. We observe that in the U.S., one-third of the convertible debt issuers in 
2006 simultaneously repurchases stock. We argue that convertible debt issuers buy 
back their stock in order to facilitate short selling by convertible debt arbitrageurs, 
which mitigates the negative stock price reaction at the convertible debt offering. In 
line with this prediction, we find that issue date abnormal returns are significantly less 
negative for combined offerings than for uncombined convertible issues. We also 
document that convertible arbitrage explains both the size and the timing of the stock 
repurchases. 
This thesis contributes to various research areas. First, we contribute to studies on 
empirical tests of the pecking order theory. We show that tests of the pecking order 
theory should distinguish small financing needs from large financing needs, and 
should distinguish issue decisions from repurchase decisions. Second, we contribute 
to the ongoing battle between the pecking order theory and the static tradeoff theory. 
We show that the pecking order theory is a better predictor of firms’ financing 
decisions than the static tradeoff theory. Third, we quantify a firm’s debt capacity. 
Although the concept of the debt capacity has been used throughout the pecking order 
literature, we do not know of attempts to construct an advanced empirical measure of 
this concept in terms of a debt ratio. Fourth, we extend previous studies on convertible 
designs by jointly evaluating the choices in convertible security design. Fifth, we are 
the first to closely examine cash settlement features, which have been a popular 
innovation in convertible security design, and to empirically test the motivations for 
firms to combine a convertible debt offering with a stock repurchase. Sixth, we 
contribute to the literature on the impact of short-selling activity on corporate actions. 
Lamont (2004) describes a variety of methods that firms use to impede short selling, 
including legal threats and lawsuits. We document that expected short sales also 
influence firms’ capital structure decisions. Seventh, we contribute to the literature on 
stock repurchases. Prior studies have shown that stock repurchases tend to be used to 
signal good prospects (Bhattacharya (1979), Vermaelen (1984)), to reduce the amount 
of free cash flows at management’s disposal (Jensen (1986)), to bring the firm closer 
to its optimal debt ratio (Dittmar (2000)), to reduce earnings per share dilution 
(Weisbenner (2000), Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong (2003)), and to deter takeovers 
(Bagwell (1991), Billett and Xue (2007)). We add another important motivation for 
repurchasing stock, being the avoidance of negative price effects that are related to 
open market short-selling activity.  
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An interesting direction for further research is to incorporate hybrid securities in 
tests of the standard capital structure theories. The pecking order theory, for example, 
makes clear predictions about convertible securities in the hierarchy of financing 
choices: when external financing is needed, firms prefer debt, then convertible 
securities, and issue equity only as a last resort. Incorporating convertible bonds in 
tests of the pecking order theory provides new evidence on the empirical validity of 
this theory. 
Another direction for further research is the quest for a unified capital structure 
theory, in which the proven validities of all theories are combined. The market timing 
theory, for example, in which firms issue equity when shares are overvalued (see 
Baker and Wurgler (2002)), provides evidence on firms’ financing decisions that is 
not evident from the standard pecking order and static tradeoff theory. Except 
focusing on a financing hierarchy or a tradeoff between tax benefits and bankruptcy 
costs, a unified theory should therefore also be able to explain market timing behavior. 
Other potentially important factors for a unified theory follow from extensive research 
conducted on capital structure decisions. These factors include the reported earnings 
per share (see Chapter 4), credit ratings (see Kisgen (2006)), and financial flexibility 
(Graham and Harvey (2001)). This wide range of factors makes it however 
complicated to construct one unified theory. Especially since the choice for debt or 
equity financing can also be related to less obvious factors, like a firm’s corporate 
social responsibility policy (see Derwall and Verwijmeren (2007)) and whether a firm 
is engaged in franchising (see De Jong, Jiang, and Verwijmeren (2008)). The quest for 
a unified theory is further complicated by the possibility that different factors are 
important in different circumstances (Myers (2001)).  
Another research area that has the potential of improving current capital structure 
models is the area of behavioral finance. This research area focuses on the 
psychological factors that influence decision-making. Hackbarth (2008) argues that 
the overconfidence of managers is likely to influence financing decisions. 
Incorporating behavioral issues into capital structure models is likely to improve the 
predictive power of these models. 
Regarding the designs of convertible securities, an interesting venue is to more 
closely examine the role of financial advisors. It is likely that specific advisors 
construct new design features and contact firms to include these innovations into their 
security designs. This line of research has the potential of extending our knowledge on 
the diffusion of innovations. Also, studying the fees of advisors that are innovators in 
the convertible market can shed new light on the benefits of being the innovator (see 
also Tufano (1989)). 
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A final research direction that builds on this thesis relates to the importance of 
short sales. It is likely that firms aim to mitigate the negative price effects of short 
sales in other areas than convertible arbitrage. In mergers, for example, it is known 
that arbitrageurs take short positions in the acquirer’s stock. Studying firms’ reactions 
to these short sale strategies can further deepen our understanding of the implications 
of short sales.  
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Dit proefschrift behandelt de financieringsbeslissingen van ondernemingen. Ieder 
jaar trekken ondernemingen voor miljarden euro’s aan financiering aan, bijvoorbeeld 
voor het bekostigen van investeringen. In sommige gevallen opteren ondernemingen 
voor het aantrekken van vreemd vermogen, in de vorm van een banklening of door het 
uitgeven van obligaties. In andere gevallen wordt gekozen voor een aandelenemissie, 
of worden bijvoorbeeld converteerbare preferente aandelen uitgegeven. Dit 
proefschrift is een bundeling van vier empirische studies die het financieringsgedrag 
van ondernemingen nader bestuderen. 
Het vinden van de optimale financieringsbeslissing voor ondernemingen is een 
vraagstuk waar Nobelprijzen voor zijn uitgereikt. Een belangrijk beginpunt voor de 
beantwoording van dit vraagstuk stamt uit 1958, wanneer Modigliani en Miller 
demonstreren dat in een perfecte markt de waarde van een onderneming onafhankelijk 
is van de manier van financieren. Met andere woorden, in een perfecte markt is een 
onderneming bestaande uit 100% eigen vermogen even veel waard als eenzelfde 
onderneming bestaande uit 100% vreemd vermogen, of uit een combinatie van eigen 
en vreemd vermogen. 
In de werkelijke, niet-perfecte markt zijn er echter factoren te benoemen die de 
keuze tussen eigen en vreemd vermogen kunnen beïnvloeden. Een belangrijk voordeel 
van vreemd vermogen is dat de rentebetalingen belastingaftrekbaar zijn. 
Dividenduitkeringen, als behorende bij eigen vermogen, zijn dit niet. Een nadeel van 
vreemd vermogen is dat de kansen op een (kostbaar) faillissement toenemen. Het niet 
kunnen voldoen aan de rente- of aflossingsverplichtingen stellen de vreemd 
vermogenverschaffers immers in de gelegenheid een faillissement aan te vragen. 
Agent-principaal problemen kunnen ook de keuze tussen vreemd en eigen vermogen 
beïnvloeden, want hoewel de aandeelhouders de eigenaar zijn van een onderneming, 
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de topmanagers nemen de dagelijkse beslissingen. Een voorbeeld van een agent-
principaal probleem is het overdadig aanschaffen van statusverhogende objecten 
(bijvoorbeeld bedrijfsvliegtuigen) door managers, welke geen waarde creëren voor de 
aandeelhouders.  
De voor- en nadelen van vreemd en eigen vermogen hebben geleid tot een 
algemene theorie betreffende kapitaalstructuurbeslissingen: de statische afruiltheorie. 
Deze theorie stelt dat de optimale financieringsmix voor ondernemingen voortkomt 
uit de voor- en nadelen van vreemd en eigen vermogen. Ondernemingen trekken 
vreemd vermogen aan om te profiteren van belastingvoordelen, maar zorgen ook voor 
eigen vermogen op de balans om bijvoorbeeld de kans op faillissement in te perken. 
Iedere onderneming heeft daardoor een eigen optimale financieringsmix.  
Een andere invloedrijke kapitaalstructuurtheorie is de pecking order theorie. Deze 
theorie stelt dat belastingen en faillissementskosten ondergeschikt zijn aan problemen 
gelieerd aan informatieasymmetrie. Myers en Majluf (1984) en Myers (1984) tonen 
aan dat informatieasymmetrie leidt tot een financieringshiërarchie, waarin financieren 
met intern geld bovenaan staat en financieren met aandelenemissies onderaan. Met 
andere woorden, er bestaat een “pecking order” voor financieringen: ondernemingen 
hebben een voorkeur voor het financieren met intern geld, daarna voor het financieren 
met vreemd vermogen, en zullen slechts financieren door middel van een 
aandelenemissie als de maximale schuldcapaciteit bereikt is. 
Empirisch onderzoek heeft bewijs gevonden voor beide theorieën. Hovakimian, 
Opler, en Titman (2001) analyseren de uitgiftekeuzes van Amerikaanse 
ondernemingen voor de periode 1979-1997. Ze schatten de “optimale” schuldratio van 
ondernemingen aan de hand van ondernemingskenmerken en testen of de afstand 
tussen de huidige schuldratio en deze optimale schuldratio invloed uitoefent op het 
uitgiftebeleid van ondernemingen. De conclusie is dat een hogere optimale schuldratio 
ten opzichte van de huidige kapitaalstructuur zorgt voor een grotere kans op een 
schulduitgifte. Deze bevinding is in lijn met de voorspellingen van de statische 
afruiltheorie. Flannery en Rangan (2006) vinden dat de gemiddelde onderneming in 
een jaar één derde van de afstand tussen de optimale en huidige schuldratio overbrugt. 
Shyam-Sunder en Myers (1999) introduceren een empirische test voor de pecking 
order theorie. In deze test wordt het uitgiftebeleid van ondernemingen vergeleken met 
de externe financieringsbehoefte. Indien ondernemingen een voorkeur hebben voor 
het uitgeven van schuld boven aandelenemissies, dan zal iedere toename van de 
externe financieringsbehoefte worden opgevuld met vreemd vermogen. Shyam-
Sunder en Myers gebruiken een dataset van grote, volwassen Amerikaanse 
ondernemingen, en schatten in een regressiemodel de invloed van de 
financieringsbehoefte op de schulduitgifte. Ze vinden een coëfficiënt van 0.75 en 
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concluderen dat het grootste gedeelte van de ondernemingen een voorkeur voor 
vreemd vermogen tentoonspreidt, en dus in lijn handelt met de pecking order theorie. 
Verschillende studies zijn ingegaan op de bevindingen van Shyam-Sunder en 
Myers. Chirinko and Singha (2000) zetten vraagtekens bij de regressiespecificatie die 
gebruikt wordt, en beargumenteren dat de resultaten sterk worden beïnvloed door 
grote financieringsbehoeften. Frank en Goyal (2003) imiteren de studie van Shyam-
Sunder en Myers voor kleinere ondernemingen, en vinden voor deze ondernemingen 
een lagere coëfficiënt. Dit lijkt tegen de pecking order theorie in te gaan, omdat het 
juist de kleine ondernemingen zijn die kampen met informatieasymmetrie en dus 
aandelenemissies willen vermijden. 
In de eerste twee studies van dit proefschrift gaan we dieper in op de statische 
afruiltheorie en de pecking order theorie. De eerste studie heeft als doel de 
testprocedure voor de pecking order theorie te verbeteren. We verzamelen hiervoor 
gegevens van beursgenoteerde Amerikaanse ondernemingen voor de periode 1971-
2005. Er wordt een opsplitsing gemaakt van de verschillende investeringsgroottes van 
ondernemingen: sommige ondernemingen hebben in een bepaald jaar een grote som 
aan financieringen nodig, daar waar andere ondernemingen in hetzelfde jaar slechts 
een kleine financieringsbehoefte hebben. Daarnaast kan het voorkomen dat de 
financieringsbehoefte negatief is: er wordt in een jaar meer verdiend dan er aan 
investeringen wordt uitgegeven. Het bij elkaar voegen van de verschillende groottes, 
zoals in Shyam-Sunder en Myers en in Frank en Goyal, kan een vertekend beeld 
geven van de voorspellingskracht van de pecking order theorie. 
We vinden dat ondernemingen schuldfinanciering boven aandelenemissies 
prefereren voor relatief kleinere financieringbehoeften. Gemiddeld genomen wordt 
een toename van de financieringsbehoefte met een dollar gefinancierd met 73 
dollarcenten aan vreemd vermogen, zo lang deze behoefte kleiner is dan 5.9% van de 
balanswaarde. Voor grotere financieringsbehoeften wordt vaker gekozen voor 
aandelenemissies. Zo wordt voor financieringsbehoeften van meer dan 23.7% van de 
totale balanswaarde nog maar 9 cent van een extra benodigde dollar opgevuld met 
vreemd vermogen. We concluderen dat dit verschil wordt veroorzaakt door de 
maximale schuldratio van ondernemingen: voor grote financieringsbehoeften is het 
voor veel ondernemingen onmogelijk schuld aan te trekken zonder in financiële 
moeilijkheden te geraken. Daarnaast zijn het vaak de ondernemingen in financiële 
moeilijkheden die grotere financieringsbehoeften hebben. We kunnen hierdoor 
verklaren waarom grotere, stabielere ondernemingen meer in lijn met de pecking 
order theorie handelen dan kleinere, minder stabiele ondernemingen: het zijn de 
grotere ondernemingen die minder beperkingen hebben in het uitgeven van vreemd 
vermogen. We vinden verder dat een overschot aan inkomsten in een bepaald jaar 
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vooral wordt gebruikt om de uitstaande schuld te verminderen, en niet voor het 
terugkopen van aandelen. 
De tweede studie van dit proefschrift vergelijkt de pecking order theorie met de 
statische afruiltheorie. In verschillende situaties hebben de pecking order theorie en de 
statische afruiltheorie gelijke voorspellingen. Als een onderneming bijvoorbeeld een 
erg lage schuldratio heeft, dan voorspellen beide theorieën dat de onderneming een 
eventuele financieringsbehoefte opvult met schuld. Een interessante situatie is echter 
als beide theorieën tegengestelde voorspellingen hebben. Een voorbeeld van een 
dergelijke situatie is als een onderneming boven de “optimale” schuldratio zit, maar 
nog wel schuld kan uitgeven zonder in financiële problemen te geraken. De pecking 
order theorie stelt in dit geval dat een financieringsbehoefte nog steeds wordt 
opgevuld met schuld, daar waar de statische afruiltheorie stelt dat eigen vermogen zal 
worden uitgegeven om de schuldratio te verlagen. We concentreren ons daarom op 
(Amerikaanse) ondernemingen in situaties waar de predicties verschillen. De optimale 
schuldratio in de afruiltheorie wordt geschat door te kijken naar de grootte, 
winstgevendheid, groeipotentieel, het gedeelte vaste activa, en de bedrijfstak van een 
onderneming. We stellen een onderneming in staat tot een schulduitgifte totdat deze 
uitgifte de kredietrating van de onderneming zal verlagen naar speculatief.  
We vinden dat de meeste ondernemingen nog steeds vreemd vermogen uitgeven 
en daarmee handelen in lijn met de pecking order theorie. We concluderen verder dat 
ondernemingen relatief trouw zijn in het volgen van een kapitaalstructuurtheorie: een 
onderneming die volgens de pecking order theorie handelt in een bepaald jaar, heeft 
een grotere kans dit opnieuw te doen in het daaropvolgende jaar. Een onderneming die 
volgens de statische afruiltheorie handelt in een bepaald jaar, heeft een grotere kans 
weer volgens de statische afruiltheorie te handelen in het daaropvolgende jaar. 
Specifieke ondernemingskenmerken zijn geen sterke verklaring voor het handelen in 
lijn met de pecking order theorie of de statische afruiltheorie. 
Onze bevindingen in de eerste twee studies hebben de volgende bijdragen tot de 
literatuur. Ten eerste verbeteren we de testmethode voor de pecking order theorie, en 
zijn we in staat te verklaren waarom kleine ondernemingen minder lijken te handelen 
in lijn met de pecking order theorie. Een tweede contributie is het modelleren van de 
maximale schuldratio voor bedrijven om de kredietrating niet tot speculatief te laten 
degraderen. Hierdoor zijn we in staat de predicties van de statische afruiltheorie en de 
pecking order theorie tegen elkaar te testen. In tegenstelling tot veel andere studies 
concentreren wij ons daarom niet op een enkele kapitaalstructuurtheorie, maar nemen 
wij de interacties van twee verschillende theorieën mee. We vinden dat de pecking 
order theorie beter in staat is financieringsbeslissingen te verklaren dan de statische 
afruiltheorie.  
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In de derde en vierde studie van dit proefschrift verleggen we de focus naar 
specifieke financieringsinstrumenten. We zijn in het bijzonder geïnteresseerd in 
instrumenten die kenmerken van vreemd vermogen en eigen vermogen combineren, 
en concentreren ons daarom op converteerbare vermogenstitels. Deze instrumenten 
zijn gestructureerd als een obligatie of preferent aandeel, maar kunnen worden 
omgezet in een vooraf vastgesteld aantal aandelen. Op deze manier profiteren de 
houders van converteerbare instrumenten van een stijging van de aandeelprijs.  
Converteerbare vermogenstitels zijn relatief populaire financieringsinstrumenten. 
Alleen al in de Verenigde Staten is er met converteerbare instrumenten meer dan 100 
miljard dollar opgehaald in 2007. Studies naar de motivaties voor het uitgeven van 
converteerbare vermogenstitels hebben geleid tot twee verschillende stromingen. De 
eerste stroming beargumenteert dat de belangrijkste motivatie voor het uitgeven van 
converteerbare vermogenstitels is dat deze instrumenten uitermate geschikt zijn om 
aandelen te verkrijgen via een “indirecte” manier, dat wil zeggen zonder de negatieve 
aankondigingseffecten die vaak horen bij directe aandelenemissies. De tweede 
stroming stelt dat converteerbare instrumenten worden uitgegeven door 
ondernemingen met hoge schuldgerelateerde kosten; converteerbare instrumenten 
dienen hier als een alternatief voor reguliere obligaties. 
In de derde studie bekijken we de specifieke kenmerken van recente 
converteerbare vermogenstitels. De keuzes die uitgevers van converteerbare 
vermogenstitels maken zijn bijvoorbeeld de structuur van de vaste 
inkomenscomponent (obligatie of preferent aandeel) en of er wordt omgezet in 
aandelen of geld. We vinden dat belastingen belangrijk zijn voor de structuur van de 
vaste inkomenscomponent: ondernemingen die sterk profiteren van 
belastingvoordelen kiezen vaker voor een obligatie, vanwege de aftrekbaarheid van de 
rentebetalingen. Sommige ondernemingen verkiezen ook obligaties boven preferente 
aandelen vanwege een ander aspect die aan de rentebetalingen van obligaties zitten: 
door deze rentebetalingen worden agent-principaal problemen verkleind aangezien de 
managers minder vrije kasstromen tot hun beschikking hebben. Daarnaast wordt de 
keuze voor de vaste inkomenscomponent bepaald doordat preferente aandelen over 
het algemeen geen vaste looptijd hebben. Hierdoor zijn deze instrumenten meer 
geschikt voor ondernemingen die willen voorkomen dat ze uitstaand vermogen 
moeten herfinancieren. 
We vinden dat winstmanagement vooral belangrijk is voor de keuze tussen 
conversie in aandelen of kasgeld (ter waarde van de aandelen). Hoewel beide keuzes 
de onderneming in principe evenveel kosten, zorgt een conversie in aandelen voor een 
toename van het aantal uitstaande aandelen en daardoor voor een daling van de winst 
per aandeel (bij een gelijkblijvende winst). Onder Amerikaanse verslaggevingsregels 
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vindt de toename van het aantal aandelen voor bepaalde winst per aandeel kengetallen 
al plaats voordat een werkelijke conversie plaatsvindt. Ons onderzoek toont aan dat 
ondernemingen die meerdere maatregelen nemen om de winst per aandeelcijfers te 
beïnvloeden ook vaker opteren voor conversie in kasgeld. 
De vierde studie van dit proefschrift behandelt de relatie tussen de uitgifte van 
converteerbare vermogenstitels en het terugkopen van aandelen. We observeren dat in 
2006 één derde van de converteerbare emissies in de Verenigde Staten gepaard gaat 
met aandelenterugkopen. We stellen dat deze relatie wordt veroorzaakt doordat 
arbitragepartijen (zoals hedgefondsen) een positie in converteerbare instrumenten 
combineren met een short positie in normale aandelen van de onderneming. Deze 
short posities zorgen normaal gesproken voor een neerwaartse druk op de aandeelprijs. 
Ondernemingen kunnen deze druk voorkomen door tegen een vooraf afgesproken 
prijs de (geleende) aandelen van de arbitrageurs via een tussenpartij in te kopen. De 
arbitrageurs kunnen op deze manier hun short positie verkrijgen zonder tegen een 
onzekere prijs in de markt te moeten handelen, daar waar ondernemingen voorkomen 
dat de aandeelprijs onder druk komt te staan. 
We vinden dat arbitragestrategieën inderdaad gerelateerd zijn aan de 
aandelenterugkopen. Ondernemingen die de uitgifte van een converteerbare 
vermogenstitel combineren met een aandelenterugkoop hebben een negatieve 
koersreactie van kleiner dan 1%, terwijl andere emissies van converteerbare 
vermogenstitels gepaard gaan met een koersdaling van meer dan 4%. Dit verschil 
wordt verklaard doordat er voor ondernemingen met een aandelenterugkoop minder 
short transacties in de open markt plaatsvinden. We tonen verder aan dat zowel de 
grootte als de snelheid van de aandelenterugkopen verklaard kunnen worden door de 
strategieën van arbitragepartijen. 
Onze studies naar converteerbare vermogenstitels voegen op verschillende 
manieren toe aan de literatuur. Door het gezamenlijk analyseren van de verschillende 
keuzes die uitgevers van converteerbare instrumenten maken, verschaffen we inzicht 
in de relevante financieringskosten voor ondernemingen. We verklaren tevens de 
populariteit van structuren als conversie in kasgeld en simultane aandelenterugkopen. 
Daarnaast tonen we het belang van verwachte short posities aan voor het 
financieringsbeleid van ondernemingen.  
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l)EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON DEBT, EQUITY, AND CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES
This dissertation consists of four empirical studies on firms’ financing decisions. In the
first two studies, we investigate the debt-equity choice for a large number of U.S. firms.
We find that firms prefer debt financing over equity financing in case a debt issue allows
the firm to keep its investment grade rating. When the financing requirement becomes
sufficiently large, firms are more likely to choose equity financing. We find that most firms
repurchase debt instead of equity in case they have excess funds. The last two studies of
this dissertation deal with convertible security design. Since convertible securities combine
debt and equity characteristics, the specific structure of these instruments can provide
further insight into the relevant costs and benefits of debt and equity. We find that taxes,
the costs of refinancing, and the costs of managerial discretion are important drivers of
convertible security design. We further find that the desire to manage earnings has been
responsible for recent innovations in the convertible market. Convertible arbitrage drives
the innovation of combining a convertible issue with a stock repurchase: the stock repurchase
serves to mitigate the negative price impact that results from the short sales of arbitrageurs.
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